Join us to buid a data base for Nembe Day
If you are intersted in the Nembe (Ibe) Day idea, then please contact me at idumange@yahoo.com or contact Aye Omuso in New Jersey and Dan Dede in New York. Please include your contact addresses (including emails)and phone #s. Please also indicate when and how you would like to be contacted. Indicate in what capacity you would like to volunteer or just indicate that you are not interested in volunteering at this time but would attend the celebrations. It is important that we know how many people will attend the Nembe Day celebrations and also where to hold our first Nembe Day Celebrations. I am thinking New York, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles or Washingston DC. More city suggestions are highly welcomed. Suggestions on how best to implement Nembe day is highly welcomed. So please, keep your comments coming and contact every Nembe person you know (from Akassa to Oluasiri) to visit this site and make comments or suggestions and send me, Dan or Aye your info. Please do not limit yourselves to only the Nembe people in the United States. We want to see people from all over the world. We want to make a big splash of fun and ideas. We also welcome suggestions on ideas to be discussed. Also feel free to contact me, if you have problems posting your ideas. Thanks a million... O Nua-o nua-oo! Wanna hear some Nembe music? Try this site and once in, click on the letters in blue; http://www.amadanyo.com/mangrove.html
posted by Idums @ 9:46 PM
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How rich is Nembe? Click here: http://ebendokubo.blogspot.com/2005_06_01_ebendokubo_archive.html
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NIGER DELTA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT
3
Copyright © 2006
United Nations Development Programme,
UN House, Plot 617/618, Diplomatic Zone,
Central Area District, P.M.B. 2851, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without prior permission.
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Table of Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Overview
Chapter One: Introduction
Amazing Paradoxes
Conceptual Framework
Rationale for a Human Development Approach to the Niger Delta
Pitfalls of Traditional Development Planning
Revenue Allocation
The Failure of Governance
A History of Resistance
A Regime of Reforms and Strategies: NEEDS, SEEDS and LEEDS
Methodology:
Data Collection
Secondary Sources
Primary Sources
A General Data Problem
Where is the Niger Delta?
Geography
Geology, Relief, Drainage and Ecological Zones
Climate
The People
Settlement Patterns
Size Distribution of Settlements
Population and Demographic Characteristics
Economy
International Oil Company Activities
Infrastructure and Social Services
Conclusion and Preview of the Report
Chapter Two: The Human Development Situation in the Niger Delta
Poverty in the Niger Delta
The Revenue Base of Human Development
Governance and Poverty
The Challenges of Attaining the MDGs
• Assessing Progress
The Human Development Indices
The HDI for the Niger Delta Region
The HP1-1 for the Niger Delta Region
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Gender Disparities in Human Development
The GDI for the Niger Delta Region
The GEM for the Niger Delta Region
Human Development at the Local Level
o The HDI for Local Government Areas
o The HPI-1 for Local Government Areas
o The GDI for Local Government Areas
o The GEM for Local Government Areas
Conclusion
Chapter Three: Environmental and Social Challenges in the Niger Delta
Poverty and Environmental Sustainability
The State of the Niger Delta Environment
Environmental Problems Not Related to Industry
Environmental Problems Related to Oil Operations
Other Sources of Environmental Problems
Social Impacts
The Oil Companies and the People
Rapid, Uncontrolled Urbanization
Loss of Fishing Grounds
Land Losses and Shortages
Deforestation and Forest Resource Depletion
Occupational Disorientation
The Influx of People into the Niger Delta
Air Pollution and Health
Waste Management and Health
Impacts on Culture, Traditions and Authority Structures
The History of Environmental Management in the Niger Delta
Conclusion
Chapter Four: HIV&AIDS
A Challenge to Sustainable Human Development
The Prevalence of HIV&AIDS in the Niger Delta
Factors Behind the Epidemic
Behavioural Factors
Economic Factors
Socio-cultural Factors
Gender Relationships and HIV&AIDS
Biological Factors
Government Responses
Impacts on Key Sectors
A Multidimensional Strategy
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Conclusion
Chapter Five: Conflict and Conflict Management: Towards Sustainable Peace
Niger Delta, Yesterday and Today
Types of Conflict
Intra-community Conflict
Inter-community Conflict
Inter-ethnic Conflict
Communities and Oil Companies
Governance and Conflict
Economic and Social Costs
The Beneficiaries
Extra Burdens: Women and Youth
Conclusion
Chapter Six: Sustainable Livelihoods
Livelihood Opportunities and Activities
The Informal Sector
Multiple Incomes.
Small and Medium Enterprises
Capital Assets
Human Capital
Natural Capital
Social Capital
Infrastructure
Economic Growth that Promotes Sustainable Livelihoods
The Role of Regional Development Bodies
Livelihoods from the Oil and Gas Industry
Conclusion
Chapter Seven: A Human Development Agenda for the Niger Delta
Why a New Approach to Planning?
Human Development Scenarios
A Human Development Agenda for the Niger Delta
Agenda 1: Peace as the Foundation
Agenda 2: Governance Based on Genuine Democracy, Participation and Accountability
Agenda 3: An Improved and Diversified Economy as the Lever of Progress
Agenda 4: Promoting Social Inclusion
Agenda 5: The Environment as a Basis for Sustainability
Agenda 6: An Integrated Approach to Dealing With HIV&AIDS
Agenda 7: Partnerships for Sustainable Human Development
Conclusion
References
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Appendices
Technical Notes on Human Development Indices
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AU African Union
CPED Centre for Population and Environmental
Development
DFID Department for International Development
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ERML Environmental Resources Management Limited
FGM Female genital mutilation
GDI Gender-related development index
GDP Gross domestic product
GEM Gender empowerment measure
HDI Human development index
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune
deficiency syndrome
HPI-1 Human development index for developing countries
HPI-2 Human development index for selected
OECD countries
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
LEEDS Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LGA Local government area
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NDBDA Niger Delta Basin Development Authority
NDDB Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission
NDES Niger Delta Environmental Survey
NDHS National Demographic and Health Survey
NEDECO The Netherlands Electrical Company
NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy
NEPAD New Partnership for African Development
NGOS Non-governmental organizations
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OMPADEC Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development
Commission
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSOPADEC Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development
Commission
PPP Purchasing power parity
SEEDS State Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy
SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company
STD Sexually transmitted disease
STI Sexually transmitted infection
UAE United Arab Emirates
UNAIDS United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
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UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
FOREWORD
Over the past four decades, the issues confronting the Niger Delta region have caused increasing
national and international concern. The region produces immense oil wealth and has become the
engine of Nigeria’s economy. But it also presents a paradox, because these vast revenues have
barely touched the delta’s own pervasive local poverty. Today, there are formidable challenges to
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sustainable human development in the region, including the conflicts over resources among
communities, and between communities and oil companies.
The delta’s human development dilemma raises the question of why abundant human and natural
resources have had so little impact on poverty. Exploring this conundrum is the purpose of this
human development report, the first for the Niger Delta. The report is a component of an
integrated development programme for the delta region. Its overall objective is to promote
sustainable poverty reduction by strengthening local governance and participatory planning,
ensuring sustainable use of renewable natural resources and constructing social infrastructure.
The report analyses the various dimensions of the human development challenges in the region,
with a particular focus on women and youth, and proposes a people-centred development agenda
grounded in the region’s natural, human and social capital.
The imperative for a new development agenda arises from the fact that past development
planning efforts have failed to adequately address the region’s needs. In spite of the efforts of
federal and state governments, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and oil
companies to enhance the well-being of people in the delta, wide disparities in development
outcomes persist, and the region compares poorly with the progress in other oil-producing
countries in the world. In many cases, the conditions of rural communities where crude oil is
produced are deplorable, with severe environmental degradation, and no access to safe drinking
water, electricity and roads. Among the people living there, the results have been disillusionment,
frustration about their increasing deprivation and deep-rooted mistrust.
This report recommends a new development paradigm to address these concerns. In a
seven-point development agenda, it proposes using the region’s vast oil wealth to create
an environment that allows people to flourish, live valued and dignified lives, overcome
poverty, enjoy a peaceful atmosphere and sustain their environment. The agenda is a
people-centred and sustainable framework requiring the involvement of all
stakeholders, including local, state and federal governments, the NDDC, the oil
companies and the entire private sector, civil society organizations, the people of the
region and development partners. The highlights include the following:
Agenda One: Promote peace as the foundation for development. There cannot be any
meaningful human development without peace. A peace agenda must include
education, easier access to justice and a more equitable distribution of resources.
Agenda Two: Make local governance effective and responsive to the needs of the people.
Governance is very central to achieving meaningful development outcomes. The
effectiveness of governance, especially at the local government level, is an issue of serious
concern. At the core of promoting effective governance is the urgent need to
institutionalize the practices of accountability, transparency and integrity to guide the
flow of development resources at all levels.
Agenda Three: Improve and diversify the economy. The Niger Delta region, with its
stock of natural and human resources, offers immense opportunities for developing a
diversified and growing economy. A diversified economy would reduce dependence on
oil and gas, jumpstart new industries and provide sustainable livelihoods. A growth
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pole strategy would forge closer links between industries and the production of
agricultural and mineral products, and galvanize local economies.
Agenda Four: Promote social inclusion and improved access to social services. A major
concern is the region’s longstanding exclusion from the mainstream of Nigeria’s
socioeconomic and political activities. The majority of the people in the delta live on the
margins. Reducing exclusion and achieving more evenhanded development will depend
on the empowerment of socially marginalized groups and individuals, stronger social
institutions and infrastructure, and the development of the capacity of existing local
groups.
Agenda Five: Promote environmental sustainability to preserve the means of people’s
sustainable livelihoods. The mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all
development activities must be complemented by proactive steps to conserve natural
resources; to reduce pollution, especially from oil spills and gas flares; and to set and
achieve adequate targets for clean air and water and soil fertility. These should be
backed by rigorous enforcement of environmental laws and standards.
Agenda Six: Take an integrated approach to HIV&AIDS. Strong advocacy from top policy
makers should be coupled with public awareness campaigns on the multidimensional nature of
HIV&AIDS and public education on the laws against some risky traditional practices. State and
local governments, the NDDC, oil companies, other private sector enterprises, NGOs and donors
should collectively improve the quality and accessibility of health care and HIV&AIDS facilities
and equipment, and institute actions to curb the epidemic.
Agenda Seven: Build sustainable partnerships for the advancement of human
development. Many stakeholders must work together to achieve meaningful change. All
levels of government and the NDDC, the oil companies, the organized private sector,
civil society organizations and development agencies should form partnerships around
plans for sustainable development and the attainment of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
Alfred S. Fawundu
Officer–In-Charge
The analysis and policy recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or its Executive Board. It is an independent
report commissioned by UNDP, Nigeria. The report is an outcome of a survey on human
development outcomes in the Niger Delta region under the leadership of a research institute led
by people from the region.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Niger Delta Human Development Report benefited immensely from many individuals and
institutions. While some facilitated access to relevant information and data, others provided
valuable contributions to ensure the high quality and independence of the report.
UNDP is grateful to the lead consultant, Environmental Resources Managers Limited (ERML),
which coordinated the team of consultants that worked on the report. Specifically, we
acknowledge V. Imevbore, S. Abumere, A. Imevbore, O. Areola, C. Ikporukpo, B.
Aigbokhan, O. Matanmi, O. Olokesusi, J. Amakiri, A. Gbadegeshin, D. Okorie, J.
Olawoye , Y. Aderinto, K. Garba, P. Aifesehi, O. Obono, Y. Aken’ova , A. Odejide, B.
Falade, O. Oluwasola, C. Alagoa, S. Ekpeyong, O. Taiwo, O. Obute, W. Okowa, O.
Akpoghomen and S. Ojo.
Appreciation goes to Emma Torres, a UNDP consultant, for the useful introduction to
experiences and processes in human development report preparation. The insightful comments
from independent national and international reviewers have enhanced the report. These include
Bayo Olukoshi, Mike I. Obadan, Alex Gboyega, K. K. Kamaludeen and Ganiyu Garba. The
contributions of Sarah Burd-Sharps, which cut across the entire process of preparing the report,
are highly commendable. Her contributions clarified the technical and international dimensions of
the report. The technical editing provided by Gretchen Sidhu enriched the final document and
ensured it would be reader friendly.
Under the leadership of the Resident Representative, Mr Tegegnework Gettu, the UNDP Steering
Committee, which comprised Mary Symmonds (Deputy Resident Representative, Programme),
Angela Lusigi, Emmanuel Oladipo, Ayodele Odusola and Emmanuel Evbodaghe, coordinated all
preparatory activities. Mary Symmonds carried out the overall coordination, while Ayodele
Odusola, the National Economist, provided technical support. Waziri Adio, Anthony Dioka,
David Omozuafoh and Sam Unom also enriched the reader friendliness of the report.
This report is a product of a Niger Delta development partnership between UNDP and the Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited. UNDP acknowledges the financial support
provided by Shell.
Finally, the invaluable contributions from over 200 participants from the four stakeholders’
consultation meetings in Abuja, Port Harcourt and Calabar are also appreciated. Participants
came from the private sector, including the oil companies; local, state and federal governments,
and the NDDC; civil society organizations, including ethnic associations in the region; and
journalists. The list of individual and institutional participants is contained in appendix B1.1.
OVERVIEW
Background
Vast resources from an international industry have barely touched pervasive local poverty.
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The Niger Delta produces the oil wealth that accounts for the bulk of Nigeria’s foreign earnings.
Paradoxically, however, these vast revenues from an international industry have barely touched
the Niger Delta’s own pervasive local poverty. This has spurred formidable challenges to
sustainable human development in the region, particularly as conflicts over resources tighten their
often vicious grip.
Development experts and policy makers have engaged in many debates about the
delta’s human development dilemma, questioning why abundant human and natural
resources have had so little impact on poverty. Why do conflict and youth restiveness
simmer despite years of development interventions? What should be done to calm the
situation? How can environmental sustainability and poverty reduction be achieved
given continued extraction of oil and gas resources? What path leads towards
sustainable human development?
These questions, among others, constitute the driving force for preparing this Human
Development Report, the first for the Niger Delta. It analyses the various dimensions of
the human development challenges in the region, with a particular focus on women and
youth, and proposes a people-centred development agenda grounded in the region’s
natural and human capital.
The imperative for a new development agenda arises from the fact that past
development planning efforts have failed to adequately address the region’s needs. The
result has been disillusionment and frustration among the people about their increasing
deprivation. They have seen one government-sponsored development agency after
another, without any significant changes. Instead, their physical environment has been
deteriorating at an alarming rate, which hinders economic prospects and harms human
well-being.
Local people in the delta are acutely aware of how much wealth oil can produce. Oil and
gas alone have generated 40 per cent of Nigeria’s national GDP over recent decades.
Between 2000 and 2004, oil accounted for about 79.5 per cent of total government
revenues and about 97 per cent of foreign exchange revenues. Within the delta, a few oil
companies and individuals appear to be flush with cash.
But for most people, progress and hope, much less prosperity, remain out of reach.
Instead, misdirected resources, inappropriate policy frameworks and a poor ‘visioning’ of
what development should look like have destabilized their societies, and stoked deep and
The imperative for a new development agenda for the Niger Delta arises from the failure of past
development planning to meet the needs of the people.
Instability in the Niger Delta does not bode well for the future of Nigeria or an oil-hungry world.
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proliferating concerns. If unaddressed, these do not bode well for the future of Nigeria or
an oil-hungry world.
The Human Development Situation
The Niger Delta region, as covered in this report, includes all nine oil-producing states in Nigeria
(Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states) with a total
land area of about 75,000 square kilometres and 185 local government areas. The region contains
the world’s third largest wetland, with the most extensive freshwater swamp forest and rich
biological diversity. Over half of the area is criss-crossed with creeks and dotted with small
islands, while the remainder is a lowland rainforest zone.
Difficult topography encourages people to gather in small communities—of the estimated 13,329
settlements in the region, 94 per cent have populations of less than 5,000. These are rural
communities, which offer very limited economic opportunities. Infrastructure and social services
are generally deplorable, and vastly inadequate for an estimated regional population of nearly 30
million people.
While many development agencies and private sector organizations, including oil companies, have
sought to transform the region socially and economically, analyses of poverty and human
development paint a dismal picture. The region’s human development index (HDI) score, a
measure of well-being encompassing the longevity of life, knowledge and a decent standard of
living, remains at a low value of 0.564 (with 1 being the highest score). While these ratings put
the Niger Delta at a slightly higher level than Nigeria’s overall HDI of 0.453, the area rates far
below countries or regions with similar oil and gas resources. For example, the HDI for Saudi
Arabia in 2000 stood at 0.800, while in 2003 the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya,
Venezuela and Indonesia achieved scores of 0.849, 0.844, 0.799, 0.772 and 0.697, respectively.
A further disaggregation of the HDI score at the local government level in the Niger Delta clearly
shows that regional and state scores mask inequalities in human development among oilproducing
communities. In spite of the efforts of oil companies to enhance the well-being of the
communities where they operate through several development initiatives, particularly in social
infrastructure, there is still wide disparity in the performances of local government areas. The
report discovers that most of the best performing local government areas on the HDI are the
urban ones, while the majority of the poorly performing ones are those based in rural areas. The
local government areas without oil facilities appear to fare better on the poverty index than those
with oil facilities; an indication of unequal distribution of oil revenues. The poor outcomes of
development interventions of oil companies are, to some extent, due to lack of a systematic link
to government development plans.
The delta’s appalling human development situation cannot be completely captured by
the HDI, as some essential issues in the region are not reflected in the computation of the
index, such as the dire state of infrastructure. The lack of data also distorts the
Analyses of poverty and human development paint a dismal picture, particularly when the delta is
compared with other oil-producing regions of the world.
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calculation of the index to some extent. Nevertheless, available data point to the fact that
the region is not faring well. The poor marks suggest the delta may struggle to achieve
the MDGs. It is only close in one area—school enrolments—and is not likely to meet the
other goals by the target date of 2015 or anytime soon after.
Behind the delta’s poor performance on human development is a complex brew of
economic, social, political and environmental factors. Social instability, poor local
governance, competition for economic resources and environmental degradation have
taken a toll. The general neglect of infrastructure, often rationalized by the difficulty of
the delta’s terrain, has worsened people’s access to fundamental services such as
electricity, safe drinking water, roads and health facilities that are taken for granted in
many other parts of Nigeria. Other elements include the negative impacts of the oil
industry, a constricted land area, a delicately balanced environment and extreme
economic deprivation.
The delta today is a place of frustrated expectations and deep-rooted mistrust. Unprecedented
restiveness at times erupts in violence. Long years of neglect and conflict have fostered a siege
mentality, especially among youths who feel they are condemned to a future without hope, and
see conflict as a strategy to escape deprivation. Persistent conflict, while in part a response to
poor human development, has also entrenched it, serving as a consistent drag on the region’s
economic performance and expectations for advancement.
The sabotage of oil production hurts the economy through the loss of sorely needed foreign
exchange to finance national development. Blown pipelines interrupt the supply of crude to
refineries and produce shortages that cause sudden spikes in oil prices. Hostage-taking is not only
a stress on foreign captives, their families and the companies they work for, but also presents a
challenge to international diplomacy and foreign direct investment.
But the disruption also has adverse effects on the local people, as ensuing violence threatens
individuals and communities. Lives are lost, and investments drop along with the availability of
jobs. The response to violence has at times meant further violence is unleashed randomly on
unsuspecting communities or oil workers. Whole villages have been destroyed and their populace
displaced because of disputes that could have been amicably resolved. The human development
implications extend to the harm done to the life chances of children unable to go to school and the
further constraints on human and social capital.
There is a general concern that some people, particularly unscrupulous politicians and political
organizations, benefit from violence, and that they sponsor some of the youth gangs in the region.
Arms merchants along with police and military personnel have supplied weapons to various
gangs, and the increased incidence of oil theft has been linked to the need for foreign exchange to
purchase arms.
Social instability, poor local governance, competition for economic resources and environmental
degradation have taken a toll.
The delta today is a place of frustrated expectations and deep-rooted mistrust.
In spite of the substantial flow of oil money to state and local governments, service delivery and
development projects have been disappointing, especially at the local government level.
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While turmoil in the delta has many sources and motivations, the preeminent underlying cause is
the historical failure of governance at all levels. Declining economic performance leading to
rising unemployment or underemployment; the lack of access to basic necessities of life like
water, shelter, food and clothing; discriminatory policies that deny access to positions of authority
and prevent people from participating in shaping the rules that govern their lives—these all
indicate that governance over time has fallen short. Corruption aggravates feelings of being
cheated, especially when the rulers live like kings amid extreme want. In spite of the substantial
flow of oil money to state and local governments, many communities see no sign of government
presence in terms of development projects. This intensifies a sense of hopelessness and mistrust
that for the most aggrieved people leads to a call to arms.
Among the delta’s many problems, some of the most serious relate to environmental
sustainability, which is fundamental to people’s well-being and development. Wide-ranging and
usually destructive environmental changes have stemmed from oil and gas extraction,
industrialization and urbanization. Oil spills and gas flares in particular have destroyed natural
resources central to local livelihoods. The alienation of people from their land and resources has
led to the inefficient use of remaining resources and poor or inequitable land-use practices.
Local people have ended up frustrated both with the oil and multinational companies doing
business in the region, and the government agencies that fail to rigorously regulate them. For
years, local people have expected protection from successive federal and state governments that
never arrived. Attempts to fight back have compounded the environmental challenges in some
cases, such as when the sabotage of oil pipelines results in more oil pollution, in addition to the
frequent loss of lives and property.
Economically, the Niger Delta region is heavily invested in the oil and gas industry, but despite
the fact that this is a non-renewable resource, economic diversification has been limited. Local
people often cannot tap directly into oil industry benefits, including employment, because they
lack skills or capital resources or both. The once rich agricultural enterprises developed in the
mid-20th century, which generated substantial foreign exchange earnings in the 1960s and 1970s,
have mostly been abandoned. For 85 per cent of the population, informal enterprises are the
primary source of a livelihood, but these are characterized by low productivity and wages. Not
surprisingly, women, who face a double marginalization due to gender, are particularly active in
this sector.
A majority of the people lacks information and technical abilities, and unemployment and
underemployment rates are high. The tension in the region has prompted some local people,
especially youths, to prefer quick and profitable gains from conflict over longer term—and
frequently unavailable—investments in education and training. Available data show that limited
employment correlates with the highest incidences of youth restiveness.
The delta’s unstable social, economic and political situation has helped to open the door to
HIV&AIDS, a devastating force reversing decades of human development and perhaps the
biggest obstacle to reaching the MDGs in the Niger Delta. The prevalence rate in the delta is
among the highest in Nigeria. Social instability and decaying social values have encouraged the
Local people often cannot tap directly into oil industry benefits, including employment, because they
lack skills or capital resources.
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spread of risky behaviours, while incorrect information about HIV&AIDS, traditional practices
and poor economic conditions compound the chance of exposure to HIV. As people die in large
numbers, society loses much needed human capital, productivity declines and dependency rates
skyrocket.
Making matters worse is the poor quality and accessibility of basic health care services—
prevention, care, support and treatment programmes are simply not available. Many people turn
to unqualified but locally available caregivers. Other factors include the region’s oil exploratory
activities, which produce men with easy money who engage in risky sexual behaviour with girls
driven into prostitution by poverty. In general, women’s low economic status hinders their ability
to negotiate sex and other family planning issues, even with their husbands.
A Human Development Agenda
Addressing the Niger Delta region’s many development challenges begins with using its
vast oil wealth to create an environment in which most people can flourish. People
should be able to live valued and dignified lives, overcome poverty, enjoy a peaceful
atmosphere and expect a sustainable environment. For development to be meaningful,
people-centred and sustainable, this report proposes a seven-point human development
agenda. It is rooted in images of the future identified by people through focus group
discussions held as part of the preparation of this report, and the scenarios presented in
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Regional Master Plan.
1. Promote peace as the foundation for development
Without peace, there will be no human development in the Niger Delta. Conflicts have now
escalated to the point where the balance could tip towards outright warfare, which will be even
more difficult to control. Brokering peace can only be achieved through a closely coordinated
domestic strategy that addresses oil theft, money laundering and illegal arms. International
cooperation can help create a climate where this strategy will have a realistic chance of success.
The specific activities of a regional blueprint for peace should encompass renewing peacebuilding
initiatives; promoting the rule of law and easier access to justice; ensuring the integrity
of the electoral process and other leadership selection mechanisms; promoting equitable
distribution of the benefits from mineral resources; encouraging demilitarization (including
disarmament); and ensuring effective law enforcement and policing.
Key issues first need to be identified and addressed to manage the current conflict and security
situation. A priority would be the disarmament and demobilization of militia groups. Programmes
could be initiated to foster a climate of peace, while cross-cultural awareness campaigns could
reorient people towards human coexistence, harmony and mutual partnerships. Rehabilitation
efforts should reach out to youths who have become largely unemployable or unwilling to
develop themselves.
People should be able to live valued and dignified lives, in peace and free from poverty.
A peace agenda must include education, easier access to justice and a more equitable
distribution of resources.
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Overall, the region should embark on a realistic and mutually agreed long-term development
agenda that can be rigorously monitored by stakeholders. Strategies to improve the quality of
governance should focus on enhanced service delivery, checks on corruption and the engagement
of people in shaping policies for their well-being. Finally, existing compensation to communities
for oil production and pollution needs to be examined. The debate over the derivation policy,
which determines the sharing of oil revenues, should be resolved. An oil trust fund could ensure
that revenues reach local communities where oil is being drilled.
2. Make local governance effective and responsive to the needs of the people
The effectiveness of governance, especially at the local government level, is an issue warranting
concern. For both state and local governments, accountability, transparency and integrity have not
necessarily kept up with the increased flow of resources in the delta—politicians and local
officials flaunting ill-gotten gains in fact help to fuel conflicts. Bad local governance is also a
major cause of endemic poverty and the poor quality of human development.
Local development depends on committed and effective local governments capable of providing
infrastructure and services that meet local needs. Public policies and mechanisms should ensure
that good governance principles are upheld, especially in state and sub-national interactions.
Since they are close to the people, local governments are in the best position to involve everyone,
especially poor and marginalized people, in planning, implementing and monitoring development
activities. The worsening poverty in the Niger Delta and the limited involvement of the poor in
poverty interventions go hand in hand, and require urgent actions by governments at all levels.
Priority strategies should include the following.
Local governments should enhance their capacity to conceive and implement policies
that deliver development to their constituents.
Local communication systems should be institutionalized to provide information about
local development activities and resources. The local monitoring of public funds should
be encouraged. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups
could model the process of questioning people in authority and holding them
accountable without fear or favour.
State and local governments need frameworks to cooperate on development, and local
governments should receive their due allocations from the Federation Account and also
from the states in line with extant laws.
Democratic decentralization should devolve decision-making to communities. This will
encourage the participation of civil society organizations in the management of local
development.
3. Improve and diversify the economy
Accountability, transparency and integrity must guide the use of development resources at all
levels.
A diversified economy would reduce dependence on oil and gas, jumpstarting new industries and
sustainable livelihoods.
20
From its stock of natural and human resources, the Niger Delta region offers immense
opportunities for developing a diversified and growing economy. Using existing assets,
including oil and other natural resources, a diversified economy would reduce the
heavy focus on oil and gas—a non-renewable resource—while providing a basis for
growth clusters within the region. Pro-poor economic growth would expand the
employment, productivity and incomes of poor people; unleash human and institutional
capacities; eradicate poverty through improved livelihoods; and stimulate industrial
development through increased access to basic public goods.
Of prime importance is the promotion of sustainable livelihoods. Fortunately, the delta has many
opportunities to diversify and grow its economy in ways that would encourage livelihoods
drawing upon the region’s considerable human, social, natural and other assets. Initiatives to
cultivate people’s skills and capacities so that they may participate in productive economic
activities will be imperative.
Many agricultural and mineral products can be produced or found in the delta. These can be
linked to industries that can galvanize the local economy. Such ‘propulsive’ industries are
referred to as ‘growth poles’ because they act like magnets, drawing other industries to their
localities, along with the requisite labour, social facilities and services. They can help attract
desperately needed infrastructural developments.
The growth pole strategy is particularly relevant in the delta because of the preponderance of
small settlements, the low purchasing power of most of the people and the dominance of the
informal sector. Expanding the capacity of informal businesses through connections to new
industries would do much to reduce both poverty and gender disparities. Key to this process,
however, is that informal sector entrepreneurs need to learn new and modern ways of doing
business to avoid displacement and marginalization.
Improving rural competitiveness in non-traditional agricultural products through valueadded
exports could be one major source of economic diversification. The region can
readily produce rice, sugar, cocoa, roots and tubers, citrus fruits, plantains, rubber and
rubber products, and is blessed with many resources for aquaculture and forestry.
Cultivation of industries related to these products deserves the active support of the
various governments, oil and gas companies, and other stakeholders. Training and skills
acquisition, especially tied to modern technology; seed multiplication centres; access to
credit and affordable modern storage facilities are all important.
Synergy between agriculture and industry could come from establishing industries that use
agricultural products. For instance, linking agriculture with the energy industry around the
production of alternative fuels such as ethanol from sugarcane and cassava shows great promise
and could benefit both sectors. There is also the need to rapidly expand such service industries as
information technology and communication, re-exports through the creation of free-trade zones
and ports, tourism, water transportation and finance.
Some traditional occupations that could absorb many labourers, such as agriculture, need to be
improved to attract youths. But increased local involvement in the oil sector is worth pursuing as
well. Oil companies can adopt programmes to encourage the development of skilled and qualified
persons from host communities. Social and labour policies and programmes could address this
21
issue through affirmative action. One good example is the proposed US $350 million Local
Content Fund of the Federal Government, which would support local entrepreneurs in delivering
quality service at competitive rates to the oil industry.
Several underlying conditions will determine the success of the drive towards economic
prosperity in the delta. Many youths need to change their mindset from one dependent
on the syndrome of ‘settlement’ or ‘standby’ money into one that embraces a more
meaningful and productive life—heavy investments in education are required. More
broadly, aligning business objectives with overall human development will require
massive investments in human capital, access to resources and functional infrastructure.
4. Promote social inclusion and improved access to social services
The Niger Delta Region has historically felt excluded from mainstream development in
Nigeria. Within the delta, some groups have been further marginalized. Social exclusion
is always an obstacle to development, but particularly when most of the population lives
on the margins, where there are few if any development opportunities, and economic,
social and health benefits are minimal.
In studying how to engage everyone in the delta in securing a sustainable future, this
report concludes that resources should be targeted towards enhancing access to
opportunities, goods, services and facilities for all stakeholders, and developing
capacities to overcome obstacles and engage in activities necessary for sustainable
livelihoods. This requires empowering socially marginalized groups and individuals,
strengthening social and infrastructural institutions, and developing the capacity of
existing local groups. Fully participatory approaches to the planning and
implementation of development interventions are essential; partnerships can go far in
removing the barriers to social inclusion. Interventions tailored to localities or groups
will meet their unique needs.
Social cohesiveness could also be advanced through the establishment of local
development funds that garner contributions from various stakeholders, including the
Federal Government and oil companies, but are managed locally.
5. Promote environmental sustainability to preserve the means of people’s
sustainable livelihoods.
This report traces the many intricate links between the environment and sustainable
livelihoods, demonstrating that environmental degradation and poverty are mutually
reinforcing. This underscores the urgency of proactive steps to conserve natural
Full participation in development planning will ensure that everyone has a stake in the delta’s future.
Environmental sustainability should be mainstreamed in all development activities.
22
resources, reduce pollution especially from oil spills and gas flares, and reach adequate
targets for clean air and water, and soil fertility. There is a need to raise environmental
awareness, including through the provision of information based on the collection of
credible data. Other necessary steps comprise instituting the polluter–pays principle,
passing and enforcing environmental laws, institutionalizing equitable compensation
regimes for oil and gas-related activities, ensuring environmental considerations in
budgets across different sectors and bolstering existing environmental institutions.
Overall, environmental sustainability should be mainstreamed in all development
activities.
Environmental laws should protect the rights of citizens, establish mandatory
environmental standards for the oil and gas business that are not below average global
standards, and provide easier access to judicial redress when either the government or
businesses violate people’s rights.
6. Take an integrated approach to HIV&AIDS
Any human development agenda must factor in the burdens imposed by HIV&AIDS, given that
the Niger Delta now has HIV prevalence rates that are among the highest in Nigeria. Since
HIV&AIDS is much more than a health issue, dealing with it requires an integrated approach
involving federal, state and local governments, the NDDC and other government agencies, the
private sector, civil society groups and international organizations. Strong leadership is needed at
all levels to push for meaningful results. Policies need to focus not only on the control of the HIV
virus, but also on coping mechanisms for the large number of infected people in the region.
Potential strategies include strong advocacy among top-level policy makers coupled with public
awareness campaigns on the multidimensional nature of HIV&AIDS, including in terms of highrisk
behaviour. All forms of gender discrimination should be discouraged, and people should be
educated on the laws against some risky traditional practices. Employers should establish workplace
policies on HIV&AIDS, and oil companies should integrate HIV&AIDS assistance into
their social responsibility and community development activities.
State and local governments and the NDDC should institutionalize their responses to
HIV&AIDS. Governments, oil companies, other private sector enterprises, NGOs and donors
should collectively improve the quality and accessibility of health care and HIV&AIDS facilities
and equipment.
7. Build sustainable partnerships for the advancement of human development.
The development of the Niger Delta region cannot be the responsibility of any one level
of government alone. While the Federal Government can take the lead on overarching
Public awareness campaigns should recognize that HIV&AIDS is much more than a health issue.
Many stakeholders must work together to achieve meaningful change.
23
issues influencing development in the region, it has to work with many stakeholders
and partners if change is going to be sustainable and meaningful.
The different levels and branches of government should form partnerships around plans
for sustainable development and the attainment of the MDGs; accountability and
transparency in the use of available resources; the creation and sustenance of the right
environment for meaningful development; the promotion of investment; social inclusion
and popular participation in decision-making; broad-based consultations for peacebuilding;
the deliberate empowerment of women and youth groups; and resource
mobilization for development.
For their part, organized private sector operators have already committed themselves to
certain corporate social responsibilities, particularly those that improve their operating
environment. They can now align themselves with a human development agenda in the
delta by promoting good neighbourliness and mutual coexistence with host
communities; shunning unscrupulous business practices and the abuse of the
environment; embracing consultative processes and popular participation; providing
mentoring programmes and scholarships to aid the development of critical industrial
competencies; and exhibiting good faith in abiding by international best practices in
compensation payments and their general operations.
Community-based organizations and civil society groups can build partnerships to
uphold legitimate avenues for redress—such as consultation and negotiation—for
injustices and discontent arising from strained relationships among the government,
communities and the oil industry. Community groups can promote local acceptance and
ownership of socio-economic development reforms, and civic, voter and peace
education for the acculturation of democratic tenets. They can motivate and mobilize
youth to engage in political, social and economic processes, and act as pressure groups
backing sustainable democracy.
Finally, bilateral and multilateral donors can support the spirit of partnership by setting
their development priorities in line with the guidelines and oversight functions of the
Nigerian Government, and working consistently to achieve development symmetry
through the harmonization of individual agency efforts and the avoidance of
unnecessary duplication. Agencies such as UNDP can call upon all partners to buy into
a human development agenda, which will be the only guarantee of peace and prosperity
for all concerned.
24
25
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
AMAZING PARADOXES
Some amazing paradoxes have come from the development of the Niger Delta region.
Ordinarily, the Niger Delta should be a gigantic economic reservoir of national and
international importance. Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed
methodically into the international economic system, in exchange for massive revenues
that carry the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the delta itself. In
reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling
social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject
poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.
Enormous possibilities for industrial development abound in terms of the abundance of
raw materials in the region, but these remain unrealized. Beyond vast oil and gas
deposits, the delta is blessed with good agricultural land, extensive forests, excellent
fisheries, and a large labour force. But juxtaposed against the potential for economic
growth and sustainable development are deteriorating economic and social conditions
that have been largely ignored by contemporary policies and actions (Jonathan 2004: 20-
21). With local inhabitants subjected to abject poverty and suffering in the midst of
plenty, some view the oil and gas endowments as a curse and a double-edged sword
(see box 1.1).
The data presented in this report reveal some troubling findings and deep ironies. Life
expectancy is falling in an age of blockbuster oil prices. Energy availability is poor in a
region that provides one-fifth of the energy needs of the United States. The delta needs
to import fuel despite producing over two million barrels of crude oil per day. There is
an almost total lack of roads in a region whose wealth is funding gigantic infrastructural
development in other parts of Nigeria and expensive peacekeeping activities in other
parts of Africa. The delta accounts for upwards of 80 per cent of Nigeria’s foreign
exchange earnings and about 70 per cent of government revenues.
This report analyses the various dimensions of the dismal human development situation
The Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty,
filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.
Social and economic deterioration, ignored by policy makers, undercuts enormous
possibilities for development.
26
in the Niger Delta, with a view to fostering a people-centred development agenda that
can unleash the region’s enormous natural and human capacities.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In recent years, development programming has been focused on the overriding issues of
equity and equality in the distribution of the gains from development efforts. A lot of
concern has been expressed about the predicament of the rural poor and the imperatives
of several baseline requirements for human development. These include access to land
and water resources; agricultural inputs and services, including extension and research
facilities; and participatory development strategies to tackle rural poverty, with social
equity and civil participation viewed as essential to well-rounded socio-economic
development.
BOX 1.1: Oil—A Double-Edged Sword
The positive blessings of oil derive mainly from the huge financial resources it
generates for producing countries. As an internationally traded commodity that
attracts foreign exchange, oil is a quick source of capital accumulation or foreign
direct investment for developing countries faced with capital constraints. Countries
without oil face a struggle to overcome capital shortages, a major developmental
inhibition.
Huge revenues are realized from the wide differential between unit production costs
and economic rents, royalties, petroleum taxes, oil exports, etc. Between 2000 and
2002, total oil revenues to members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) were US $606 billion (OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet, June 2003). If
management of oil-related revenues could be based on transparency, accountability
and fairness, oil revenues will become a source of substantial benefit for the
populations of these countries (Gary and Karl 2003).
Negative development trends are similarly associated with oil and mineral
production in general. There tends to be an inverse relationship between economic
growth and natural resource abundance, and sustained poor performance on such
social indicators as education and health. These outcomes have been dubbed the oil
resource curse.
Development that ventures beyond the calculus of economic growth enlarges human
choices across all economic, social, cultural and political dimensions.
27
This relatively new orientation has produced concepts such as ‘people-centred
development’, ‘participatory development’ and ‘sustainable human development’. The
concept of people-centred development states that meaningful development must be
people-based or human-centred, since development entails the full utilization of a
nation’s human and material resources for the satisfaction of various (human) needs. In
more specific terms, a development programme that is people-centred is expected to
achieve the following objectives (Chinsman 1995):
• enable people to realize their potential, build self-confidence and lead lives of
dignity and fulfilment;
• free people from poverty, ignorance, filth, squalor, deprivation and exploitation,
recognizing that underdevelopment has wider social consequences; and
• correct for existing economic, social or political injustices and oppression.
The notion of ‘participatory development’ bridges the interrelated goals of development
and the empowerment of people. Development has to be designed to capture what the
people themselves perceive to be their interests and needs. Participatory development,
sometimes interchangeably called popular participation, is “a process by which people
take an active and influential part in shaping decisions that affect their lives” (OECD
1995: 8). People or communities that enjoy active participation in decision-making over
issues that concern their livelihood and interests should be able to realize their human
potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. Participatory
development builds civil society and the economy by empowering social groups,
communities and organizations to influence public policy and demand accountability.
The process links democratic institutions with human development motivations (OECD
1995; Bass 1972: 212-216).
More recently, the United Nations has popularized the multidimensional term
‘sustainable human development’ (see box 1.2). This is defined as: “Development that
not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that
regenerates the environment rather than destroys it; that empowers people rather than
marginalizing them. It gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and
opportunities, and provides for their participation in decisions affecting them” (James
Speth, former UNDP Administrator). Speth says further that “sustainable human
development is development that is pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs, and pro-women. It
stresses growth, but growth with employment, growth with environmental friendliness,
growth with empowerment, and growth with equity.”
Development has to be designed to capture what the people themselves perceive to be their
interests and needs.
“Sustainable human development is development that is pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs,
and pro-women.”
28
This report takes a human development approach to the situation in the Niger Delta.
This approach questions the presumption of an automatic link between expanding
income and expanding human choices, and places people at the centre of development.
A people-oriented approach correspondingly shifts the emphasis, for example, from
how much a nation or region is producing, economically and in the aggregate, to how its
peoples are faring in terms of quality of life and general social well-being. This means
venturing beyond the calculus of economic growth and considering how to enlarge
human choices across all economic, social, cultural and political dimensions.
RATIONALE FOR A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO THE
NIGER DELTA
Since 1996, UNDP has produced four national human development reports on Nigeria
(in 1996, 1998, 2000/2001 and 2004). This report is the first on one of Nigeria’s six subnational
geopolitical regions, the Niger Delta. The attention to the delta should be
explained.
One of the main conclusions of the Nigerian Human Development Report 1996 (UNDP
1996) was that “wide regional disparities are Nigeria’s Achille’s heel—the primary
source of its perennial conflict, political instability and social unrest.” Since 1996, with
the degeneration in the Niger Delta, it is obvious that the regional disparities remain. It
is also evident that in spite of ongoing reform programmes, inequities in the allocation
of resources from oil and gas and the degradation of the Niger Delta environment by oil
Box 1.2: The Tenets of Human Development
Indeed, defining people’s well-being as the end of development and treating
economic growth as a means have been central messages of the annual Human
Development Reports published since 1990.
Source: Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar 2003: p. vii.
Top-down development plans have made little impact on the real lives of people in the
delta—or on their perception that development planning is little more than an imposition
by the Federal Government.
Inequities fan increasingly intense and frequent conflicts that threaten Nigeria as a whole,
and Africa at large.
29
spills and gas flares continue to adversely affect human development conditions. The
inequities fan increasingly intense and frequent conflicts.
The potentially adverse impacts of the Niger Delta crisis on Nigeria, and on Africa as a
whole, make the focus of this report on the delta imperative and timely. The report
serves as an instrument to review the multidimensional nature of the problem and its
history, as well as the consequences on the income, education and life expectancy of the
people who live in the delta, and on environmental sustainability.
Early concerns about the plight of the Niger Delta region referred to the part now
sometimes called the ’core’ Niger Delta, comprising Bayelsa, southern Delta and Rivers
states. The present definition and composition of the Niger Delta region is a pragmatic
one that brings together all oil-producing states in the Nigerian Federation, because they
have common ecological and socio-economic problems.
The following sub-section briefly reviews some of the causal factors behind the poor
state of human development in the delta, including the pitfalls of traditional
development planning, revenue allocation problems and the failure of governance.
Pitfalls of Traditional Development Planning
Development planning in Nigeria, in the modern sense, dates back to the formative 10-
year national development plan for 1946-1955 prepared by the colonial administration.
After political independence in 1960, successive post-colonial governments initially
prepared mostly medium-term development plans, namely 1962-1968, 1970-1974, 1975-
1980 and 1981-1985. A series of two-year rolling plans followed between 1990 and 1998.
These efforts were often associated with the income-centred development paradigm.
Short term and based on official convictions, they lacked essential civil society and
grass-roots inputs or participation. They failed to be sufficiently far-reaching,
longitudinal or symmetrical enough in scope and coverage to pursue the inclusive goals
of human development. In most cases, traditional planning efforts amounted to ends in
themselves. They ended up either not being implemented or, at best, being largely
unimplemented.
Since the colonial era, some policies and programmes within national development
plans have been formulated to address the minority status, agitations and perceived
marginalization of the people of the delta. But the recurring feeling in the region is that
it is often pushed aside within the Nigerian Federation. This is particularly true for
minority ethnic groups. The first major attempt to address these grievances was in 1957,
when the colonial administration set up the Willink’s Commission of Inquiry to
investigate the fears of minorities and how to allay them. The Commission reported in
1958 that “the needs of those who live in the creeks and swamps of the Niger Delta are
Inequities in the allocation of resources from oil and gas and the degradation of the Niger
Delta environment by oil spills and gas flares continue to adversely affect human
development conditions.
30
very different from those of the interior.”
The Commission also noted that “it is not easy for a government or legislature operating
from the inland to concern itself or even fully understand the problems of a territory
where communications are so difficult, building so expensive and education so scanty in
a country which is unlikely ever to be developed.” Perhaps more importantly, the
Commission concluded that “a feeling of neglect and a lack of understanding was
widespread...a case has been made out for special treatment of this area. This is a matter
that requires special effort because (the area) is poor, backward and neglected.” That
conclusion is as true in the Niger Delta today as it was in 1957. Be that as it may, the
immediate post-independence Government eventually responded to the Willink’s
Report by setting up the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961.
The NDDB could not solve the problems of the Niger Delta enunciated in the Willink’s
Report. Subsequent bodies included the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority
(NDBDA) set up in 1976, and the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development
Commission (OMPADEC) set up in 1992. But they also failed woefully. In the case of the
NDBDA, organizational problems bedevilled it from inception. None of the board
members appointed by the Federal Government to run the Authority came from the
Niger Delta. During the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari, 11 river basin
development authorities were created; several now have jurisdiction in the delta,
including the Niger River Basin Development Authority, the Anambra-Imo River Basin
Development Authority, the Benin-Owena River Basin Development Authority, the
Niger Delta Basin Development Authority and the Cross River Basin Development
Authority. But these authorities also have had very little impact. For one thing, their
boards often comprise politicians who have regarded their tenures as opportunities to
reap the ’dividends of democracy’. They have often been viewed as drains on the
nation’s finances.
OMPADEC was established in July 1992 and given the statutory responsibility to receive
and administer, in accordance with the confirmed ratio of oil production in each state,
the monthly allocation of the Federation Account. This is set aside for the rehabilitation
and development of the mineral producing areas and for tackling ecological problems
that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals. Between 1993 and 1997,
OMPADEC collected about N17.42 billion, a little over US $135 million. At first,
OMPADEC was allocated three per cent of the Federation Account, but this was raised
to 6 per cent in 1995.
The Commission did not make any meaningful impact on the lives and environment of
the Niger Delta people. It was noted for its profligacy and extravagance. Contracts were
awarded in anticipation of funds, with the result that contracts worth billions of naira
were awarded that were not eventually backed with cash. At the time it folded, the
The needs of those who live in the creeks and swamps of the Niger Delta are very different
from those of the interior.
31
Commission owed its contractors billions of naira and left the Niger Delta with
numerous abandoned projects.
The Chief Executive of OMPADEC had identified three pressing problems at the
Commission. There were no available data for planning purposes, such as the crude oil
production quota by state. The Commission had no means to cope with the volume of
demands given decades of physical neglect and deprivation. And funding was
inadequate. While the decree establishing OMPADEC stipulated that it should receive
three per cent of the Federation Account, the Commission claimed that what it actually
got was three per cent of net revenues from the Federation Account.
When the present federal administration came into power in 1999, it constituted a new
body, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to take over from
OMPADEC. At the inauguration of its pioneer board, in December 2000, the President of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria noted that the NDDC has the potential to offer a lasting
solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta, which successive
governments have grappled with even before independence. To achieve its mandate, the
NDDC board identified areas of focus including:
• development of social and physical infrastructures
• technology
• economic/environmental remediation and stability
• human development
• pursuit of a peaceful environment that allows tourism to thrive and supports a
buoyant culture
As a development agency, the NDDC quickly identified the need for a master plan as
part of its overall strategy, which has now been completed. In the interim, the NDDC
board elaborated a plan involving the construction of roads, shoreline protection, rural
and urban water supply schemes, and the rehabilitation of schools and health centres.
This is in addition to human capacity development in new centres that help people
acquire skills and build sustainable livelihoods.
By November 2002, the board had reported awarding contracts for more than 650
projects worth over N35 billion or US $271.3 million in the nine states of the delta region.
The NDDC funding structure includes contributions from the Federal Government, the
oil companies operating in the region, the Ecological Fund and member states in the
delta. The Federal Government accounted for 78.03 per cent of the N44 billion or US
$341.1 million that was disbursed to the Commission between 2001 and 2004. Annual
federation allocations to the NDDC from 2000 to 2004 are, respectively, N0.944 billion
(US $7.3 million), N10.0 billion (US $77.5 million), N13.9 billion (US $107.8 million), N9.0
There were no available data for planning purposes, such as the crude oil production quota
by state. OMPADEC had no means to cope with the volume of demands given decades of
physical neglect and deprivation. And funding was inadequate.
32
billion (US $69.8 million) and N14.0 billion (US $108.5 million). Member states have yet
to contribute directly to the Commission, and there is continued wrangling over the
contributions from oil companies. In spite of the provisions of the NDDC Act on
financing (see box 1.3), the NDDC is facing some of the same problems with funding
that plagued OMPADEC.
33
Source: African Network for Environment and Economic Justice (2004).
BOX 1.3: Financial Provisions in the NDDC Act, 2000
(1) The Commission shall establish and maintain a fund from which shall be
defrayed all expenditure incurred by the Commission.
(2) There shall be paid and credited to the fund established pursuant to
subsection (1) of this section—
a. From the Federal Government, the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total
monthly statutory allocations due to member States of the Commission
from the Federation Account; this being the contribution of the Federal
Government to the Commission;
b. 3 per cent of the total annual budget of any oil-producing company
operating, on shore and off shore, in the Niger-Delta area; including gasprocessing
companies;
c. 50 per cent of monies due to member States of the Commission from the
Ecological Fund;
d. Such monies as may, from time to time, be granted or lent to or deposited
with the Commission by the Federal or a State Government, any other
body or institution whether local or foreign;
e. All moneys raised for the purposes of the Commission by way of gifts,
loans, grants-in-aid, testamentary disposition or otherwise; and
f. Proceeds from all other assets that may, from time to time, accrue to the
Commission.
(3) The fund shall be managed in accordance with the rules made by the Board,
and without prejudice to the generality of the power to make rules under this
subsection, the rules shall in particular contain provisions—
a. Specifying the manner in which the assets or the funds of the
Commission are to be held, and regulating the making of payments into
and out of the fund; and
b. Requiring the keeping of proper accounts and records for the purpose of
the fund in such form as may be specified in the rules.
Source: Niger-Delta Development Commission Act, 2000.
34
BOX 1.4: State Initiative on Development Challenges: The Functions
of the Ondo State Oil-Producing Areas Development Commission
(OSOPADEC)
OSOPADEC was established by law on October 29, 2001 as an
interventionist agency to cater for the development of the oilproducing
areas of the state. It was created as an institutional
framework for the development of that part of the state. It was
inaugurated in November 2001. Its functions, as spelt out in its
enabling law, are:
(a) To receive and administer exclusively 40 per cent of the 13 per cent Oil
Derivation Fund accruing to the state government:
(i) For the rehabilitation and development of oil-producing areas in the
state;
and
(ii) Other development projects as may be determined from time to time
by the commission;
(b) To release a sum of 5 per cent of the 40 per cent accruing to the
commission to the host local government of the oil-producing areas;
(c) To liaise with the relevant federal and state government authorities on the
control and effective methods of tackling the problems of coastal erosion
and oil spillages in the state;
(d) To ensure fair and equitable distribution of development projects in the
oil-producing areas of the state;
(e) To ensure judicious utilisation of the fund accruing to the commission;
and
(f) To execute other works or projects and perform such other functions which
in the opinion of the commission are geared towards the development of
the oil-producing areas of the state.
Source: African Network for Environment and Economic Justice
2004.
35
It is probably premature to assess the achievements of either the NDDC or similar state
initiatives (see box 1.4). With the production of a Regional Master Plan for the Niger
Delta, however, the NDDC is at least poised for positive action on its founding
objectives. Earlier bodies had never managed or bothered to produce a plan, whether at
regional or sectoral levels. But the NDDC does not seem to have made any positive
impression on the peoples of the Niger Delta. Comments by participants at focus group
discussions and stakeholders’ meetings indicate that people still see the NDDC as an
imposition from the Federal Government, and a top-down approach to development
planning and implementation. The local people had no say in determining its
composition; it primarily comprises appointees of the Federal Government. As far as
ordinary people are concerned, the loyalty of the NDDC is not to the Niger Delta but to
the Federal Government and the oil companies that provide the bulk of its budget.
Revenue Allocation
The politics and dynamics of revenue allocation have also manifested in attempts to
address the peculiar development challenges of the Niger Delta as an oil-producing
region. At the root of the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by
Lord Lugard in 1914 was the issue of cross-subsidization—the richer South would
subsidize development endeavours in the poorer North. The level of cross-subsidization
was not clearly specified. The first attempt to write down the basis and levels of sharing
revenues among the component units (or regions, as they were then called) of the
Nigerian Federation was in 1946, when the Phillipson Fiscal Commission, set up by the
Colonial Administration, proposed the derivation principle as a basis for fiscal
federalism. The idea was that revenue should be shared, among other things, in
proportion to the contribution each region made to the common purse or central
government. Derivation became the only criterion used to allocate revenues among the
regions in the 1948-1949 and 1951-1952 fiscal years.
In the period shortly before independence in 1960, the disparity in allocation largely
reflected the degrees of enterprise and levels of production in the regions. This meant
that, by merely looking at the levels of allocations, one could easily discern the regions
with high levels of economic activities in areas such as cash crop production (e.g., cocoa,
rubber, palm oil, cotton, hides and skins, groundnuts, etc), earnings from export and
excise duties, etc. The incentives embedded in the revenue allocation inevitably
encouraged competition among the regions, with each striving to contribute more in
People still see the NDDC as an imposition from the Federal Government, and a topdown
approach to development planning and implementation. The local people had no
say in determining its composition; it primarily comprises appointees of the Federal
Government.
The central control of petroleum resources has denied local people the right to benefit from
the land on which they live.
36
order to get more from the centrally allocated revenues.
Between 1946 and 1960, the derivation principle was maintained at 50 per cent. After
independence, it continued at the same level until 1967, when the Nigerian civil war
started (see box 1.5). The 1960 and 1963 constitutions affirmed the 50 per cent rate.
Section 140 of both documents stipulated that for the sharing of the proceeds of
minerals, including mineral oil, “there shall be paid by the Federal Government to a
Region, a sum equal to 50 per cent of the proceeds of any royalty received by the
Federation in respect of any mineral extracted in that region and any mining rents
derived by the Federal Government from within the region.” To summarize, 50 per cent
of the proceeds from minerals, including mineral oil, went to the region from where
they were extracted; 30 per cent went into a pool for distribution to all regions, including
the producing regions; and 20 per cent went to the Federal Government.
The 50 per cent derivation formula changed in varying ways during the military and civilian
administration eras. After the civil war led to the political and fiscal centralization of the
federal system, the military administration of General Yakubu Gowon promulgated Petroleum
Decree No. 51 in 1969. This put the ownership and control of all petroleum resources in,
under or upon any land in Nigeria under the control of the Federal Government. It meant that
individuals, communities, local governments and even states with land containing minerals
were denied their rights to the minerals. Between 1969 and 1971, the military government,
fighting an expensive civil war, expropriated five per cent from the 50 per cent meant for the
producing states, thereby bringing the Distributable Pool Amount to 55 per cent, while 45 per
cent was for the producing states. During the administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo
(as he was then), from 1976 to 1979, a distinction was made between onshore and offshore
proceeds, with all offshore proceeds going into the Distributable Pool Amount. In addition,
the share of the onshore proceeds in the pool was raised to 80 per cent, while producing states
were allocated the balance of 20 per cent. Between 1982 and 1992, derivation accounted for
merely 1.5 per cent of oil proceeds.
The reason for the change in the size of the derivation formula was the onset of the civil
war, which was to lead to the political and fiscal centralization of the federal system.
37
Under the military regime of General Sani Abacha, from 1993 to 1998, derivation was
raised to three per cent as an interim palliative, pending the determination of an
appropriate derivation formula by the Constitutional Conference called to resolve the
political crisis created by the annulment of democratic presidential elections of June
1993. The Conference recommended a 13 per cent Derivation Fund, which was accepted
by Abacha’s Government, but not really implemented until General Abdulsalami
Abubakar replaced him as head of state. At the inception of the current democratic
regime in 1999, non-implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula was a source
of much agitation, bringing the governors of the region into closer alliance with the
‘resource control’ agitators and into conflict with federal authorities.
Subsequent implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula appears not to have
assuaged feelings in the region much. Political mobilization to win elections during the
transition from military to democratic rule justifiably raised expectations of rapid socioeconomic
development in the region and enhanced opportunities for individual wellbeing.
The failure to meet these expectations, together with the apparent increased
BOX 1.5: Federal and State Shares of Petroleum
Proceeds
Years Producing state
( per cent)
Distributable Pool Amount or
Federation Account
(per cent)
1960-67 50 50
1967-69 50 50
1969-71 45 55
1971-75 45 minus offshore
proceeds
55 plus offshore proceeds
1975-79 20 minus offshore
proceeds
80 plus offshore proceeds
1979-81 - 100
1982-92 1.5 98.5
1992-99 3 97
1999- 13 87
The failure to meet people’s expectations of rapid socio-economic
development, together with the extravagance of some government and
NDDC officials in the region, have inflamed feelings of neglect and
deprivation.
38
wealth and extravagance of some government and NDDC officials in the region,
inflamed feelings of neglect and deprivation. These found expression at the National
Political Reform Conference held in 2005. The Conference recommended an upward
review of the derivation percentage to 17 per cent, but this was unacceptable to the
Niger Delta delegates, who insisted on a minimum of 25 per cent with a phased review
to 50 per cent. Other delegates did not agree, leading to the collapse of the Conference
and further political polarization along oil-producing/non-oil-producing lines.
Many citizens of the Niger Delta may be forgiven for believing that, if the mineral oil
was found in the areas of the major ethnic groups rather than in the minority areas, the
derivation story may have been different. The pros and cons of this argument
notwithstanding, the bottom line is that a credible and equitable revenue allocation
formula represents a viable way of lessening the tension, agitations and perceptions of
unfairness, if not total disillusionment, in the Niger Delta. Correspondingly, the
implementation of a viable programme for rapid human development would be a lot
easier to achieve with a revenue allocation formula that the peoples of the delta could
consider equitable and acceptable.
The Failure of Governance
The foregoing sections support the new global thinking that an income-centered
development paradigm cannot capture the multifaceted development challenges of any
country, region or peoples, including the Niger Delta. Given the frustration and
disillusionment with the present development failures in the delta, a more focused effort
on human development is clearly desirable.
The delta’s water-logged, flood-prone terrain is the most difficult in Nigeria. Many of
the region’s vast development needs are attributable in part to the complexities of the
physical landscape. But human development deprivations are equally traceable to
asymmetrical planning at the national level, and maladministration and inefficiencies at
the state and local government levels. Even the political measures intended to
Human development deprivations are traceable to asymmetrical planning at the national
level, and maladministration and inefficiencies at the state and local government levels.
Only an equitable revenue allocation formula will ease the tension, agitations and
perceptions of unfairness.
Corruption, mismanagement, rampant human rights abuses, and inadequate
access to justice and human security heighten alienation from government and
other authority structures.
39
decentralize responsibility for development and provide more resources to states and
local leaders have not achieved as much as they should have. Some of these measures
include the creation of more states and local governments, as well as increases in
revenues going to these tiers of government. The potential value of such policies was
undermined, however, by the authoritarian style and insensitivity of successive military
rulers in the region and the local leaders they appointed to administer the localities. A
return to civil democratic rule should have led to more responsive and participatory
governance at both the state and local levels, but appropriate reforms have been slow to
take hold.
The enormous revenue assignments to the states and local governments in the region,
from the Federation Account, Derivation Fund and the OMPADEC (now replaced by
the NDDC) fund did not have their desired impact largely because the development
agenda of these authorities have not been people-centred and participatory. Corruption,
mismanagement, rampant human rights abuses, inadequate access to justice and human
security, and the vulnerabilities of most of the population heighten frustration and
alienation from all levels of government and other authority structures. The expectations
of positive or effective governance—in terms of basic city and country planning,
improved human livelihoods, general utility satisfaction, quality of life, employment
generation, the management of biodiversity and the environment, and the development
of infrastructure and modern communications, all within the scope of sustainable
human development—have remained largely unfulfilled. The contribution of poor
governance to the abject poverty of the Niger Delta region is highlighted in chapter
three of this report.
A History of Resistance
As a source of the global energy supply, the Niger Delta is also important within the
wider context of the international economic and political system. Since the 19th century,
a complex interplay of factors has provoked sometimes volatile responses to the
pressures for the control and distribution of resources. Underlying this volatility has
been a feeling, among the peoples of the delta, of injustice and inequity. The following
instances illustrate this point. From 1894 to 1895, King William Koko of Nembe resisted
the Royal Niger Company’s attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the lucrative
trade in palm oil. Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966 and Ken Saro-Wiwa from 1993 to 1995 put
up similar resistance, but this time mostly over petroleum. In total, the Niger Delta has
witnessed six major rebellions in the last two centuries. Besides the three mentioned, the
others included struggles sparked by King Nana of Itsekiri (1896) and Oba Overanmi of
Benin (1897), and the numerous events leading to the Kaiama Declaration of 1998-2000.
To these must be added the numerous armed rebellions of youths in the last 10 years or
Numerous armed rebellions have disrupted oil production, attracting international
attention and contributing to rising crude oil prices.
40
so, which have disrupted oil exploration, while also attracting international attention
and contributing to the rise of crude oil prices. Conflicts in the region, including the
recent spate of hostage-taking, are further discussed in chapter five.
Events in the Niger Delta should concern or appeal to all Nigerians. The development
problems and needs of the region are very relevant to other regions and communities, as
fallouts of the generic experience of bad governance, particularly in the postindependence
period. The potential for a disaster arising from the Niger Delta and
producing a conflagration across the country should not be underestimated.
Some administrative measures were taken in the past to ameliorate the restiveness of the
region. These culminated in the production of numerous reports and plans by
governments (federal, state and local), oil companies, NGOs, and bilateral and
multilateral agencies. Unfortunately, such interventions and outputs appear to have
mostly addressed the economic and environmental components of the problem. They
should have been more human-centred, concentrating on people rather than
developmental artefacts (innovations, industries, social and physical infrastructures,
etc.). They should have sought to widen people’s choices and open additional
opportunities in productive sectors apart from oil. This approach would favour more
sustainable solutions to the delta’s development problems.
One significant intervention was the establishment of the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency in 1988 to enforce environmental regulations and ameliorate
environmental degradation. Laudable as this was, its effectiveness was limited by a
narrow focus on environmental impact assessments, which soon became routine to the
point of being a charade.
A Regime of Reforms and Strategies: NEEDS, SEEDS and LEEDS
The embrace of the human development approach used in this study could result in a
deeper understanding of the development needs of the region and the adoption of a
more down-to-earth approach to development planning and implementation. A peoplecentred,
bottom-up strategy is in tune with existing priorities, including the attainment
of the MDGs, as listed in box 1.6. Also targeting the MDGs is the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which draws from strategic
planning techniques to stimulate sustainable development. NEEDS is aimed at economic
Government interventions should have been more human-centred, concentrating on
people rather than developmental artefacts. Human-centred steps to calm the restiveness
of the region would include new opportunities in productive sectors apart from oil.
The application of the human development approach in the Niger Delta could provide new
insights into development planning by recognizing that the real wealth of the delta is its
people.
41
growth, human development and improvements in service delivery in Nigeria,
especially through positive governance, zero tolerance for social corruption, the reform
of public service, and improvements in financial planning and control (see National
Planning Commission 2005).
The Federal Government has encouraged state and local governments to develop and
implement their own economic empowerment and development strategies—SEEDS and
LEEDS. The underlying strategy is the cohesive coordination of development process,
through the adoption of bottom-up approaches and the inclusiveness of all stakeholders
in development.
The new development strategy accords with the tenets of the human development
paradigm in the following ways:
• It promotes local participation in development management.
• It effectively discontinues the top-down approach of development management
and upholds the bottom-up approach.
• It ensures value for money in service delivery.
• It makes development people-centered, with people being the means and end of
true development.
The human development paradigm is also relevant to the Federal Government strategy
because it embodies the following concerns:
Box 1.6: Millennium Development Goals
1. Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achievement of universal primary education
3. Promotion of gender equality and the empowerment
of women
4. Reduction of child mortality
5. Improvement of maternal health
6. Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensuring environmental sustainability
8. Developing a global partnership for development
Source: UNDP/National Planning Commission
42
• Development must put people at the centre.
• The purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices, not just income.
People must have the freedom to do what they want to do and be what they want
to be.
• Human development is concerned with both building human capabilities
through investment in people and utilizing these capabilities fully for growth and
employment.
• Human development emphasizes equality, sustainability, productivity and
empowerment. Issues such as gender inequality, regional inequality, social and
political exclusion, participation, human rights, the rule of law and basic
freedoms must be addressed.
• Human development defines the ends of development and analyses sensible
options for achieving them.
The application of the human development approach in the Niger Delta could provide
new insights into development planning for that region. Among other things, by
recognizing that the real wealth of the Niger Delta is its people, the right environment
will be created for policies that go beyond sheer economic preoccupations and gains in
order to enrich people’s lives.
The section that follows elaborates the analytical framework of the report, starting with
a description of the practical tools and approaches of the preparatory process.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
The data for this study came from both primary and secondary sources. It was, however,
difficult to obtain all the data required through these sources. To resolve the problems
created by this dearth of data, standard techniques for interpolating missing data were
used, some of which are presented in the report. Data were collected from local and state
governments.
Secondary Sources
Before data collection began, the report team carried out an extensive literature review
and search for existing records. Sources comprised local government offices, relevant
ministries, parastatals and companies; books on development issues in the Niger Delta;
reports by non-governmental and community-based organizations; annual reports of oil
companies and corporate organizations; public institutions such as the Independent
National Electoral Commission, state independent electoral commissions, the NDDC
and the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES); and the Internet. Other national
human development reports prepared by UNDP and outputs by various human rights
43
organizations, including Human Rights Watch, were consulted as baseline resource
materials.
Following an exhaustive search for existing secondary data on the indicators of interest,
however, the data gaps were daunting. For many of the indicators, data were either not
available at all at both the state and local level, or available at the state level only. Very
few of the indicators had data at the local level. To solve this problem, primary sources
were utilized.
Primary Sources
Primary data were obtained through surveys and focus group discussions. One hundred
and fifty questionnaires (50 in each senatorial district) were administered in each of the
nine states of the Niger Delta, amounting to 1,350 collected from the region overall.
Specific information (especially on the perceptions of research subjects) was obtained
from the nine states of the Niger Delta on issues including governance, poverty,
sustainable livelihoods, gender relationships, conflicts and HIV&AIDS. The information
sources included women, men, youth and opinion leaders in communities.
Focus group discussions were also conducted to obtain information on knowledge about
poverty, the role of government, the level of infrastructure development, gender
relationships, conflict, HIV&AIDS, etc. Eight discussions were conducted in each of the
Niger Delta states. This amounts to 72 focus group discussions. They took into
consideration the age, gender, cultural, socio-political and other diversities and
complexities of the area. Participants were carefully selected to avoid bias. They covered
all segments of society, including opinion leaders, church leaders, traditional authorities,
community leaders, youths, women’s groups, academics, civil society representatives,
etc.
A General Data Problem
While official data sources exist in Nigeria, their data are often hardly disaggregated
according to vital demographics, including at the state, local government and ward (or
community) levels. Where data sources exist, there are often confusing discrepancies
between various sources, to the extent that official databases are rendered unusable by
structural inconsistencies and systematic compilation errors that threaten data reliability
and validity. Due to the unavailability of data on some indicators at the local
government level, realistic proxies were used to fill the gaps. This does not in any way
affect the reliability of the data.
WHERE IS THE NIGER DELTA?
Geography
For practical purposes, the Niger Delta region is defined as comprising the area covered
by the natural delta of the Niger River and the areas to the east and west, which also
44
produce oil. The natural limits of the Niger River Delta can be defined by its geology
and hydrology. Its approximate northern boundaries are located close to the bifurcation
of the Niger River at Aboh, while the western and eastern boundaries are around the
Benin River and the Imo River, respectively. The area covers approximately 25,900
square kilometres (ERML 1997). The broader Niger Delta region, which includes all oilproducing
areas and others considered relevant for reasons of administrative
convenience, political expedience and development objectives, extends the land area to
75,000 square kilometres. It is this definition that is used by the NDDC and in this
report. Defined in this way, the Niger Delta consists of nine states (Abia, Akwa Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers) and 185 local governments.
Map 1.1 shows the Niger Delta and its constituent states.
Geology, Relief, Drainage and Ecological Zones
The natural delta of the Niger River is a vast sedimentary basin. The deltaic deposits
comprise mainly medium to coarse unconsolidated sands, silt, clay, shale and peat. The
delta is mostly a flat, low-lying swampy basin criss-crossed by a dense network of
meandering rivers and creeks. There are four broad ecological zones in the region
defined by both relief and hydrological characteristics. These are, from the coast inland,
the coastal sandy barrier ridge zone, the mangrove swamp zone, the freshwater swamp
zone and the lowland rainforest zone.
The coastal sandy barrier zone, as the name suggests, is made up of a chain of sandy
barrier islands, which are separated by numerous estuaries and inlets. The islands are
generally less than one metre above the sea level at high tide. They extend along the
outer coastline from the Benin River to the Imo River. Typically, they are 16 to 20
kilometres wide. Because of their relatively higher topography, which keeps them from
the tidal influence of the marine and brackish waters, the coastal barrier islands support
freshwater forests and associated fauna. These islands are also often flooded during the
year when rainfall is heavy.
Moving inland, the mangrove swamp zone occurs immediately after the barrier islands. It
is the swampiest of the ecological zones, being essentially a massive swamp dotted with
islands of dry land covering about 10,240 square kilometres (Mosunmolu 1998). Most of
the zone is at elevations of less than one metre, and it is generally muddy and under
tidal influence. Within the zone are feeder channels that move tidal waters into the
swamp, connecting channels and inter-fluves.
45
Map 1.1: States and Local Governments of the Niger Delta
Boki
Akamkpa
Ikom
Yala
Ose
Ilaje
Idanre
Burutu
Odigbo
Brass
Biase
Owo
Irele
Southern Ijaw
Orhionmwon
Ekeremor
Ovia South-West
Ogoja
Warri North
Ini
Obubra
Uhunmwonde
Ovia North-East
Odukpani Etche
Etung
Akuku Toru
Akoko-Edo
Ndokwa East
Obanliku
Degema
Ogbia
Owan East
Nembe Bonny
Yakurr
Emuoha Sagbama
Warri South-West
Etsako East
Bende
Ikwerre
Ese Odo
Abi
Khana
Ondo West
Okitipupa
Okpe
Akpabuyo
Oguta
Yenegoa
Esan South-East
Etsako West
Itu
Obudu
Ikpoba-Okha
Ohafia
Sapele
Ughelli North
Ohaji/Egbema
Owan West
Isoko South
Aniocha South
Abua/Odual
Ughelli South
Ndokwa West
Uruan
Akure North
Warri South
Tai
Ukwuani
Arochukwu
Uyo
Ikono
Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni
Oruk Anam
Ika South
Esan West
Okobo
Etsako Central
Ngor-Okpala
Ibeno
Okigwe
Ile Oluji/Okeigbo
Ifedore
Iguegben
Obi Nwga
Oredo
Ethiope West
Isoko North
Ika
Abak
Eket
Isuikwuato
Ikot Abasi
Oshimili North
Oyigbo
Mbo
Patani
Okrika
Ikwuano
Andoni
Ondo East
Ika North E ast
Bekwarra
Udu
Orlu
Ahoada West
Onna
Mkpat Enin
Ibiono Ibom
Aniocha North
Akoko South West
Mbatoli
Akoko North West
Etinan
Umu-Nneochi
Akure South
Ahoada East
Ukwa East
Ukanafun
Ethiope East
Ikeduru
Owerri West
Ukwa West
Essien Udim
Obio/Akpor
Eleme
Akoko North East
Obot Akara
Etim Ekpo
Esan North-East
Egor
Esit Ek et
Nsit Ubium
Oshimili S outh
Kolokuma/Opokuma Omumma
Umuahia North
Gokana
Nsit Atai
Uvwie
Owerri North
Ideato North
Oru East
Nsit Ibom
Njaba
Isiala-Ngwa South
Obowo
Isiala Mbano
Akoko South East
Osisioma Ngwa
Calabar South
Ezinihitte
Ehime -Mbano
Orsu
Unuimo
Asari-Toru
Ikot Ekpene
Opobo/Nkoro
Ugwunagbo
Bomadi
Calabar Municipal
Bakassi
Udung Uko
Asa
Odi
ORO
AWI
EBU OHE
UGO
UPE
EKE
OPA
IJU
OWO
UTE
OKO
IDU
ABE
AFO
OKE
UHI
EWU
EKO
ISU
IFE
MBA
IKO
EDU
OTU
UBE
NDE
AKO
ORE
Agge
Egho
Avba
Ellu
Irri
Onya
Ogbe
Deli
Zion
Ugho
Okwa
Ugbo
Adia
ASSA
Escravos
BAGA
IFON
EGBA
UVBE
EHOR
IMEN
OKPE
EKON EKPE
IBIE
OKWE
EGBU
MPAM
LERU
NKEK
IKPE
UFUT
UGEP
EFAM
NSAN
IBUM
EDOR
NFOM
OBAN
ALOK
NKUM
NFUM
UGHU
IKOM ABIA
ONYA
NJUA
EGBE
BOJE
OTUK
OKPE
OGUN
WULA
OKWE
UGBO
ONDO
Amazo Ofoni
Atuar Atuar
Ndoro
Osifo Warri
Akoko
Umutu
Molume
Tobor
Tunwe
Obodo
Oburu
Ichue
Isara Umuti
Olodi
Paina
IRELE
Awoye ATANI
IBUSA
IKANG
OBIGA
ILARA
ALADE
EDEDE
ILADO
AMATA
ODEYA
BENIN
IYERE
EKORO
IPELE
ISABA
IMORU
IRHUE
ORHUA
URONI
IRRUA
OTTAH
OSOSO
EKPON
IBORE
UMUDO
ATUMA
EREMA
ILLAH
NGENE
ANWAI
FEGGE
AKATA
OBITE
AKABA
AGAJA
AKAWA
IFOKO
ABAKI
AMIYIAMEKE
NGUZU
IPENE
EDIBA
EKURI
BETEM
KURAP
AKATA
IBUNA
IKOYA
BODOM
LEFIN
IFETA
ONYEN
OLOPA
OFFEN
MFUMA
ESAJA
MBAKA
IJAMA
MKPOT
OKUKU
OGOJA
ETOMI
MARAN
BAWOP
MBEBU
ABUNG
GAKEM
BASUA
OBANG
BAMBA
ASHAM
UMAJI
NDIRI
OLOW O
AJAPA
Ijansa
Okuntu
Yobebe
Okueka
Anuabo Obotie
Eghoro Opuama
Ugbege
Olagwe
Ogbaja
Biseni
Kulama
OKPOSO
IDANRE
KEKERE
UBAOKE
SILUKO
JIMGBE
EGBEDA
GBEN TU
IJAGBA
OZALLA
IDOGUN
OBADON
OROGHO
IGARRA
SASARO
OLOGHEEBELLE
EWOSSA
OKOHIA
OBIGBO
NZEREM
DORILE
MAYUTU
AHIAFO
AGANSA NTAFRE
NKPANI
OLOKUN
ATAKEN
DUWANG
ENIONA
BRAMAH
IBINTA
AGBU NG
OBIOKO
NDEKKE
NTINUB
NSARUM
NSADUP
EKUMBA
AJASSA
OKUNDI
ALONYE
AGBABU
OMINLA ODIGBO
IGBADO
Abuluku
Isikite
Umuedim
Osemele
Ekeresa
Ughotor
Nikrowa
GBELEJU
OMOLOMO
POTOGRI
YOPEARA
ADUFORE
OROBIRI
BOGOUBO
ARAROMI
UZUALLA
OTUOFOR
EVBOESI
IGBANKE
TINGIBI
UMUOKWU
LEKWESI
AGER IGE
IFUNKPA
ODERIGA
IFUMKPA
NJO-IKO
OGAMANA
OKOKORI
DONGALA
OBUTONG
OGANGAN
NDAREKE
BANSARA
EKPOKPA
INSOFAN
OKAR ARA
OKOROBA
OKER OKU
AKPAKPA
OGBERIA
ABOABAM
KANYANG
ABANADE
BAKALUM
KUNDEVE
Obikwele
Umuokolo
Kolokolo
Tenfiasa
LOKPANTA
IGBATORO
BENIBOYE
BILABIRI
AGIGBIGI
EMAOJOMA
IYAMITET
OFONBONG
WANAGINA
RAILHEAD
ASHEWELE
IGUNSHIN
LAGBOGBO
Bisaghene
Ogidigben
Ofuo Camp
Forupafor
Kulama 11
Odoigbene
ISEKELEWU
OTUGBEMBO
OMIFUNFUN
AIYEGUNLE
ILAJAKIRI
UGO-OZADA
IKOT-IYAN
ESUK-ARIM
EDIK-IDIM
EKANG-AWA
ABANTOKEN
VANDEIKYA
AIYEBIMBO
ITA-OGBOLU
YOKR I-SOBO
AGO-OGBODO
ESUK-NTEHE
EKONGAHAKU
AKPARABONG
AGA-OSOGBON
ARAROMI-ISO
IHITA-NANSA
AGBARA-IGBO
RIO-DEL-REY
Urhobo Camps
Ogolangaragbene
AQUA-OBIO-EFFIATA
EKET
ONNE
KOKO
EHOR
EKET
Warri
WARRI
WARRI
WARRI
Sapele
Amukpe
AKASSA
SAPELE
AMUKPE
UGHELLI
Ughelli
OGOLOMA
SAGBAMA
SAGBAMA
FORCADOS
PORT-HARCOURT
BRASS
States
LGAs
Communities
100 0 100 200 Kilometers
LEGEND
5°
5°
6°
6°
7°
7°
5°
5°
6°
6°
7°
7°
8°
8°
9°
9°
46
The freshwater swamp zone is characterized by seasonal flooding. It is during the rainy
season that its swampy characteristics are vividly obvious. It has the most distinct
subdivisions, is most diverse in terms of biology and supports a similar ecology to the one in
the coastal barrier islands. The zone’s three subdivisions are the flood forest zone or ’upper
delta’, the marsh forest zone and the eastern flank. The flood forest subdivision has large sand
river channels, permanent creeks and seasonal flood creeks, and is inundated annually by the
Niger River flood. Flood-free levees are common, while back swamps and cane forests help
give the zone a highly diverse habitat. The marsh forest subdivision is also referred to as the
transition zone. It is permanently swampy and under flooding from freshwater. Muddy
swamp channels and raffia swamps can be found in the zone, and its species of wildlife are
usually different from those of the flood forest zone. The eastern flank is thought to have been
a flood forest when the Orashi River was a major tributary of the Niger Delta (Powell 1995).
The lowland rainforest zone is in the northern part of the Niger Delta region, beyond the
areas of dense river and creek networks. It is not considered within the area defined by
the natural limits of the Niger Delta, but falls within the broader Niger Delta area. This
is the least swampy part of the region. It has a varied geology and terrain, but
sedimentary rock formations, mostly sandstone with some shale and limestone, underlie
most areas. The rock formations present a ridge and valley topography. In some areas of
Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Ondo states, the terrain is characterized by advanced gully
erosion. In Edo, Cross River and Ondo states, there are areas of old, crystalline basement
complex rocks, mainly granites, gneisses and granodiorite. These areas are characterized
by rugged, rocky terrain with massive rock domes and inselbergs.
Apart from the Niger River, the other major rivers in the region include the Cross, Imo,
Qua Iboe and Orashi in the east; and the Benin, Oluwa and Siluko in the west.
Climate
The Niger Delta has a semi-hot, humid equatorial climate with wide variations from one
part of the region to another. This is a place of uniformly high temperatures throughout
the year, high relative humidity and intense rainfall, which occurs almost year round in
the core delta, but becomes markedly seasonal further inland with increasing distance
from the ocean. Copious rainfall coupled with the low relief and high water table
produce frequent flooding (see box 1.7).
47
The mean annual rainfall in the Niger Delta region varies from 4,000 millimetres in the
coastal towns of Bonny (Rivers State) and Brass (Bayelsa State), to about 3,000
millimetres in the central Niger Delta towns of Ahoada (Rivers), Yenagoa (Bayelsa) and
Warri (Delta), and about 2,400 millimetres in the northern Abia and Imo states. In the
more interior locations in the northern parts of Cross River and Ondo states, mean
annual rainfall is much less, ranging from 2,000 millimetres nearer the coast to 1,500
millimetres farther inland.
Temperatures are high and fairly constant throughout the year. Average monthly
temperatures for the warmest months (February to April) range from 28 degrees Celsius
to 33 degrees Celsius, while the average monthly temperatures for the coolest months,
June to September, range from 21 degrees Celsius to 23 degrees Celsius.
BOX 1.7: Climate
The Niger Delta has a humid, semi-hot equatorial climate. The
region experiences heavy rainfall, leading to floods in urban
areas and communities along the rivers. Due to the heavy and
frequent rainfalls, soils consisting mainly of silt and clay
become saturated, reducing infiltration to the barest minimum
and encouraging run-off. Rainfall induced run-off is directed
mainly to the back swamps in the upper and middle parts of
the delta. In the coastal zone, there is an even smaller
topographic gradient that makes run-off difficult.
Precipitation frequently results in flooding.
On average, about 10 per cent of the total annual rainfall
occurs during the dry season months of November to March.
Rainfall Distribution in Selected Communities
Community Number of
years
covered
Average total
annual rainfall
(mm)
Average
number of
rain days
Nembe 5 3419 128
Ahoada 4 1989 121
Ndele 5 2285 124
Port-Harcourt 31 2286 180
Calabar 63 2651 190
Warri 64 2842 183
Source: NDDC 2003.
48
The People
The Niger Delta region is extremely heterogeneous with respect to culture and ethnicity.
The five major linguistic and cultural groups—the Ijoid, Edoid, Delta Cross, Yoruboid
and Igboid—are each composed of numerous sub-groups. The Ijoid, who are said to
have the longest settlement history in the Niger Delta, are the most complex
linguistically. Each of the numerous clans of this group has some linguistic and cultural
distinctiveness. In certain cases, villages in the same clan have linguistic differences. This
group, which occupies virtually the whole of Bayelsa State, is also found in Rivers,
Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo and Ondo states.
The Edoid group is made up mainly of the Isoko and Urhobo of Delta State, the Edo of
Edo State, the Engenni and Apie-Atissa of Bayelsa State, and the Degema of Rivers State.
Even within these groups, several sub-groups exist; many claim to have their own
individual identity. The groups within the Urhobo are good examples. Typical cases are
the Okpe and Uvbie. Among the Edoid groups, the Urhobo is the largest. Although the
Edo is a larger group overall, most of them are found outside the Niger Delta region.
The Edoid groups in Bayelsa and Rivers states are considered largely within the Ijoid
group because of the cultural impact the latter has had on the former.
The Delta Cross comprises mainly the Ogoni, Ogba, Abua, Odual and Obolo/Andoni in
Rivers State and the Ibibio, Oron and Ibeno of Akwa Ibom State. The Ibibio is the largest
of these groups. The most well known, especially internationally, is the Ogoni because
of its agitation for resource control and autonomy. The ethno-cultural complexity of the
Niger Delta region is vividly illustrated by the fact that even a small ethnic group like
the Ogoni (about 500,000 people) is made up of at least four cultural groups: the Khana,
Gokama, Tai and Eleme.
In spite of the fact that the Yoruba and the Igbos are two of the largest ethnic groups in
Nigeria, the related groups in the Niger Delta are some of the smallest there. The main
Yoruboid groups are the Itsekiri of Delta State, and the Ilaje and Ikale in the borderlands
of Ondo State. The main Igboid groups are the Ikwerre, Ndoni, Egbema, Ogba and
Ekpeye in Rivers State and the Ukuwani in Delta State.
Before modern times, there was considerable interaction among the groups of the Niger
Delta region, especially those of the core Niger Delta. This interaction has always been in
terms of trade and inter-group marriages. One major system of exchange is the trade
between the Ijaws, who fish, and the agricultural Urhobos. Until recently, Itsekiri female
traders were important facilitators of this trade. Inter-group marriages have been so
significant, particularly among the Urhobo, Itsekiri and Western Ijaws, that a large
A long history of close interaction between different groups has not prevented an intense
competition for resources. Without oil and gas, there may have been far fewer conflicts.
49
proportion of families in some areas are multicultural.
Given such interactions, it is curious that inter-ethnic conflicts have been common in the
Niger Delta. But the competition for resources, especially land in this land-short region,
has been intense. The emergence of petroleum on the scene seems to have accentuated
such conflicts. There is no doubt that the incidence of conflicts may have been
considerably less if there had been no oil and gas in the region. The development
challenge is how to manage these conflicts so that the business of promoting human
development can go on without interruption.
Settlement Patterns
Settlement patterns in the delta are influenced by topography and drainage. In the
coastal beach ridge zone, dry land is readily available, though in narrow strips.
Settlements in this area typically stretch along the coast with little breadth. Various wide
estuaries separate settled areas. A number of sizeable settlements, such as Bonny,
Akassa and New Forcados, are located here.
Given the fact that the mangrove swamp zone is a massive swamp with scattered
islands, population is sparsely distributed. The swamp is virtually uninhabited except
for fishing camps; some settlements exist on dry islands. Settlement size is dependent on
the size of a given island. Large settlements include Buguma, Nembe and Burutu.
Land is more or less continuous in the freshwater swamp region, save for the numerous
creeks. Since much of the land is swampy, habitation is usually in areas of high land.
The levees along the rivers and creeks are the favoured sites, and often densely
populated. Other areas are very sparsely settled. Major settlements include Sagbama,
Oleh and Patani.
Of all the zones, the lowland rainforest zone provides the best places for settlement.
Most of the large settlements are found here, although the largest towns in the Niger
Delta—Port Harcourt and Warri—are found in the transition zone between swampland
and the more solid land of the lowland rainforests.
Size Distribution of Settlements
Small settlements with less than 1,000 people (table 1.1) dominate in the Niger Delta,
There are 13,329 settlements in the region, and 94 per cent of these have populations of less
than 5,000. Limited space explains the prevalence of small settlements.
Development should reach people without recourse to forced relocation or agglomeration of
settlements.
50
followed by settlements in the range of 1,000 to 5,000 people. The NDDC Regional
Master Plan determined that there are 13,329 settlements in the region, and 94 per cent
of these have populations of less than 5,000. Only 98 settlements, or one per cent, can be
regarded as urban centres based on population size. The prevalence of small settlements
is explained by a number of factors. First, the environment provides limited space for
human settlement, given the fragmentation of land into islands and the occurrence of
dry land in isolated pockets. Most settlements are small and dispersed. Second, fishing
communities all over the world characteristically dwell in small fishing villages close to
their fishing grounds. Third, as indicated above, the Niger Delta is home to many small
minority groups, each of which is composed of numerous clans. Each clan cherishes its
own private space.
Table 1.1 Size Distribution of Settlements in the Niger Delta
NDDC states Less than
1,000 people
1,000-5,000
people
5,000-20,000
people
20,000 people
and above
Abia 393 494 52 11
Akwa Ibom 1,236 1,098 46 7
Bayelsa 290 317 85 4
Cross River 117 500 56 8
Delta 1,016 307 104 22
Edo 903 264 70 11
Imo 788 925 81 2
Ondo 1,463 278 57 16
Rivers 428 598 213 17
Niger Delta 7,686 4,781 764 98
Source: Centre for Population and Environment Development (CPED), 2003,p.236.
Given this preponderance of small settlements, the task of promoting sustainable human
development in the Niger Delta is that much harder. Size plays an important role in the
promotion of development, whether human or economic. In many parts of the world,
the human development agenda has revolved mainly around large settlements.
Developmental artefacts usually involve large capital outlays and great elements of risk,
and are therefore more likely to be located in areas where the risks are low and profit or
potential use can be maximized. Many products can only be produced economically at a
certain scale; many innovations are adoptable by production units of a certain size; and
many organizations require a certain minimum support threshold to exist. All of these
factors point to large settlements, which are universally accepted as engines of human
and economic development (see Abumere 2000, 2004; Mabogunje 1965). Unfortunately,
this phenomenon has often fostered inequality in development between urban and rural
areas. This is especially true in Nigeria, where many of the cities are parasites that
absorb resources without spreading development to surrounding rural areas. In
Small settlements, topography and a swampy landscape make the task of
promoting sustainable human development in the Niger Delta harder.
51
particular, large settlements with populations of 20,000 or more are few in the Niger
Delta (see table 1.1). Only Delta, Rivers, Ondo, Abia and Edo States have reasonable
numbers of such settlements.
The distribution of settlements by size is of considerable interest, therefore, in the
articulation of a viable human development agenda for the Niger Delta region. This
agenda should take development to the people of the region, without any recourse to
forced relocation and agglomeration of settlements. Naturally, over time, some
settlements are bound to emerge as ‘growth centres’ that—due to an advantageous
location or the existence of some employment-generating economic activities and/or the
provision of social facilities—are able to draw population from the surrounding areas.
Given the historical background of the region, any agenda that includes forced
relocation and agglomeration of settlements will only exacerbate the volatile
atmosphere, rather than promoting the needed transformation.
Population and Demographic Characteristics
Population size and density
In the 1991 census, the total population of all nine states of the Niger Delta was 20.5
million (see table 1.2). This was made up of 10.133 million males and 10.329 million
females. The projected total population for 2005 is 28.9 million, rising to 39.2 million by
2015 and 45.7 million by 2020. The states with the highest population sizes are Rivers,
Delta, Akwa Ibom and Imo. With the possible exception of Bayelsa and Cross River
states, there are probably no significant differences in population sizes among the states.
Differences do show up in population densities. The overall population density for the
Niger Delta region based on the 1991 population is 182 persons per square kilometre.
But some states have densities far above this—e.g. Abia State (478 per square kilometre),
Akwa Ibom (354 per square kilometre), Imo (481 per square kilometre) and Rivers (307
per square kilometre). Population distribution within each state is uneven, particularly
in the states in the core Niger Delta, where the fragmented, swampy landscape
constrains human settlements.
Age-sex composition
Based on the 1991 census, there is almost an even distribution of population between
men and women in the Niger Delta region. In some states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo
and Imo), there are more females than males (see table 1.3). This has implications for
development planning especially in a situation where gender disparity has been a major
problem. The NDDC Regional Master Plan, however, reports that there are more males
(54 per cent) than females (46 per cent) in the Niger Delta region. If this is confirmed by
the 2006 National Census, then things may have turned around. What may not have
changed is the male domination of traditional Nigerian society.
52
Available information on the age structure of the population of states in the Niger Delta
region depicts a large segment of young people below 30 years of age. This group
comprises 62.1 per cent of the population of the region, compared with 35.8 per cent of
adults in the 30- to 69-year age bracket. This demographic feature has various
implications for development planning and the financing of social services. A youthful
age structure implies that many people remain outside of the working age bracket. In
the formative years, social investment rather than economic investment is required. This
creates an additional dependency burden for the average family or the economically
active population, and states in the Niger Delta. The magnitude of such a burden tends
to be greater for impoverished families or population units that are either unemployed,
under-employed or lack the benefit of full employment. A comparatively high
proportion of people below the working age also tends to reduce labour input per capita
and income per capita.
Fertility, life expectancy and mortality
Available household survey data for 2004 put the average crude birth rate for the Niger
Delta region at 45.8 per 1,000 people. The corresponding average natural growth rate of
3.1 per cent per annum across the region is, thus, higher than the rate of 2.5 per cent
often used by the Government for estimating the growth rate of rural population in the
country.
There is little empirical data on life expectancy in the delta. But the best national
estimates, citing figures from 2000, indicate that average life expectancy is 46.8 years.
The present figure may have dropped to about 43 years because of the economic
deprivations of the intervening years and the cumulative impact of HIV&AIDS. It is
assumed that life expectancy in the region is similar to that in the rest of the country.
Nevertheless, even in the best of times, life expectancy has tended to be lower in the
more economically deprived communities, such as those in the most swampy and least
accessible parts of the core Niger Delta. Although hard longitudinal data are also
generally lacking on specific maternal and infant mortality rates, the crude death rate for
the Niger Delta region was 14.7 per 1,000 people in 2003 (CPED 2003). Low life
expectancy, of course, is also a reflection of high mortality rates. For instance, against the
A youthful demographic structure means many people remain outside of the working age
bracket and are in their formative years, when social investment is heaviest.
Although life expectancy in the region is similar to that in the rest of the country, it has
tended to be lower in the more economically deprived communities.
53
life expectancy index of 0.78 for Saudi Arabia and 0.70 for Indonesia in 2003 (UNDP
2005), the oil producing LGAs of Bakassi in Cross River state had 0.392, while Burutu of
Delta state, Brass of Bayelsa state, and Bonny of Rivers state had 0.433, 0.458, and 0.471,
respectively.
As a nation, Nigeria has one of the worst child survival rates in the world. Child
mortality is as high as 178 per 1,000. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), about one out of five Nigerian children die before the age of five years. Child
infant mortality rates are 105 per 1,000 live births. Nigeria also has one of the world’s
highest maternal death rates, between 704 to 1,000 deaths per 100,000 women.
54
Table 1.2: Projected Population of Niger Delta States
States
Land
area
(kms2)
Male Female Both 1996 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020
Abia 4,877 1,123,754 1,210,013 2,333,567 2,667,762 3,026,623 3,230,000 3,763,000 4,383,000 6,106,000
Akwa Ibom 6,806 1,167,829 1,241,784 2,409,613 2,746,748 3,131,230 3,343,000 3,895,000 4,537,000 6,285,000
Bayelsa 11,007 584,117 537,576 1,121,693 1,327,488 1,571,540 1,710,000 1,992,000 2,320,000 2,703,000
Cross River 21,930 956,136 955,159 1,911,295 2,206,105 2,546,388 2,736,000 3,187,000 3,712,000 4,325,000
Delta 17,163 1,271,932 1,318,569 2,590,491 2,952,900 3,365,881 3,694,000 4,186,000 4,877,000 5,681,000
Edo 19,698 1,085,156 1,086,849 2,172,005 2,475,352 2,826,004 3,018,000 3,516,000 4,096,000 4,871,000
Imo 5,165 1,166,448 1,319,187 2,485,636 2,798,238 3,150,050 3,342,000 3,894,000 4,535,000 5,283,000
Ondo 15,086 1,121,898 1,127,650 2,249,548 2,532,535 2,851,293 3,025,000 3,524,000 4,105,000 4,782,000
Rivers 10,378 1,655,441 1,532,423 3,187,864 3,772,738 4,466,293 4,858,000 5,659,000 6,592,000 7,679,000
Niger Delta 112,110 10,132,711 10,329,200 20,461,711 23,469,866 26,934,302 28,856,000 33,616.000 39,157,000 45,715,000
Source: CEPD, 2003, p.339.
Table 1.3: Sex Distribution of Population, 1991 (per cent)
State Male Female
Abia 48.2 51.8
Akwa Ibom 48.5 51.5
Bayelsa 52.1 47.9
Cross River 50.0 50.0
Delta 49.1 50.9
Edo 50.0 50.0
Imo 46.9 53.1
Ondo 49.9 48.1
Rivers 51.9 48.1
Niger Delta 49.5 50.5
Source: National Population Census 1991.
44
Economy
Fishing and agriculture are the two major traditional occupations of the Niger
Delta peoples. During the colonial era, forestry was introduced as the third major
economic activity in the region. Today, agriculture, fishing and forestry still
account for about 44 per cent of employment (see chart 1.1). All three economic
activities have declined since the ascendancy of the oil industry, however.
Rubber plantations that once covered thousands of hectares of land in Edo and
Delta states were cleared as the oil boom took hold. Many palm oil and cocoa
plantations were abandoned and allowed to revert to bush. Fortunately, since the
1990s, there have been renewed efforts to resuscitate the agricultural sector. New
rubber plantations are being established; cocoa and oil palm farms are being
rehabilitated. Also, there is increased activity in arable crop cultivation,
particularly of cassava for commercial purposes.
The urban sector, with its concentration of informal sector activities, plays a
growing role in the economy of the Niger Delta region. Trading (17.4 per cent),
services (9.8 per cent) and miscellaneous activities (11.1 per cent) are the most
important areas of employment, after agriculture, fishing and forestry overall.
But a strong informal sector economic base is also growing in rural areas.
One major contemporary challenge facing the region’s economy may be how to
revamp the rural economy by optimizing and modernizing agriculture as well as
fishing. Oil wealth can be put to good use in this regard. The people of the Niger
Delta Region would feel that they have gained something substantial to make up
for all the miseries associated with past neglect.
Rubber plantations that once covered thousands of hectares of land in Edo and
Delta states were cleared as the oil boom took hold. Many palm oil and cocoa
plantations were abandoned and allowed to revert to bush.
Revamping the rural economy by optimizing and modernizing agriculture and fishing
would empower people in rural areas.
The ascendancy of the oil industry has meant the decline of traditional economic
activities. Oil wealth needs to be channelled into revamping the rural economy.
45
Chart 1.1: Percentage Distribution of EmployedHousehold Members by IndustryofEmployment (Niger Delta)
Agriculture
Mining/quarrying
Manufacturi ng/
processing
Construct ion
Transport
Trade/sel ling
Services
Education/health
Admin
Others
Source: NDDC Master Plan 2003/2004.
International Oil Company Activities
The Niger Delta Region has been particularly attractive to major international oil
companies, including Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Elf, Agip and Texaco, among others,
which have been involved in joint ventures with the Federal Government in
connection with oil exploration, exploitation and production. Links between
their operations and human deprivation in some areas of the delta has local
raised expectations that the oil companies should contribute to physical and
human development in affected communities. Other expectations include the
monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights, compliance with
environmental standards for exploration and exploitation, and, where necessary,
restitution for damages. For their part, oil companies expect the provision of
security for the oil facilities, the prevention of damage to their facilities and
environment and the protection of their personnel.
Links between oil companies’ operations and human deprivation in some areas of the
delta has raised local expectations that the oil companies should contribute to physical
and human development in affected communities.
46
Oil company operations have included some externalities. For example, oil
production has often damaged the environment in the region. This dimension is
further elaborated in chapter three of this report. The perennial conflicts between
the oil companies and the local communities are discussed in chapter five.
It is also true that oil production and oil-based industrial expansion by the
multinational oil companies have transformed the local economy of the region.
Some communities have greatly benefited from oil production, through
attractive wages for full-time employment or specialized contractual services,
although underemployment and unemployment are also rife. Development
spending by the oil companies has brought appreciable social services, utilities
and other infrastructure to pockets of the region, in the absence of what the
government could have provided.
Infrastructure and Social Services
In general, the available social development indicators in the Niger Delta region
point to inadequate, unavailable and poor quality infrastructure and social
services, from water to telecommunications. The historical neglect of the region’s
development poses a steep barrier to attaining socio-economic transformation
and poverty alleviation.
Water supply
A vivid account of the water supply situation was provided in the focus group
discussions held to prepare this report:
“Have you seen any taps here? … Water used to run in public taps, but that had stopped some 20 years ago. We basically
drink from the river and creeks. Then, this rainy season is also a blessing because we fetch water easily from God. Lack of
water has led some people to sink boreholes where water is produced and sold…the cheapest is N5.00 per 20
litres…hygiene is secondary.”
Data from the Federal Office of Statistics, now the National Bureau of Statistics,
reveal that water in the majority of Niger Delta states comes from unsafe supply
Oil companies’ activities have transformed the local economy of a few parts of the
region through attractive wages and the provision of social services. But
unemployment is also rife.
Inadequate infrastructure in the delta is the result of historical neglect.
47
facilities, including rivers, lakes or ponds, unprotected wells and boreholes (see
chart 1.2). The Bureau classifies available sources of potable water for household
consumption as: pipe borne, untreated pipe, borehole, protected well,
unprotected well, river/lake/pond, vendor trucks and other categories (see table
A1.1 in the appendix).
Chart 1.2: Sources of Potable Water
Source: National
Bureau of Statistics 2005.
In five of the nine states in the region—Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ondo
and Imo—water problems are very acute and result in supplies of unsafe water
in more than 50 per cent of the cases.
An NDES Report (2000) covering the states of the Niger Delta region, except
Cross River State, also found that most settlements depend on untreated surface
water and wells, which leads to health problems from waterborne diseases. It
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Akwa-
Ibom
Bayelsa Cross
River
Delta Edo Rivers Ondo Imo Abia
State
Percent
Pipe Borne
Untreated Pipe
Protected well
Unprotected Well
River Lake Pond
Vendor Truck
Others
Safe
Unsafe
Water in the majority of Niger Delta states comes from unsafe supply
facilities, including rivers, lakes or ponds, unprotected wells and boreholes.
About 20 per cent to 24 per cent of rural communities and 45 per cent to 50 per cent
of urban communities have access to safe drinking water.
48
was estimated that only 20 per cent to 24 per cent of rural communities and 45
per cent to 50 per cent of urban communities have access to safe drinking water.
Poor access to adequate drinking water has had serious implications for the
general health, environment, economic activity and sustainable livelihoods in the
Niger Delta region. The lack of potable water in rural areas, as well as severe
shortages of pipe-borne water in urban centres, necessitates new policies that
favour community involvement and participation in devising and managing
water supply systems in a sustainable fashion.
Transport
Field research for this report revealed that the delta’s roads are mostly bad.
Focus group participants described them as being impassable during the rainy
season. Efforts by local government authorities to repair the roads have
worsened them and left the local people with more hardship. Although urban
road transportation development has recently been accorded some priority
attention, less regard has been shown for rural transportation, especially water
transport, which the majority of the rural populace depend on. Focus group
participants referred to transport and communication in the area as a source of
misery, requiring people to trek long and excruciating distances due to the high
cost of motorcycle transport, a popular means of transport. Some roads have so
many death traps that motorists avoid them. One participant said that the only
vehicle-worthy road linking her community to the local government
headquarters is in a deplorable state of disrepair.
Telecommunication
The dearth of telecommunication infrastructure in the Niger Delta region stifles
the advancement of information technology and the development as well as
technical empowerment of the populace. Most rural communities are largely
unconnected and completely unable to take advantage of modern trends in
telecommunications and technology as tools for accelerated rural development.
Available data show that the number of telephone lines in the Niger Delta works
out at about 38 per 1,000 people. Growth in the number of land lines has stalled
in the last few years due to the introduction of the global system of mobile
Most rural dwellers see transport and communication as a source of misery. They
often trek long distances trekking due to the high cost of motorcycle transport.
49
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Akwa-
Ibom
Bayelsa Cross
River
Delta Edo Rivers Ondo Imo Abia
State
Percent
Fire Wood
Charcoal
Kerosine
Gas
Electricity
Crop Residue
Animal Waste
Others
communication.
Power and fuel
Data from the Federal Office of Statistics (see chart 1.3) show that across the region, on
average, only 34 per cent of people use electrical lighting; 61 per cent use kerosene or a
lantern. Less popular sources of lighting are gas (1.2 per cent on average), a generator
(1.5 per cent), batteries (0.2 per cent), candles (0.6 per cent), firewood (1.8 per
cent) and others (1.2 per cent).
The general sources of household fuel are firewood, charcoal, kerosene, gas,
electricity, crop residues, animal waste and others (see chart 1.4) The modal fuel
or primary energy source in the region is firewood (a mean of 73 per cent),
followed by kerosene (24.8 per cent) and gas (1.2 per cent).
Chart 1.3:
Percentage
Distribution of
Lighting Sources
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2005.
50
Chart 1.4 : Sources of Fuel (Energy)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2005
Housing
Housing in the Niger Delta region is predominantly of poor quality, especially in
the swamps and creeks where dwellings are made up largely of mud walls, and
stilt or strip foundations. A survey of 40 locations that included Warri, Port
Harcourt and Sapele by the NDES revealed that 30.4 per cent of houses had mud
walls, 53.8 per cent had corrugated-iron sheet roofing, and 46.6 per cent had a
strip foundation. Flooring materials vary widely, but are predominantly concrete
followed by mud.
Chart 1.5: Types of Housing in the Niger Delta Region
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Akwa-
Ibom
Bayelsa Cross
River
Delta Edo Rivers Ondo Imo Abia
State
Percent
Kerosene
Gas
Electricity
Generator
Battery
Candle
Firewood
Others
51
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2005) largely confirm the findings of
the NDES survey, but the lumping together of data for rural and urban centres
distorts the picture of housing conditions in the core Niger Delta states, where
small settlements and camps predominate. Charts 1.5 and 1.6 are based on the
National Bureau of Statistics data (see also table A1:4 and chart 1.7). Although
the charts indicate that concrete walls predominate, it is also true that mud
houses constitute a high proportion of housing in Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Cross
River states.
Chart 1.6: Types of House Flooring in the Niger Delta States
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2005.
Waste management
The Niger Delta region is laden with problems related to waste management.
These are the combined effects of environmental pollution from oil, gas and
industrial activities, as well as the implicit population/settlement issues in the
semi-urban and urban areas. Drawing from data from the National Bureau of
Statistics (2005), the most widespread methods of waste or refuse disposal are
disposal within household compounds (an average of 56.9 per cent) and disposal
in authorized heaps (34 per cent). Other methods are through collection by
government (3.3 per cent), collection by private service providers (2.7 per cent),
the use of government disposal bins (1.4 per cent) and others (2.7 per cent). See
also chart 1.7 for data on the distribution of household toilet facilities.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Akwa-
Ibom
Bayelsa Cross
River
Delta Edo Rivers Ondo Abia Imo
State
Percent
Earth or Mud
Wood or Tile
Plank
Concrete
Plant Straw
Others
52
Recent ecological studies have shown that the adverse consequences of waste
generation and improper disposal have been severe on both people and the
environment. These effects have also influenced the stagnation of human
livelihoods and the region’s economy. In increasing the misery and
impoverishment of the populace, they have exacerbated political tension,
acrimony, outright conflicts and violence.
Education
Statistical estimates have put the proportion of children attending primary
school at 80 per cent (which compares favourably with the estimated national
average of 54 per cent). But across the region, nearly all school facilities are in a
state of extreme disrepair, requiring major rehabilitation. The secondary school
system has been seriously afflicted by shortages of quality teachers, a regional
pattern that is becoming increasingly acute due in large part to discordance
between investments in infrastructure outside a well-coordinated planning
process.
Revealing the immense challenge to development and provision of social
amenities for sustainable livelihood, an NDES report (2000) noted that in the
Niger Delta states, covering some 30,000 square kilometres and with over 3,800
settlements and an estimated eight million people, there were only 2,169 primary
schools and 545 secondary schools. For primary schools, this implied one school
per 3,700 people serving an area of 14 square kilometres, and one school for
every two settlements. For secondary schools, the ratio is one school per 14,679
people serving an area of 55 square kilometres, and one school for every seven
settlements.
Nearly all school facilities are in a state of extreme disrepair, requiring major
rehabilitation. The secondary school system in particular has been seriously
afflicted by shortages of quality teachers.
53
Chart 1.7: Types of Household Toilet Facilities
Source: National Demographic and Health Survey 2003.
Health and health service delivery
Dismal health and health care service delivery manifests in poor hygiene; little or
no health information and education; a grossly inadequate capacity for service
delivery; inadequate provision of hospitals, clinics and primary health centres;
and a lack of effective operational plans for holistic health management. The
majority of Niger Delta communities living in isolated areas lack the most basic
modern medical care, including first aid, given the absence of formal health
services in much of the hinterland (for the various dimensions of infrastructure
and social services in the region, see the NDDC Regional Master Plan, 2003/2004,
chapter one, pp. 1-19).
The focus groups provided corroborative evidence on the status of health in the
region, affirming that modern health care facilities are largely absent. The few
existing public health care centers are all in critical need of repair. Villagers
described them as moribund and offering little or no assistance. The centers lack
Dismal health and health care service delivery manifests in poor hygiene; little or no
health information and education; a grossly inadequate capacity for service delivery;
inadequate provision of hospitals, clinics and primary health centres; and a lack of
effective operational plans for holistic health management.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Abia Akwa-
Ibom
Bayelsa Cross
River
Delta Edo Imo Ondo Rivers
Bush
Toilet on water
Flush to sewer
Flush to septic
Pail bucket
Covered pit latrine
Uncovered pit latrine
VIP latrine
Others
54
doctors, nurses, and critical supplies such as drugs, syringes and sterilizers.
There were a few privately run clinics, but focus group members said services
there cost exorbitant amounts. Community members resort to local and
traditional remedies to deal with their health conditions.
According to the NDES (1997), communities have identified health as a major
issue that must be addressed to improve their quality of life. In addition to a
range of diseases such as malaria, gastroenteritis, respiratory track infections,
measles, worm infestation, anaemia and heart diseases, malnutrition was seen as
a major problem, especially among children, with about 10 per cent to 12 per cent
severely malnourished, 18 per cent to 23 per cent moderately so, and 30 per cent
to 40 per cent mildly malnourished. Fuelling this problem is a perceived lack of
correct breastfeeding methods and household food insecurity.
According to an NDES (2000) report on primary health care, there is a ratio of
only one health care facility for every 9,805 people, with the average facility
serving an area of 44 square kilometres. There is one facility for approximately
every 43 settlements. The numbers worsen for secondary health care. There is
only one facility for every 131,174 people, serving an area of 583 square
kilometres. A single facility serves an average of 48 settlements. Poor access to
health care reduces people’s quality of life and increases their poverty.
CONCLUSION AND PREVIEW OF THE REPORT
This chapter has clearly shown that an income-centred development paradigm
would be grossly inadequate to deal with the varied and complex development
challenges facing the peoples of the Niger Delta. In failing to address the human
development needs of the region, past development planning efforts have
resulted in disillusionment and frustration about deepening socio-economic
deprivation and environmental devastation. The peoples of the Niger Delta have
seen one government-sponsored development agency after another come and go,
without any significant changes in their lives or in the quality of their delicate
physical environment. There is clearly a need for a new development paradigm
that makes people the centre of all development goals and actions.
A people-centred or participatory approach to development planning and
management involves people’s active participation in decision-making on issues
that pertain to their livelihoods and interests. This helps people to realize their
potential and play an active role in the social and economic transformation of
their different communities. A people-centred development paradigm would
help not only to achieve the goals of physical and socio-economic development,
55
but also to empower the local people, who are undoubtedly the most important
factor in the development process in the Niger Delta.
Chapter two of this report provides an account of the human development status
of the Niger Delta region. It examines poverty scenarios, with the aid of
associated metrics and graphics—including the human development index
(HDI), the human poverty index for developing countries (HPI-1), the genderrelated
development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure
(GEM)—and looks at disparities in the incidence of poverty by location and
group. The chapter also assesses the region’s progress towards achieving the
MDGs.
The focus of chapter three is the environment-development nexus. The chapter
analyses the wide-ranging changes in the Niger Delta environment, attributed to
the impacts of oil and gas exploration and exploitation, industrialization and
urbanization. The negative social impacts of the environmental problems are
highlighted, including the frustrations of the local people with both the oil
companies and multinational corporations on the one hand, and the three tiers of
government and the environment regulatory agencies on the other hand.
Chapter four dwells on HIV&AIDS, prevailing social vices and the compounding
effects of the impoverishment of women and young people. It explores the
connections to human development concerns, and advocates for a multisectoral
and multi-stakeholder approach to the management of HIV&AIDS.
In chapter five, conflicts and peace-making in the Niger Delta are considered,
given their ramifications for the inclusive goals of human development. The
origins, incidences and political economy of conflicts are discussed. The chapter
also elaborates the requirements for sustainable peace and political stability, as
grounds for harnessing the benefits of development in the region.
Chapter six looks at the future possibilities for promoting sustainable livelihoods
in the Niger Delta. The possible expansion of the economic base of the region,
and consequently the institutional labour market framework, would ideally
increase opportunities for employment in both the modern and traditional
sectors, as well as expand people’s occupational or career choices in the pursuit
of social and economic activities that offer self-fulfilment and quality of life.
Finally, chapter seven is about development programming and its practical
implementation in the Niger Delta. The chapter suggests a seven-point agenda
and action strategy to achieve human development. The seven points are peace,
governance, economic diversification, promotion of social inclusion,
environmentally sustainable development, an integrated approach to HIV&AIDS
56
and partnerships for progress. These, more or less, appear to constitute the
necessary building blocks for laying a solid foundation for sustainable human
development, and the future of the Niger Delta region.
57
CHAPTER TWO
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SITUATION
IN THE NIGER DELTA
In line with the people-centred approach to development described in chapter
one, this chapter uses several human development indices to assess the Niger
Delta region. The analysis highlights empirical deprivation overall, and outlines
the disparities between different areas and socio-economic groups. It begins by
depicting the nature, extent and spatial patterns of poverty and socio-economic
deprivation, underscoring the dismal performance of governments at all levels in
addressing critical human development needs.
POVERTY IN THE NIGER DELTA
The incidence of poverty in Nigeria has increased since 1980 (see table 2.1).
According to the Federal Office of Statistics (1999), while poverty incidence was
28.1 per cent in 1980, it rose to 46.3 per cent in 1985. It declined slightly to 42.7
per cent in 1992, before soaring dramatically to 65.6 per cent in 1996. Estimates
from the Central Bank of Nigeria (1999) were even higher, with the Bank putting
the overall poverty rate for the country at 69 per cent in 1997. Aigbokhan (1998),
using the food energy intake measure, determined the incidence of national
poverty as 38 per cent in 1985, 43 per cent in 1992 and 47 per cent in 1996.
Evidence from the National Bureau of Statistics suggests that using the food
energy intake measure yields a figure of 34.9 per cent in 2004. The relative
poverty1 trend reveals that the incidence rose from 28.1 per cent in 1980 to 46.3
1 Relative poverty refers to people living below two-thirds of the average weighted household income.
A critical issue in the delta is not only the increasing incidence of poverty, but also
the intense feeling among people that they ought to do far better given the
enormous resources flowing from their region.
High prices and the earnings of some workers tied to the oil industry erode the
purchasing power of the ordinary person, making poverty more pervasive than
conventional measurements reveal.
58
per cent in 1985, but declined to 42.7 per cent in 1992. It later rose to 65.6 per cent
in 1996 before declining to 54.4 per cent in 2004 (National Bureau of Statistics
2005).
In the Niger Delta, the situation is similar to that at the national level. Except for
Rivers and Bayelsa states, where poverty incidence seems to have stabilized at
around 44 per cent after an initial jump from seven per cent, the poverty level
increased between 1980 and 1996 (see table 2.1). In line with the national
estimate, poverty incidence declined between 1996 and 2004.2
Table 2.1 Incidence of Poverty in the Niger Delta, 1980-2004
1980 1985 1992 1996 2004
Nigeria 28.1 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4
Edo/Delta 19.8 52.4 33.9 56.1 Delta 45.35
Edo 33.09
Cross River 10.2 41.9 45.5 66.9 41.61
Imo/Abia 14.4 33.1 49.9 56.2 Imo 27.39
Abia 22.27
Ondo 24.9 47.3 46.6 71.6 42.15
Rivers/Bayelsa 7.2 44.4 43.4 44.3 Rivers 29.09
Bayelsa 19.98
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2004.
The critical issue in the Niger Delta is not only the increasing incidence of
poverty, but also the intense feeling among the people of the region that they
ought to do far better. This is based on the considerable level of resources in their
midst, and the brazen display and celebration of ill-gotten wealth in Nigeria,
most of which derives from crude oil wealth. This to a large extent explains why
there is so much frustration and indignation in the region. The poverty rate
based on self-assessment (or a perception index) is much higher than the data
indicate—74.8 per cent in the South-South zone, for example. The perception of
what poverty means is reflected by the responses of various participants in the
focus group discussions conducted for this report (see box 2.1). The World
Bank’s definition of poverty more or less confirms people’s views (see box 2.2).
2 The outcome of the poverty survey has been seriously debated, with the main thrust of the debate being
that the evidence does not reflect the reality on the ground. Besides, given the enormous resources that
have been generated from the region, there was no reason for it to experience even an iota of poverty.
59
Even if poverty is measured as living on less than US $1 a day, the true levels of
poverty in the region will still be underestimated. During the preparation of this
report, focus groups maintained that poverty had become very prevalent in their
localities and gave their opinions on the reasons behind this trend. One
discussion made clear that poverty has become a way of life due to economic
stagnation; agricultural underdevelopment from soil infertility; unemployment;
poor quality of life due to shortages of essential goods, facilities and money;
isolation and poor communication; government insensitivity; and an unhealthy
environment spreading disease and malnutrition. Such conditions influence most
members of the affected communities. It is not only income poverty that is the
Box 2.1: Definition of Poverty by the People of the
Niger Delta
Among the numerous descriptions of poverty offered by
discussants in the focus groups conducted to prepare this report,
the following descriptions are typical:
(a). “The poor person is one who cannot pay school fees
for his children; cannot meet any needs, including
food; has no farm land and cannot farm well; cannot
take part in age-grade activities (responsibilities that
are specifically designated to some age groups in
communities); cannot afford to send his children to
school; wears tattered clothes; is very lean; and has
no house to live in. In short, a poor person is one
who has nothing. Consequently, he ‘has no voice’ in
the community.”
(b). “When you wake up hopeless as to where the next
meal is coming from… when you cannot attend
certain functions because you don’t have clothes
…when your roof leaks and you cannot change
it…when you cannot travel because the transport
fares are high…and when the school fees and allied
demands are too much to bear…. Then poverty is
the cause.”
Source: ERML fieldwork 2005.
Poverty has become a way of life due to economic stagnation,
unemployment, poor quality of life due to shortages of essential
goods and facilities, an unhealthy environment and
government insensitivity.
60
problem, therefore, but also the lack of access to social and physical
infrastructure. When poverty is measured in terms of this access, the level in the
Niger Delta is high.
While discussing poverty in this region, it is important to appreciate that price
regimes for goods and services can be different from those of most other regions.
Prices are often higher in remote oil-producing communities, where they are tied
to the pricing of services in the oil and gas industry and the much higher
earnings of oil sector workers. This erodes the purchasing power of the ordinary
person, heightening inflation in the costs of basic needs such as housing,
transportation, health care, education and food products. In the absence of
commodities and services price surveys for various regions and towns, it is
imperative to look at the gross earnings of people in the region beyond the
nominal statement of mean income or the proportion of those living on less than
US $1 a day. If tied to purchasing power, the actual poverty level could be much
higher.
A realistic assessment of poverty in the delta needs to include
access to health care, education, water and other basic
amenities, as well as people’s involvement in the decisions
that affect their lives.
Box 2.2: Poverty as Defined by a Multilateral Organization
Poverty is hunger. Poverty is being sick and not being able to see a
doctor. Poverty is not having access to school and not knowing how to
read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at a
time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water.
Poverty is about powerlessness, lack of representation in decision
making in the society and lack of freedom to express oneself.
Poverty has many faces, changing from place to place and across time,
and has been described in many ways. Most often, poverty is a situation
people want to escape. So poverty is a call to action—for the poor and the
wealthy alike—a call to change the world so that many more may have
enough to eat, adequate shelter, access to education and health,
protection from violence, and a voice in what happens in their
communities.
Source: The World Bank 2006, Poverty Net (http://web.worldbank.org/)
61
A critical and realistic assessment of poverty in the Niger Delta region should
focus attention on key considerations such as access to health care, education,
water, transportation and other basic amenities of life, as well as the extent to
which people are involved in decisions that affect them. The facts revealed in
chapter one about water supply, housing and education, for instance, point to the
immense challenges facing development and the provision of social amenities as
a critical support for sustainable livelihoods. In addition, the oil and gas industry
has damaged farmlands and fishing grounds, which has harmed traditional
occupations such as fishing, farming, lumbering, crafts and small-scale agrobased
activities. But these livelihoods have also become unattractive because of
weak earnings relative to the oil sector. There is a need not only to revive the
traditional forms of work, given the transient nature of the oil industry, but also
to give a wider spectrum of people opportunities for survival through a more
diverse economy.
Poverty is a cross-cutting issue with numerous dimensions. While it may be
measured in terms of the income or resources of an individual, many of the
conditions that perpetuate or alleviate poverty are at the communal or societal
level. Poverty in the Niger Delta region encompasses the issues of
discrimination, neglect and the lack of a voice. Another dimension is that the
people of this region have been excluded from tapping into modern
infrastructure, even as the resources for transforming other parts of the country
have poured out of the Niger Delta.
While poverty may seem to cause deprivation and hinder individual
development, it is also the consequence of a number of social and national
factors, such as poor governance and the exclusion of particular social groups,
including minority ethnic groups, women and youth, from participation in
decision-making on matters relating to their welfare. Other issues include poor
environmental quality and high levels of pollution, conflict and lack of security,
threats to health and well-being including HIV/AIDS, and unsustainable
livelihoods and unemployment.
THE REVENUE BASE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Poverty in the Niger Delta region encompasses the issues of discrimination,
neglect and the lack of a voice.
Oil wealth enriches Nigeria as a country, but it has not alleviated the grinding
poverty, neglect and deprivation in the region that produces it.
62
Oil wealth derived from the Niger Delta region sustains the Nigerian Federation.
Oil revenues, in the form of crude oil and gas exports, petroleum profits taxes
and royalties, and domestic crude oil sales accounted for an average of 79.52 per
cent of the total revenues of the Federation from 2000 to 2004. During the same
period, the contribution of oil to total export earnings was 79.53 per cent
(computed from Central Bank of Nigeria 2004). Tables 2.2a and 2.2b show huge
increases in revenues accruing to the Federal and Niger Delta state governments
between 1999 and 2003. Statutory allocations from the Federation Account
constitute a substantial part of the total (see column 4 in table 2.2b).
The role of oil revenues in the statutory allocations cannot be overemphasized.
Yet the problem of grinding poverty, neglect and deprivation in the region that
produces the nation’s oil wealth has remained a daunting reality. The tables
show that capital expenditures to provide a basis for rapid progress on human
development are low compared to recurrent expenditures on personnel and
overheads. While total expenditures increased sharply between 1999 and 2003,
the quality of such spending was invariably low, considering the already low
level of human development. Bad governance and corruption perpetuated these
patterns.
Bad governance and corruption have played essential roles in perpetuating low levels of human development.
63
Table 2.2 (a): Revenues and Expenditures of the Federal Government and States in the Niger Delta
Region, 1999
Revenues Expenditures
Fed Govt./ Total Statutory Share of statutory Total Recurrent Capital Share of
states revenues allocation allocation in expenditures expenditures expenditures capital ex-
(N’mn) (N’mn) total revenues (%) (N’mn) (N’mn) (N’mn) penditures in total
(%)
Federal Govt. 662,585.3 218,874.5 33.0 947,690.0 449,662.4 498,027.6 52.5
Abia 3,458.3 2,268.5 65.5 3,544.9 2,245.2 1,299.7 36.6
Akwa Ibom 5,389.6 3,161.1 58.6 5,389.6 3,377.3 1,889.3 35.0
Bayelsa 3,938.8 2,666.4 67.6 3,923.5 2,708.4 1,215.1 30.9
Cross River 3,824.9 2,786.4 72.8 3,948.6 2,302.4 1,546.2 39.1
Delta 6,690.1 3,382.8 50.5 7,145.5 4,431.2 2,714.3 37.9
Edo 5,127.2 2,644.2 51.5 5,027.7 3,179.8 1,847.9 36.7
Imo 3,540.5 2,526.5 71.3 3,474.2 2,071.9 1,402.3 40.3
Ondo 4,049.6 2,621.1 64.7 3,941.8 2,681.3 1,260.5 31.9
Rivers 8,379.4 3,196.5 38.1 7,579.2 4,002.6 3,576.6 47.1
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 1999.
64
Table 2.2 (b): Revenues and Expenditures of the Federal Government, States and the NDDC in the
Niger Delta Region, 2003
Revenues Expenditure
Fed Govt./ Total Statutory Share of statutory Total Recurrent Capital Share of
states/NDDC revenues allocation allocation in total expenditures expenditures expenditures capital ex-
(N’mn) (N’mn) revenues (%) (N’mn) (N’mn) (N’mn) penditures in
total
Fed Go vt. 1,023,241.2 889,197.8 86.9 1,225,965.9 984,277.6 241,688.3 19.7
Abia 17,496.0 12,846.8 73.5 17,022.4 8,562.8 5,588.9 32.8
Akwa Ibom 39,906.5 30,655.5 76.8 56,737.0 34,000.0 20,633.0 36.4
Bayelsa 38,716.0 34,741.9 89.7 27,982.2 13,853.1 10,250.9 36.6
Cross River 17,466.9 12,436.8 71.2 14,542.6 8,225.8 3,300.0 22.7
Delta 65,057.0 51,191.8 78.7 67,148.6 40,858.6 25,410.2 37.8
Edo 17,242.0 11,891.5 69.0 17,292.0 12,564.4 2,169.7 12.5
Imo 18,337.9 13,889.3 75.7 35,175.1 20,922.2 7,277.1 20.7
Ondo 30,528.0 15,114.5 49.5 38,834.4 16,252.3 21,719.0 55.9
Rivers 73,415.0 41,984.1 57.2 70,233.6 36,699.0 28,779.5 41.0
NDDC* n.a. 9,044.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: *The revenue of the NDDC for the years 2000, 2001 and 2003 was N19,988.9 million.
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 2003.
109
GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY
Given the abject poverty in the Niger Delta, there is a strong basis for people’s
demands for a greater share of the region’s vast oil revenues, particularly as they
bear the full burden of environmental degradation caused by the oil industry.
Agitation to achieve this goal has spawned various youth groups determined to
use violence to claim a share of the wealth they believe to be theirs by right. As
shown in chapter one, the revenue allocation system has been contentious, with
the oil-producing states shortchanged since the beginning of military rule.
Successive governments progressively reduced the derivation percentage from
50 per cent until it was zero during the military era.
The agitation for the control of resources has achieved much in drawing
government attention to poverty in the Niger Delta and in ensuring that more
revenues are assigned to the area. The derivation percentage was raised from
three per cent to 13 per cent in 1999, although this still does not satisfy local
demands. The National Political Reform Conference held in 2005 was willing to
recommend an increase to 17 per cent, but this was not enough for regional
delegates. Delegates from other regions, however, could not accommodate the
demand for an immediate increase to 25 per cent and a programmed increase to
50 per cent in the medium term.
The stalemate brought the Conference to an abrupt end and resulted in
heightened tension. Militant youths stepped up activities such as hostage-taking
and the disruption of oil prospecting and production activities to pressure
“Poverty is caused by poor management and
governance. If government manages our resources very
well . . . to build hospitals, schools, good roads,
poverty will be reduced. When children go to good
schools, and there are cheaper drugs in our hospitals,
everyone will cater for his health and thus reduce the
impact of poverty. So our government is causing
poverty on the people because they have refused to
A low level of physical development points to the fact that the
region suffers from poor governance.
110
authorities to make further concessions. The subsequent arrest and detention of
some leaders from the core Niger Delta states appeared to be exacerbating the
feeling of political marginalization.
While the Niger Delta region deserves much greater attention and revenues to
deal with poverty and infrastructure needs, it is also important to acknowledge
that, even though the percentage allocated to the delta from the Federation
Account appears small, in real terms it amounts to substantial sums of money,
enough to significantly improve the well-being of citizens through better service
delivery and access to utilities. The fact that the level of physical development in
the region has not improved underscores that it also suffers from poor
governance. That the Federal Government has had to intervene from time to time
to create regional bodies like the OMPADEC and the NDDC to plan for and
implement development projects in the region is itself evidence of the failure of
state and local governments to carry out their responsibilities to the people. The
absence of government in many communities is behind the provision of socioeconomic
infrastructures by some oil companies.
As in other parts of Nigeria, the Niger Delta region has been split into more
states in order to create more centres of growth and administration, and to
spread development more evenly across the region. But the benefits of this state
creation exercise are not obvious—the states simply have failed to perform. In
the core Niger Delta states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa, infrastructural
development, social amenities and facilities are unduly concentrated in a few
cities, notably the state capitals and older administrative headquarters, without
much regard for development in other parts of these states.
In a region that produces so much fuel, for example, the electricity supply is very
sporadic—Bayelsa State is not even linked to the national electric power grid.
The delta could be served with thermal power stations strategically located to
serve the needs of every part of the region. But this is not the case.
Similarly, the delta has a dense network of freshwater distributaries and vast
reserves of groundwater, but no part of the region can boast of a regular supply
of potable water. And while the watery terrain across the region greatly increases
the cost of road building and construction of all types, the vast amounts of
money going into the states should have produced a steady increase in the road
network over time. Again, this has not been the case. Nor have improvements
Infrastructural development, social amenities and facilities are unduly
concentrated in a few cities, without much regard for development in other
parts.
111
been made to health and educational facilities, which are in a deplorable state of
neglect in many areas outside the state capitals.
Part of the problem of poor service delivery is traceable to the absence of an
effective machinery to hold elected officials accountable to the electorate. Several
years of military rule have left their mark on the culture of governance, with
rulers not acknowledging any obligation to be accountable to citizens. Civil
democratic rule has not changed the situation much because elections are flawed
in several ways. Evidence from focus group discussions revealed that strong-arm
tactics characterize electioneering. Those with ample funds employ thugs to
terrorize opponents, and prevent free and fair access to the electorate. Federal
and state elections are usually rigged and not a reflection of voter preferences,
while local elections, conducted by state electoral commissions, are even less
related to local wishes. Election administrators and security agencies condone
and or abet the perpetration of electoral malpractices, thereby eroding public
confidence in electoral outcomes, which in turn leads to the declining legitimacy
of elected officials and their institutions.
In a stakeholders meeting held in Port Harcourt in February 2006, which drew
people from all the states in the region as part of the preparation of this report,
one participant said: “In 2003, no election took place in (our state). The State
Governor simply allocated figures and put the people he liked in the House of
Assembly.” Election tribunals in a number of cases have confirmed that elections
have been rigged through political manipulation and the connivance of officials.
The insinuation is that most state parliamentarians are not true representatives of
the people, and do not owe any allegiance to the electorate but only to the
powers that be. Thus, the elected state assemblies in the region do not provide
the necessary check on the executive branch in the way money is allocated and
Strong-arm tactics characterize electioneering, with thugs often used to terrorize
opponents, and prevent free and fair access to the electorate. This erodes public
confidence in electoral outcomes, which in turn leads to the declining legitimacy
of elected officials and their institutions.
“If government is to make life better for the citizenry, then
there is no government here. Governance here seems to be a
god’s appointed time for political office occupants to wreck the
state treasury without any intention to serve the people. That’s
why you see heads of council and councillors leaving their areas
to make their homes in urban centres.” (Focus group
participant)
112
spent. There is a very strong belief in the delta that the state governors divert
most of the fiscal allocations from the Federation Account and Derivation Fund
to their states for their own private use. The mismatch between allocations and
the low level of infrastructural development and service delivery seems to lend
credence to such a claim. If a particular state gets at least a N6 billion (about $46.5
million) allocation every month, that should translate into tangible physical
developments. The fact that it does not give rise to the legitimate question:
Where does all that money go? If it does not give rise to this expected question,
another question arises – why is nobody asking?
Error!
Local governments are even more problematic. This tier of government is closest
to the people; it should be the most democratic and responsive to the needs and
yearnings of the grass-roots. But non-performance is even worse than at the state
level. Local government chairpersons see themselves as ‘executive’ overlords.
They are not responsible to the local council or to the people because their
revenues come directly from the Federal Government and not from the locality.
It does not matter what a chairperson does or fails to do—the monthly
allocations from the Federation Account will come. Many a chairperson rides
roughshod over the local councillors, most of whom are mere puppets willing to
do anything to please the chairperson, from whose hands they all, literally, eat.
In some of the core delta states, it is an ‘open secret’ that local officials do not
reside in the locality and hardly visit their offices at all for months on end. Yet
they collect and disburse the monthly allocations from the Federation Account.
In some of the core delta states, it is obvious that local officials do not reside in
the locality and hardly visit their offices at all for months. Yet they collect and
disburse the monthly allocations from the Federation Account.
113
No poverty alleviation programme can be implemented in an atmosphere of
such gross and barefaced official corruption. Still, in the midst of the rot, there
are a few good examples that can serve as role models.
Although there is no concrete evidence to back it up, it is generally believed that
some wealthy politicians within the region fund youth gangs to intimidate
opponents and harass oil companies as a deliberate strategy for political power
and economic relevance. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that some
of the politicians may be exploiting the low socio-economic status of the Niger
Delta youths to serve their own private agenda and in the process further
compounding the problems of the region.
The youth question is explored in greater detail in chapter five of this report.
Suffice it to say here that the traditional authorities in the Niger Delta have lost
much of their clout and respect with the local people, particularly youths. As
described in chapter three, many once acted as ‘benefit captors’, who pocketed
compensation money from the oil companies on behalf of landowners and
communities. Today, their political influence has declined even as that of the
local government chairpersons has risen. Most traditional rulers, chiefs and
elders now spend most of their time currying the favour of the local political
elite. They are virtually powerless to help lift their people out of their misery.
The conflicts in the region, the disappearance of traditional authority structures
and the phenomenon of absentee local officials mean that there is really no
effective local government in many areas. As a result, people have developed a
siege mentality, with a general sense of insecurity hindering economic activities.
People who fish and farm are afraid of the dark because of the risk of being
attacked by the numerous armed groups, including hijackers, oil bunkerers,
hostage takers, youth gangs and the like. Fishers and farmers wait until it is
broad daylight before they go out to work, and they also return before it gets
dark. On top of all this, there is the risk of being caught in the crossfire between
Part of the problem of poor service delivery is that elected officials are not
accountable to the electorate.
“At any point the youths collect themselves into a group,
the elders with eyes on elective positions merely hijack us
and use us as political thugs with good promises upon
political success. But, when they are sworn-in, they become
distanced from us and brand us as miscreants. We are
aware that youths elsewhere are vanguards of
development but it would be difficult here because the
basic needs of life are hardly met…so contributing to the
society is thus a near impossibility.” (Focus group
participant)
114
different militant groups and, much more, between the militant groups and
patrolling government law enforcement agents.
115
THE CHALLENGES OF ATTAINING THE MDGS
In view of the deplorable level of poverty and the gross failure of governance in
the Niger Delta region, it is important to examine the MDGs and the prospects
for attaining them, in part as a baseline for future progress. As indicated above,
with the mineral and oil derivation share of only 13 per cent since 1999, most of
the oil-producing states receive higher revenue allocations than others in the
Nigerian Federation. This should mean that the Niger Delta states are in a better
position than other states to meet the MDGs.
But a fundamental structural problem remains the much higher costs of meeting
the goals in the delta region. As a result of the difficult terrain, the costs of
providing residential housing, hospitals, schools, roads, water supplies, etc. are
much higher than in most other parts of Nigeria. Chief D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha
(2005), the former Governor of Bayelsa State, reported that it cost the Bayelsa
State Government about N500 million merely to reclaim the land for the 500-bed
state hospital. This is only one example of the daunting challenges to achieving
the MDGs.
Assessing Progress
Assessing whether or not the Niger Delta states are on their way to attaining the
MDGs is inherently constrained by the lack of credible data. Even for a basic
issue such as poverty, the best measurement indicators have often been
controversial. In Nigeria, one debate in the press has been whether the overall
level of poverty is around 70 per cent as claimed by many experts and
multilateral agencies or about 54.4 per cent as suggested by the Federal
Government (according to the Sunday Vanguard, 13 March 2005, p. 11).
An MDG assessment done within the limitations on data availability and
reliability, however, can still be a useful exercise to help frame a call to take
action.
Areas of concern under the MDGs
With high revenues, the delta states should be in a good position to meet the
MDGs, although difficult terrain will make the costs higher than in other areas.
116
There are eight major areas of concern covered by the MDGs, with objectives,
targets to be achieved and indicators of performance (see table 2.3). Each area is
briefly discussed in the following sections.
117
Table 2.3: Millennium Development Goals
S/N MDGs TARGETS INDICATORS
a) Halve, between 1990 and
2015, the population whose
income is less than US $1
per day.
• Proportion of population
below US $1 per day
• Poverty gap ratio
• Share of poorest quintile in
national consumption
1. Eradicate extreme
poverty and
hunger
b) Halve, between 1990 and
2015, the proportion of
people who suffer from
hunger.
• Prevalence of underweight
children (under five years
of age)
• Proportion of population
below minimum level of
dietary energy
consumption
2. Achieve universal
primary education
Ensure that, by 2015, children
everywhere, boys and girls
alike, will be able to complete a
full course of primary
schooling.
• Net enrolment in primary
education
• Proportion of pupils
starting grade I
• Literacy rate of 15-24 year
olds
3. Promote gender
equality and
empower women
Eliminate gender disparities in
primary and secondary
education, preferably by 2005,
and at all levels of education
not later than 2015.
• Ratio of girls to boys in
primary, secondary and
tertiary education
• Ratio of literate females to
males for 15-24 year-olds
• Share of women in wage
employment in the nonagricultural
sector.
• Proportion of seats held by
women in national
parliament
4. Reduce child
mortality
Reduce under-five mortality by
two-thirds by 2015.
• Under-five mortality rate
• Infant mortality rate
• Percentage of one-year-olds
fully immunized against
measles
5. Improve maternal
health
Reduce the maternal mortality
ratio by three-quarters between
1990 and 2015.
• Maternal mortality ratio
• Proportion of births
attended by skilled health
personnel
6. Combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases
a) Have halted by 2015 and
begun to reverse the spread
of HIV/AIDS.
• HIV prevalence among 15-
24 year-old pregnant
women
• Contraceptive prevalence
rate
• Number of children
orphaned by HIV/AIDS
118
b) Have halted by 2015 and
begun to reverse the
incidence of malaria and
other major diseases.
• Prevalence and death rates
associated with malaria
• Prevalence and death rates
associated with
tuberculosis
(a) Integrate the principles of
sustainable development
into country policies and
programmes and reverse
the loss of environmental
resources.
• Proportion of land area
covered by forest
• Ratio of area protected to
maintain biological
diversity to surface area
• Energy use (kg of oil
equivalent) per US $ GDP
(PPP)
• Carbon dioxide emissions
per capita and consumption
of ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons
• Proportion of population
using solid fuels
(b) Halve by 2015 the
proportion of people
without sustainable access
to safe drinking water and
sanitation.
• Proportion of population
with sustainable access to
an improved water source,
urban and rural
• Proportion of population
with access to improved
sanitation, urban and rural
7. Ensure
environmental
sustainability
(c) By 2020, achieve a
significant improvement in
the lives of at least 100
million slum dwellers.
• Proportion of households
with access to secure
tenure.
8 Develop a global
partnership for
development
a) Deal comprehensively with
the debt problems of
developing countries
through national and
international measures in
order to make debt
sustainable in the long
term.
• Debt service as a
percentage of exports of
goods and services
• Proportion of ODA
provided as debt relief
b) Address the special needs
of the least developed
countries, including
through more generous
ODA (official development
aid) for countries
committed to poverty
reduction.
• Share of ODA in GDP
c) In cooperation with the
private sector, make
available the benefits of
new technologies especially
for information and
• Telephone lines per 1,000
people
• Personal computers per
1,000 people
119
communications.
Source: Millennium Development Goals Report, Nigeria, 2004 and 2005
120
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
The targets of this MDG include halving the proportions of people whose income
is less than US $1 per day and who suffer from hunger. The overall poverty level
in the Niger Delta fell from 57.9 per cent in 1996 to 42.85 per cent in 2004 (see
table 2.4). This relative reduction is nowhere near halving poverty, but it may be
argued that 2015 is still far off, and there is still the chance that the MDG may be
attained. This is doubtful, however, because a drop in the poverty level from 57.9
per cent to 42.85 per cent in eight years represents less than one percentage point
annually. At that rate, it will be well beyond 2015 before poverty can be reduced
considerably, let alone halved.
As for meeting the target of halving the proportion of people suffering from
hunger, this is clearly more difficult to assess for the Niger Delta states given the
lack of data. Table 2.4 shows that food poverty as measured by a daily calorie
intake of 2,900 calories averaged 28.78 per cent by 2004. Time series data do not
exist, however, so it is difficult to measure progress. The Niger Delta states have
done better than the national performance level of 36.04 per cent. Only Cross
River and Rivers states have done worse than the national average.
2. Achieve universal primary education
The data to assess progress in net enrolment in primary education are readily
available. From tables 2.5 and 2.6, there is real hope that the Niger Delta states
may just be able to meet the MDG target for universal primary education by 2015
or a little beyond. Net enrolment ratios in both primary and secondary education
are very encouraging, with the Niger Delta states outperforming the national
scores by considerable margins. This suggests the delta may meet the target of
universal education overall. A cautionary note is in order, however, since the
other indicators for measuring universal primary education, such as the
proportions starting first grade and the levels of preparatory schooling, were not
considered because no data are available.
121
Table 2.4: Poverty in the Niger Delta Measured by Income and Food Intake
Per cent poverty level Food poverty levels as measured
by 2,900 calories, 2004
States
1996 2004 Per cent with
calorie intake
below 2,900
Per cent above
2900 calories
Abia 58.6 29.95 22.03 77.17
Akwa Ibom 72.3 39.86 31.60 68.40
Bayelsa 44.3 25.64 20.77 79.23
Cross River 61.4 52.60 42.30 57.70
Delta 61.9 41.88 35.57 64.43
Edo 53.3 41.40 35.24 64.76
Imo 53.6 24.80 12.75 87.25
Ondo 71.6 88.84 21.21 78.79
Rivers 44,3 40.65 37.56 62.44
Niger Delta 57.9 42.85 28.78 71.22
Nigeria 65.0 56.90 36.04 63.96
Source: Federal Office of Statistics 2004: 78, 81.
Table 2.5: Net Enrolment Ratios in Primary and Secondary Schools in the Niger
Delta
Net primary school enrolment
ratio (2004) per cent
Net secondary enrolment ratio
(2004) per cent
STATES
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Abia 98.1 98.08 98.10 97.05 98.85 97.75
Akwa
Ibom
99.56 93.06 96.31 99.66 98.48 99.07
Bayelsa 95.68 96.46 96.07 99.58 98.86 99.22
Cross
River
93.92 92.35 93.13 95.77 100.00 97.89
Delta 93.88 96.88 95.38 99.05 98.76 98.90
Edo 97.35 96.43 96.89 99.52 100.0 99.76
Imo 98.33 98.25 98.29 99.29 98.95 99.12
Ondo 98.48 100.00 99.24 100.00 100.00 100.00
Rivers 97.47 97.92 97.69 98.55 100.00 99.28
Niger
Delta
97.0 96.6 96.8 98.72 99.32 99.02
Nigeria 82.21 60.17 81.19 88.51 83.59 86.07
Source: Federal Office of Statistics 2004: 86-87.
122
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
There are a number of possible indicators for measuring the MDG targets, as
indicated in table 2.3. Table 2.6 presents a comparison of the male and female
school enrolment ratios in the Niger Delta. The available data suggest that
females have equal opportunities for education. The MDG targets on gender
equality in primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment have either already been
attained or are attainable by 2015.
In some states, a higher proportion of girls than boys are in primary and
secondary schools. There is a serious concern, however, that many boys of
secondary school age have abandoned their formal education to go into business
activities, rather than completing their education. This is particularly common in
Abia and Imo states. If not properly addressed, this phenomenon could spread to
other parts of the region. ‘Standby money’3 also cuts into enrolment rates at
higher school levels.
Table 2.6: Ratio of Boys to Girls in Primary and Secondary Education
STATES Primary
education
Secondary
education
Tertiary
education
Abia 0.999 1.019 0.806
Akwa Ibom 0.935 0.988 0.801
Bayelsa 1.008 0.993 0.599
Cross River 0.983 1.044 0.622
Delta 1.032 0.997 0.696
Edo 0.991 1.005 0.599
Imo 0.999 0.997 0.932
Ondo 1.015 1.000 0.481
Rivers 1.005 1.015 0.738
Niger Delta 0.996 1.006 0.697
Nigeria 0.975 0.944 0.665
Source: Federal Office of Statistics 2004: 86-87.
For tertiary education, the story is a little different. Gender equality is far away in
some states, although it could be achieved by 2015. Table 2.6 shows that a few
states are already very close.
Although an appreciable number of women are appointed as directors general in
state public services, the situation is not the same for political positions. Looking
at gender equality as measured by parliamentary seats held by women, many
3 This refers to money paid to youths by oil companies for staying at home instead of working in their
organizations or for persuading youths not to disturb their operations.
123
states do not have a single female representative in the National Parliament. This
scenario repeats itself in legislatures across the country.
4. Reduce child mortality
Assessing progress in reducing child mortality requires data on such indicators
as under-five and infant mortality rates, and the percentage of one-year-olds
fully immunized against measles. In the estimates derived from the Nigeria
Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) for 1999, conducted by the National
Population Commission, the infant and child mortality rates for the Niger Delta
region were estimated at about 48 and 35 per 1,000, respectively, compared with
national rates of 71 and 67 per 1,000, respectively. Table 2.7 presents a vivid
picture of the situation as of 2003. The Niger Delta region performed very poorly
on neonatal, post-neonatal and infant mortality, with the worst post-neonatal
mortality rate in Nigeria. Even where it performed moderately well, the
achievement is not commensurate with the resources generated by the region.
As for immunization against measles, available data show that the proportions of
fully immunized under-one-year-olds are 61.5 per cent for males and 49.5 per
cent for females. Evidence from the 2003 NDHS reveals that only 20.8 per cent of
the children between 12 and 23 months had been vaccinated against the killer
diseases as opposed to 32.5 per cent and 44.6 per cent in the South-West and
South-East regions of Nigeria, respectively. In addition, only 25.1 per cent of
children with acute respiratory infections and fever sought treatment from health
providers, as against 52.6 per cent and 49.5 per cent in the South-West and
North-Central regions, respectively (see NDHS 2003: 132). Since no time-series
data are available, it is extremely difficult to measure progress on reducing child
mortality.
5. Improve maternal health
Estimates derived from the 2003 NDHS suggest a national maternal mortality
rate of 22 per 1,000. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel
(doctors and midwives in a hospital setting) was 74.5 per cent in 1999, but
declined substantially to 55.8 per cent in 2003. The South-South zone had the
largest proportion of births attended by traditional attendants in 2003—32.2 per
cent against three per cent, 6.1 per cent and nine per cent in the South-East,
North-Central and South–West regions, respectively (NDHS 2003). Reasons for
Nationally, 30.4 per cent of women say they cannot afford health care. In the
delta, the figure is 47.1 per cent.
124
the poor performance on maternal mortality are limited health facilities and the
costs of services. The figures on births attended by unskilled medical personnel
are much higher for urban than for rural areas and for educated than for
uneducated women.
125
Table 2.7: Child and Infant Mortality Rates by the Regions of Nigeria
Source: NDHS 2003.
Nothing can be said about progress being made on maternal health in the Niger
Delta since the required time-series data are not available. But in general, the
region has very limited access to health care relative to other parts of the country.
For instance, 13.8 per cent of the women from the delta sampled in the 2003
NDHS indicated that they did not know where to go for treatment, whereas only
2.5 per cent of the women in the South-West, 5.2 per cent in the North-Central
area and 13.7 per cent nationally identified that factor as a problem. The Niger
Delta also had the largest proportion (34.8 per cent) indicating that the distance
between their residence and the location of health facilities is a major problem.
This compares to a national average of 24.4 per cent, and to 5.6 per cent in the
South-West, 18.6 per cent in the North-Central area and 21.8 per cent in the
North-East. Chart 2.1 clearly shows poverty is a major factor in accessing health
facilities. Nationally, 30.4 per cent of women indicate that lack of money inhibits
access to health care. In the Niger Delta, the figure is 47.1 per cent.
Neonatal
mortality
Post-neonatal
mortality
Infant
mortality
Child
mortality
Underfive
mortality
National 53 56 109 121 217
North-
Central
53 49 103 70 165
North-
East
61 65 125 154 260
North-
West
55 59 114 176 269
South-
East
34 32 66 40 103
South-
South
53 68 120 63 103
South-
West
39 30 69 47 113
126
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
%
North Central
North East
North West
South East
South-South
South West
Chart 2.1: Lack of Money as a Major Factor for Limited Access to Health Facility
6. Combat HIV&AIDS, malaria and other diseases
HIV&AIDS prevalence in the Niger Delta is among the highest in the country.
This report deals extensively with the topic of HIV&AIDS in chapter four, so it
will only be discussed briefly here. Prevalence rates rose in the Niger Delta and
nationally between 1999 and 2001, but declined in 2003. This could indicate that
the spread of the disease is being curtailed, as the MDGs stipulate. Although
there is some indication that current efforts are having some positive impact, the
Niger Delta region recorded one of the smallest declines, from 7.7 per cent in
2001 to 5.8 per cent in 2003. The South-West declined from four per cent to 2.3
per cent.
A careful examination of the Niger Delta states reveals that much effort is still
needed to fully contain the spread of HIV&AIDS. Cultural factors may have to be
seriously considered for much progress to occur. For instance, evidence from the
2003 NDHS reveals that people in the region are the most sexually active of any
group in the country’s six zones (67 per cent of men have never married,
The highest incidence of risky sexual behaviour was recorded in the Niger Delta region.
127
compared to nine per cent in the North-West and 22 per cent in the South-East).
Condom use is limited. The survey also reported that the region has the largest
number of people who affirmed that they had sex with prostitutes during the
previous 12 months and the highest incidence of risky sex.
The incidence of death associated with malaria and tuberculosis in the Niger
Delta is still considerably high and will probably remain so by 2015 if current
efforts are not stepped up. Estimates by CPED (2004) show that malaria accounts
for over 71.2 per cent of the sickness in the Niger Delta. Evidence from the 2003
NDHS reveals that 30 per cent of the children sampled in the region had fever or
convulsion compared to 18 per cent in the South-West, 23.6 per cent in the South-
East and 24.2 per cent in the North-Central region.
7. Ensuring environmental sustainability
Chapter three of this report is entirely devoted to an analysis of the
environmental problems in the Niger Delta, and the social and economic
repercussions of industrial activities. Although it is difficult to assess the
progress being made towards the attainment of the MDG targets on
environmental sustainability, environmental quality ranks among the top
priorities of the Niger Delta. Environmental degradation is arguably a major
source of the agitation in the region.
The numerous oil spills and the gas flaring in much of the delta have taken an
enormous toll on the environment. Pollution has greatly affected the air, water,
soils, vegetation and even physical structures. Perhaps more troubling are
problems related to limited access to safe drinking water and electricity supply,
poor environmental sanitation and waste management, and the lack of security
of land and property tenure as highlighted in both chapters one and three. These
are all part of the MDG indicators for measuring progress on environmental
sustainability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development
Many of the MDG targets are better handled at national rather than sub-national
levels. Nigeria gives high attention to global and regional partnerships as key
instruments for achieving development. It belongs to regional initiatives such as
the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). Nigeria is also a key player in global organizations such as the
Environmental quality ranks among the top priorities in the delta;
environmental degradation is arguably a major source of agitation.
128
United Nations and its agencies, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At home, Nigeria
partners with the private sector and civil society in several areas of development.
In the Niger Delta, the issue of partnership for the attainment of not just the
MDGs but also overall human development is critically important. Partnerships
with oil companies, NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral agencies will be
required to carry forward the human development agenda and to attain many of
the MDG targets.
The indicators that can easily be measured for the eighth MDG are telephone
lines per 1,000 people and personal computers per 1,000 people. As stated in
chapter one, available data show that the number of fixed telephone lines in the
Niger Delta works out at about 38 per 1,000. The growth in these land lines has
stalled in the last few years, with the introduction of the global system of mobile
communication. Due to this, Nigeria probably already exceeds the target for
telephones. The Niger Delta ratio is predicted to be better than Nigeria’s, perhaps
being one per 20 people.
The story is completely different with respect to the distribution of personal
computers. Nigeria’s 2004 MDG Report estimates that the number of computers
per 1,000 persons remained at 4.1 in 1995 and 1996, rising to 6.6 by 2000. The
number of computers must have increased considerably by 2005, but no hard
data support this.
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICES
Given the social, economic and political conditions just described, it is of
considerable interest to see how the Niger Delta region fares on the human
development indices. These include the human development index (HDI), the
human poverty index for developing countries (HPI-1), the human poverty index
for selected countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (HPI-2), the gender-related development index (GDI) and the
gender empowerment measure (GEM). Each of these is a composite index; many
indicators go into their calculation (see boxes 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 for the
Most indicators used to compute the HDI do not include the items that the Niger
Delta states badly need, such as roads, water, electricity and appropriate waste
management, among others.
129
computations). The indices have been calculated for the nine states of the Niger
Delta as well as for the 185 local governments.
In interpreting the results, it is important to note that the human development
situation in Nigeria as a whole is deplorable. The use of relative terms—better,
higher, worse and lower—should not be misconstrued. The mere fact that a
region, state or local government has a higher score on an index than another
does not necessarily mean that the human development situation in that region,
state or locality is good. As will be clear in subsequent sections of this report, the
HDI for the Niger Delta region as a whole is unacceptable considering that it has
produced the wealth fuelling development in other parts of the country.
The HDI for the Niger Delta Region
In 1996, UNDP computed the first HDI for Nigerian states, for the year 1992. As
table 2.8 shows, the Niger Delta states of Bendel (now Delta and Edo states),
Rivers (now Bayelsa and Rivers) and Cross River (now Akwa Ibom and Cross
River) obtained the highest HDI scores in Nigeria, outperforming even Lagos
State. The HDI scores were 0.631 for Bendel, 0.539 for Rivers and 0.513 for Cross
River. UNDP (1996) argued that, on the basis of their HDI scores, these three
states “would easily have qualified in 1990 as middle human development
countries occupying positions 79th, 91st and 96th respectively in the World.”
The relative positions of the states seem to have been maintained in 1996, when
UNDP again calculated the index and concluded: “A ranking of the Nigerian
States by HDI puts, for example, the Edo and Delta States (formerly Bendel State)
on the top, with an HDI of 0.666. Were Edo and Delta States constituted into a
separate sovereign country, their ‘nation’ would rank 90th in the world—
relatively high among the medium-level human development countries.” Even
now, the situation has not changed. The main concern is the significance of the
achievement relative to what has been accomplished in other oil-producing
regions.
There are sometimes wide variations among the various local governments in the
Niger Delta. In Cross River State, for instance, the Bakassi local government,
despite oil drilling, has the poorest HDI in the state—0.36, compared to 0.501 in
Calabar, the state’s capital. Life expectancy and education indices follow this
pattern. The situation in Ilaje, an oil-producing area in Ondo State, is similar.
In Bayelsa State, one of the major oil-producing states, the HDI ranged between
0.255 and 0.422. This is extremely low compared to the neighbouring Rivers and
Delta states. It is a clear indication of unequal development, often because local
130
governments are not using resources generated from oil to improve the lives of
local inhabitants.
131
Table 2.8: Components of the HDI for Nigeria (1992)
State Life
expecta
ncy at
birth
(years)
Adult
literacy (%)
Mean
years of
schooling
Educationa
l
attainment
(%)
Real GDP
per capita
(PPP$)
Adjusted
real GDP
per capita
(PPP$)
HDI
Bendel 53.7 65.6 4.00 45.07 5,003.4 5,003.3 0.631
Rivers 50.2 51.9 3.84 35.88 4,860.7 4,860.7 0.539
Cross
River
57.8 69.4 3.27 47.36 2,626.0 2,626.0 0.513
Lagos 61.4 65.0 3.92 44.64 2,034.7 2,034.7 0.489
Imo 60.0 75.6 3.80 51.67 1,341.1 1,341.1 0.466
Gongola 57.8 26.0 2.15 18.05 665.1 665.1 0.214
Ondo 49.4 50.6 3.29 34.83 422.9 422.9 0.212
Oyo 51.3 40.4 3.11 27.97 678.1 678.1 0.210
Niger 54.9 16.0 1.04 11.01 1,262.0 1,262.0 0.191
Benue 53.5 27.0 1.91 18.64 809.5 809.5 0.188
Kwara 45.9 40.0 3.00 27.67 1,020.1 1,020.1 0.183
Anambra 44.9 43.1 2.91 29.70 860.1 860.1 0.174
Kano 57.1 12.1 0.73 8.31 692.6 692.6 0.161
Plateau 39.5 36.7 2.18 25.19 1,224.1 1,224..1 0.149
Sokoto 49.2 2.7 0.43 1.94 1,246.2 1,246.2 0.128
Bauchi 36.7 39.8 2.03 27.21 762.2 762.2 0.127
Ogun 37.4 41.8 2.81 28.80 619.3 619.3 0.126
Kaduna 36.6 30.8 1.52 21.04 876.4 876.4 0.101
Borno 37.0 10.0 0.55 6.85 957.8 957.8 0.042
HDI of
1993
51.5 50.7 1.20 34.20 1,215.0 1,215.0 0.246
Source: UNDP 1996: 29.
132
Box 2.3: The Parameters of the Human Development Indices
HDI
• A long and healthy life (measured as life expectancy)
• Knowledge (measured as adult literacy rate and gross enrolment
ratio)
• Decent standard of living (measured as GDP per capita, adjusted
by PPP US $)
HPI-1
• A long and healthy life (measured as probability at birth of not
surviving to age 40)
• Knowledge (measured as adult illiteracy rate)
• Decent standard of living (measured as percentage of population
not using improved water sources and percentage of children
under five who are underweight)
HPI-2
• A long and healthy life (measured as probability at birth of not
surviving to age 60)
• Knowledge (measured as percentage of adults lacking functional
literacy skills)
• Decent standard of living (measured as percentage of people living
below the poverty line)
• Social exclusion (measured as long-term unemployment rate)
GDI
• A long and healthy life (measured as female life expectancy and
male life expectancy)
• Knowledge (measured by female adult literacy rate and male adult
literacy rate)
• Decent standard of living (measured as female estimated earned
income and male estimated earned income)
GEM
• Political participation (measured as female and male shares of
parliamentary seats)
• Economic participation and decision-making (measured as female
and male shares of positions as legislators, senior officials and
managers, and female and male shares of professional and
technical positions)
• Power over economic resources (measured as female and male
estimated earned income)
Source: UNDP 2004 and 2005
133
BOX 2.4: Computation of Human Development Indices (HDI, HPI-1, HPI-2)
134
BOX 2.5: Computation of Human Development Indices (GDI and GEM)
135
The performances of the Niger Delta states on the HDI may have declined
somewhat by 2005, but not very much. Life expectancy and GDP per capita
adjusted for purchasing power parity may have fallen slightly. Adult literacy
rates and gross enrolment ratios have increased considerably, however, helping
to keep the HDI scores for the delta almost as they were in the 1992 and 1996
calculations.
Table 2.8 may not convey the entire picture on ground. A number of the Niger
Delta states, including Bendel, Rivers and Cross River, have higher (sometimes
significantly) levels of adult literacy than some western states, such as Oyo,
Ondo and Ogun. Historically, the western states had earlier access to education,
and their Action Group governments emphasized free education in the 1950s
and 1960s. As a result of low educational ratings, the three Niger Delta states
above are classified as ‘educationally disadvantaged’. Therefore, the gulf
between the HDI of 0.539 for Rivers State and 0.126 for Ogun State does not
appear to reflect the actual quality of human development in the two states over
time.
For 2005, Table 2.9 shows the average HDI for the Niger Delta states as 0.564. The
average in 1992 was 0.472, with Bendel (now Delta and Edo states) the highest
performing at 0.631. In table 2.8, the highest performing state, Delta, has an HDI
of 0.615, which represents a slight drop. In the 2002 global HDI ranking of
countries, Delta would have ranked in the 125th position with Morocco, a big
drop from the position of 90th in 1996. Clearly, the relative human development
situation in the Niger Delta has declined. It is also important to note the gulf
between what people have defined as indicators of poverty in the region (see box
2.1) and the HDI (and HPI) indicators. The former appear to be more in accord
with the real quality of life issues and infrastructural challenges in the region.
Evidence from Chart 2.2 reveals that while some states made appreciable
progress between 1992 and 2005, most states from the Niger Delta region,
especially the South-South geo-political zone, performed poorly. Edo, Delta, and
Bayelsa showed some retrogressive trends, while Ondo, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross
River, and Rivers and Imo states achieved some progress.
136
Chart 2.2: Progress on HDI in the Niger Delta
Region
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Edo
Delta
Rivers
Bayelsa
Cross River
Akwa Ibom
Imo
Abia
Ondo
Niger Delta
State
HDI
2005
1992
Table 2.9: HDI for the Niger Delta States, 2005
State Life
expectancy
Education
index
GDP index HDI
Abia 0.492 0.578 0.560 0.543
Akwa Ibom 0.506 0.683 0.540 0.576
Bayelsa 0.455 0.523 0.520 0.499
Cross River 0.556 0.630 0.565 0.584
Delta 0.587 0.636 0.621 0.615
Edo 0.579 0.602 0.600 0.594
Imo 0.503 0.546 0.591 0.547
Ondo 0.501 0.575 0.512 0.529
Rivers 0.563 0.590 0.620 0.591
Niger Delta 0.527 0.596 0.570 0.564
Source: ERML field survey 2005.
137
Table 2.10: Trends in Human Development for Nigeria, 1975 - 2005
YEAR HDI HPI-1 GEM GDI
1975 0.324 - - -
1980 0.385 - - -
1985 0.401 - - -
1990 0.430 - - -
1995 0.455 - - -
2000 - - - -
2002 0.466 35.1 - 0.458
2005 0.453 38.8 - 0.439
Source: UNDP 2004 and 2005.
Table 2.11: Comparative Analysis of Human Development Indices, 2005
AREA HDI HPI-1 GDI
Nigeria 0.453 38.8 0.439
Best performer in sub-
Saharan Africa
(Mauritius)
0.791
11.4 0.781
Worst performer in sub-
Saharan Africa (Niger)
0.281 64.4 0.271
Best performer in the
world (Norway)
0.963 3.6 0.960
Nigeria’s world ranking 158th out of 177
countries
75th out of 103
countries
123rd out of 140
countries
*The GEM could not be computed for Nigeria due to data problems.
Source: UNDP 2005, Country Fact Sheets.
For Nigeria as a whole, the average HDI rose from 0.324 in 1975 through 0.430 in
1990 to 0.466 in 2002 (table 2.10). It then fell to 0.453 in 2005. This suggests that
the human development situation in Nigeria as a whole, as measured by the
HDI, has declined, although the drop off appears to be steeper for the Niger
Delta states than for the rest of the country. In general, Nigeria’s performance on
the HDI is not disappointing, but the improvement has been modest compared
to other developing countries, and poor compared to the best performing
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world (table 2.11).
The human development situation in Nigeria as a whole, as measured by the HDI, has
declined, although the drop off appears to be steeper for the Niger Delta states than for
the rest of the country.
138
Error!
The well-known limitations of the HDI in the region have to be borne in mind.
For instance, the data on income used to compute the per capita GDP component
include oil revenue, much of which is not retained within the Niger Delta region.
The HDI also does not adequately capture severe environmental degradation
and poor infrastructural provision because of the nature of its measurement
parameters. The Niger Delta states do rank relatively high on the HDI indicators
of life expectancy, knowledge and GDP per capita values. Unfortunately, these
do not include the items the states badly need, such as roads, water, electricity,
appropriate waste management and so on. There is a sharp contrast between the
quantitative indicators and the real quality of life of the people in the region. It is
necessary to look beyond the HDI for an effective assessment of the problems of
the Niger Delta.
To start, the poverty and human development situation in the region should be
viewed in terms of what is happening in comparable oil-producing regions of the
world. If the various governments in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta region are
not doing this, the local people are making these comparisons and genuinely feel
that they should fare much better than they are at present. In contrast to the poor
human development situation in Nigeria generally, and the Niger Delta region in
particular, Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil-producing country, has been
doing rather well. According to the 2003 global Human Development Report, the
HDI for Saudi Arabia was 0.800. The country was rated 0.792 on life expectancy,
0.838 on educational attainment (with literacy at 0.790 and the enrolment ratio at
0.858) and 0.721 on per capita income (see chart 2.3). It is easy to see that the oil
An important limitation of the HDI in the Niger Delta region is that the
income data used to compute the per capita GDP component include oil
revenue, much of which is not retained within the region.
The Niger Delta states will appear relatively high on the HDI
indicators of life expectancy, knowledge and GDP per capita.
These, unfortunately, do not include the items that the Niger
Delta states badly need, such as roads, water, electricity,
appropriate waste management and so on. It will therefore be
necessary to look beyond the HDI for an effective assessment of
the delta’s problems.
139
wealth of Saudi Arabia has served the country well in terms of enhanced human
development.
Indonesia is another oil-producing country that is almost at the same level of
development as Nigeria. Even there, the human development situation is slightly
better than in the Niger Delta. Indonesia’s HDI for 2002 was 0.658, which is
higher than the Niger Delta average of 0.564. Life expectancy in Indonesia was
rated at 0.662, compared with 0.527 for the Niger Delta; adult literacy was at
0.895, compared with 0.673 on the education index for the Niger Delta; and real
per capita consumption was at 0.592 compared with the Niger Delta’s GDP index
of 0.570. Chart 2.4 provides a good illustration of the human development
progress in the Niger Delta region compared to other oil-producing countries.
From this, it is clear that the delta could have reached a different outcome had
the region’s wealth been used judiciously. Countries such as Libya and
Venezuela have also performed better than both Nigeria as a whole and the
Niger Delta region in particular.
140
Chart 2.3: Comparative Human Development Indices Between Saudi Arabia and
Nigeria (Niger Delta Region)
a. Saudi Arabia
Source: Government of Saudi Arabia 2000.
b. Niger Delta
Source: ERML fieldwork.
Education Index
0.596
Enrolment Ratio
0.897
Literacy
0.673
GDP
0.570
Life Expectancy
at Birth
0 527
Human
Development
0 564
Educational
Attainment
0 838
Enrolment Ratio
0.858
Literacy
0.790
Per Capita
Income
0 771
Life Expectancy
at Birth
0 792
Human
Development
0 800
141
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
HDI
Niger Delta Saudi Arabia Indonesia United Arab Emirates Kuwait
Chart 2.4: Human Development Index in Oil Producing Countries Relative to the Niger
Delta Region
Life Expectancy
Education Index
GDP Index
HDI
The HPI-1 for the Niger Delta Region
The human poverty index, compared with the HDI, focuses on more fundamental
parameters of human development. Rather than using gross measures such as life
expectancy and GDP per capita, the HPI-1 addresses issues of survivorship, access
to improved water supply and the nutritional level of children under the age of
five. Table 2.12 shows the average HPI-1 for the Niger Delta states is 28.8 per cent
for 2005, compared with 38.8 per cent for Nigeria as a whole. This again means
that the Niger Delta states have outperformed the rest of the country. But the
Niger Delta average HPI-1 of 28.8 per cent is far worse than that of Saudi Arabia
(14.9 per cent), Indonesia (17.8 per cent) or Venezuela (8.8 per cent).
The best performing states in the Niger Delta are Delta at 22.4 per cent and Edo at
23.4 per cent. The worst performers are Ondo at 35.4 per cent and Bayelsa at 33.8
per cent. If Delta, the best performing state, were to be a nation, its world ranking
on the HPI-1 would have been 43rd, placing it high among the medium-ranking
developing countries.
142
Table 2.12: HPI-1 Index and Its Parameters for the Niger Delta Region
State
Probability at birth of
not surviving to age 40
Adult illiteracy
rate
Unweighted
average HPI-1
Abia 26 26 34 29.169
Akwa Ibom 27 28 35.5 30.649
Bayelsa 30 31 39 33.826
Cross River 26 28 33 29.3
Delta 20 18 27 22.355
Edo 22 18 28 23.399
Imo 25 29 32 28.949
Ondo 30 31 42.5 35.442
Rivers 24 24 30.5 26.53
Niger Delta 25.556 25.889 33.4 28.847
Source: ERML 2005.
Gender Disparities in Human Development
The term gender refers to socially constructed roles and social expectations of
individuals, based on their sex as male or female. Using the biological differences
of men and women, society erects institutions, rules and regulations that
determine what is expected of individuals, what their rights and privileges are,
what resources they can access, whether or not they can participate in societal
decision-making, and so on. In other words, the power of an individual derives
from the society in which he or she resides, temporarily or otherwise, and the
way gender is constructed in that society.
Like other categories of differentiation, such as ethnicity, race, class and
language, gender can determine a person’s life chances, and shape their ability to
participate in the socio-economic and political life of a community or society.
While some categories of differentiation are absent in some societies (for
example, race is not a normal category in Nigeria), all countries of the world,
albeit to different degrees, experience gender disparities. These present
themselves as different forms of asymmetries between men and women that
ensure that one sex is favoured at the expense of the other. Gender brings about
such disparities as unequal opportunities in employment, unequal rewards for
similar work, unequal access to various kinds of productive resources, and an
unequal capacity to participate in and influence decisions that shape the
development process. Closing gender gaps is generally attractive, not only
because it improves the lives of women and tends to raise their relative status,
but also because gender equity improves human development.
143
The gender gap must be narrowed in the Niger Delta for two main reasons. First,
Nigeria is going through a democratization process. All efforts should be made
to include and involve all citizens in governance and in the development
decision-making process in the Niger Delta. Secondly, development goals and
aspirations have a much greater chance of success if all citizens participate in the
process of achieving them. A more inclusive participatory process at the local,
state and regional levels would allow the Niger Delta to benefit from new
priorities and perspectives brought in by talented women. For example, a
process including more women in strategic decision-making might find a way to
reduce the negative externalities from oil production.
In narrowing the gender gap, with the objective of eventual elimination, extra
attention must be paid to citizens whose needs have been neglected for a long
time. A more equitable and gender-balanced society would help achieve this,
leading to improved economic and social trends overall, and the attainment of
truly sustainable development.
The GDI for the Niger Delta Region
While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts this average achievement
to reflect the inequalities between men and women. For the Niger Delta states, the
average GDI for 2005 was 0.444, compared to 0.439 for Nigeria (see table 2.13). This
indicates that the Niger Delta states have outperformed the national average, although
such states as Abia, Delta and Imo have performed below the average. The delta region
has done comparatively well with respect to gender equality in education, as measured by
the equally distributed educational index, and in terms of life expectancy. The states have
done badly, however, on gender equality and income, particularly Akwa Ibom, Delta and
Imo states.
The delta’s GDI score fares poorly in comparison with the scores of other oil-producing
countries. In 2003, Oman scored 0.759, Venezuela 0.765, Saudi Arabia 0.749 and
Indonesia 0.691 (UNDP, 2005). Gender equality in the Niger Delta still clearly remains
an important development challenge.
144
Table 2.13: GDI for Niger Delta States, 2005
State
Equally
distributed life
expectancy index
Equally
distributed
educational index
Equally
distributed
income index GDI
Abia 0.443 0.492 0.339 0.425
Akwa Ibom 0.504 0.518 0.151 0.391
Bayelsa 0.450 0.652 0.227 0.443
Cross River 0.480 0.621 0.342 0.481
Delta 0.530 0.614 0.168 0.437
Edo 0.486 0.682 0.301 0.490
Imo 0.503 0.615 0.162 0.427
Ondo 0.462 0.568 0.327 0.452
Rivers 0.480 0.609 0.273 0.454
Niger Delta 0.482 0.597 0.254 0.444
Source: ERML 2005.
The GEM for the Niger Delta Region
The GEM measures that extent to which women are excluded from opportunities in a
given country. The average GEM for the Niger Delta states is 0.399 (see table 2.13). In
the human development reports on Nigeria produced so far, the GEM could not be
calculated because of data problems. This is the same case for many sub-Saharan
countries.
Compared with the lowest GEM performers in the world—Yemen (0.123), Saudi Arabia
(0.207) and Iran (0.318)—the Niger Delta is not doing too badly, but efforts need to be
stepped up. While all the states performed very well on participation, the income index is
quite low. In Imo, Delta and Bayelsa states, women’s participation in parliamentary
activities is very low relative to other states (see table 2.14).
145
Table 2.14: GEM for Niger Delta States, 2005
State
Equally distributed
equivalent percentage
(EDEP)
parliamentary
EDEP economic
participation
EDEP for
income GEM
Abia 0.211 0.878 0.032 0.374
Akwa Ibom 0.222 0.870 0.063 0.385
Bayelsa 0.142 0.906 0.050 0.366
Cross River 0.207 0.875 0.057 0.380
Delta 0.077 0.813 0.084 0.325
Edo 0.207 0.949 0.085 0.413
Imo 0.041 0.923 0.062 0.342
Ondo 0.707 0.918 0.066 0.564
Rivers 0.317 0.916 0.092 0.441
Niger Delta 0.237 0.894 0.066 0.399
Source: ERML fieldwork 2005.
Human Development at the Local Level
Map 2.1 contains the spatial distribution of local government areas in the region.
Capturing spatial inequalities in human development in the Niger Delta region
requires data and analysis on the local level. But there are little or no data
available, including on fiscal operations. Data are generally not available for life
expectancy, the probabilities of not living to age 40 or 60 years, or male and
female estimated earned incomes.
Across Nigeria, no local data on GDP per capita exist because local contributions
to GDP have never been measured, although this issue is currently being
addressed. GDP per capita has instead been calculated as the internally
generated revenue of local governments per capita. This serves as a proxy for
measuring local economic activities. Some reservations crop up in using this
calculation to measure GDP, however, because it often does not reflect the real
lives of local people or local economic potentials, given the high levels of both
misappropriated funds and tax evasion.
To calculate the human development indices for this report, the missing data
were interpolated using standard spatial interpolation techniques. In some cases,
There is a paucity of data at the local government level, including information
on fiscal operations.
146
state scores were used as benchmarks and local scores were derived by
weighting the state score with the overall local scores on the indicators with
available data.
147
Map 2.1: Administrative Map of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria Showing
Local Government Areas.
148
For the HDI, HPI-1, GDI and GEM, data have been mapped to show the spatial
pattern of each index across the Niger Delta region. In order to highlight the
disparity in the human development indices between the drier and the more
swampy zones, maps were produced to reclassify localities into dry land and
swamp land, and to show links between ecology and human development. The
swamp land comprises the freshwater swamp forest, mangrove swamp forest
and barrier island ecological zones; the dry land includes the lowland rainforest
ecological zone and the areas outside the core Niger Delta.
In order to track the influence of oil operations (Map 2.2), the indices were also
linked to the distribution of oil facilities. Overall, the human development scores
have been broken into high, medium and low categories.
The HDI for Local Government Areas
Local HDIs are comparatively lower than state rankings. This is partly a result of
using internally generated revenue as a surrogate for GDP in the calculation of
the HDI. But the HDI values are still useful in showing the variations in human
development across each state.
The best performing local government areas are Udu in Delta State (0.579);
followed by Aniocha South in Delta State (0.561); Port Harcourt in Rivers State
(0.557); Warri North (0.555), Burutu (0.551), Oshimili South (0.529), Ethiope West
(0. 526), Warri South (0.525), Ndokwa West (0.522) and Oshimili North (0.522), all
of which are in Delta State; and Aba South in Abia State (0.518) (appendix A2.1).
Just as Delta State is the best performing state on the HDI, nine of these 11 best
performing localities are in Delta State. Out of 19 local government areas with an
HDI of 0.5 and above, 14 are in Delta State. Two are in Rivers State, and one each
are in Cross River, Abia and Akwa Ibom states.
The worst performing localities are Ifedore (0.229), Ese Odo (0.240) and Akoko
South East (0.243), all of which are in Ondo State; Opobo/Nkoro in Rivers State
(0.253); Onna (0.254) and Orukanam (0.257) in Akwa Ibom State; and Obio Ngwa
in Abia State (0.256) (appendix A2.1). While no locality scored less than 0.3 in
Cross River State, the corresponding number of the local government councils
for other states is Delta (1), Imo (2), Rivers (3), Abia (5), Bayelsa (6), Ondo (7) and
Akwa Ibom (11). Six out of the eight local government areas in Bayelsa State
Six out of the eight local government areas in Bayelsa State scored less than 0.3
on the HDI, partly as a result of the difficult terrain or neglect from different
tiers of government.
149
scored less than 0.3 on the HDI, partly as a result of the difficult terrain and
neglect by the different tiers of government.
150
Map 2.2
151
When the local HDIs are compared with the national average, 37 localities scored
above the national HDI of 0.453 for 2005, while 62 have HDIs of 0.400 or above.
Thirty-nine scored below 0.300. This demonstrates a wide gap. A graphic account
of the comparative performance of the Niger Delta states (and, by implication,
the component localities) appears in maps 2.2 to 2.9.
The data suggest that ecology, GDP, and, to some extent, the location of oil
facilities best explain the high HDI levels in certain parts of the Niger Delta
region. Most of the best performing local governments are urban; the poorest
performers are mostly rural. Ondo State has more of the worst performing local
governments, while Delta State has more of the best performing. This suggests
that a human development agenda for the Niger Delta region must pay special
attention to the varying needs of different locations.
Map 2.3 makes clear that ecology plays a role in HDI scores, but is not the only
factors behind the variations. Only a few local government areas with high HDI
scores are in the swamp land zone, such as Burutu, Warri North and Warri
South-West)—mainly in areas with extensive oil production. Oil companies have
contributed appreciably to putting infrastructure in place in some of these
communities.
Bayelsa State localities, with one exception, have low HDI scores. The state has
suffered neglect from successive administrations at the local, state and federal
government levels, presumably for three main reasons. First, the number of oil
facilities is low. Second, the entire state is within the difficult mangrove swamp
zone. Third, there is no major urban area, such as Warri or Port Harcourt, to act
as a ‘growth centre’. One of the reasons for carving out the state from the old
Rivers State was to bring development to the people in the area. Nine years after
Bayelsa State’s creation, however, development remains elusive.
There is a wide disparity in local performances on the HDI. Urban localities tend
to perform best. The most poorly performing areas are rural.
Only a few local governments with high HDI scores are in the swamp land
zone—mainly in areas with extensive oil production.
Bayelsa State is wholly in the swamp land zone. It has suffered neglect from
successive administrations at the local, state and federal government levels.
152
Map 2.4 shows the relationship between the distribution of oil facilities and HDI
scores. The map reveals some correspondence between areas with oil facilities
and high HDI scores. This is true particularly in Delta State, which receives the
highest revenue allocation in the region and indeed in Nigeria (see chart 2.5). But
many localities with oil facilities still rate low on the HDI, particularly in Bayelsa
and Rivers states. Poor planning and coordination of development activities
between oil companies and governments help account for why development
initiatives have not translated into meaningful development outcomes.
Chart 2.5: Revenue Allocation to Niger Delta States
(May 1999-October 2005)
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
Abia
Akwa Ibom
Bayelsa
Cross Rivers
Delta
Edo
Imo
Ondo
Rivers
States
Allocation (000,000 Naira)
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja.
An analysis of HDI trends in terms of dry and swamp lands reveals some
interesting tendencies for the components of the HDI. Of the few areas in the
swamp zone with high HDI scores, only Warri North and Warri South-West
have high life expectancies (see map 2.5). Burutu, Ughelli South, Patani and
In Bayelsa State, most local government areas with oil facilities score low on
education.
153
Ndokwa East (Delta State), Bonny (Rivers State) and Ikot Abasi (Akwa Ibom
State) all have low to medium life expectancies.
Map 2.6 displays patterns in education. All localities with high HDI scores fare
only low to medium on educational performance. A measure of the high degree
of deprivation in Bayelsa State, as a whole, is the fact that its educational index is
also low.
Maps 2.7 and 2.8 show that most local governments in the state fall in the
category of places with oil facilities and a low educational index. In Cross River
State, Bakassi has the largest oil well and facilities, but it has the lowest
educational index in the state. A similar situation is observed for Ukwa East in
Abia State; Ohrionwon and Ikopa Oka in Edo State; Ilaje and Ese Odo in Ondo
State; and Mbo, Ikot Abasi and Mkpat Enin in Akwa Ibom state. Other localities
with an inverse relationship between the presence of oil wells and educational
achievement are Isoko South, Oshimili North and Oshimili South in Delta State,
and Degema, Obia/Akpor, Oyibo and Ogba/Egbema/Ndoini in Rivers State.
A noticeable feature of the HDI mapping is that urban areas—such as Port
Harcourt and Eleme in Rivers State, Oredo in Edo State, Owerri in Imo State and
Akure North in Ondo State—have high HDI scores and rate high or medium on
the individual parameters of life expectancy and education. Some urban areas
with high HDI scores do not have oil facilities. This suggests that urban centres
have socio-economic infrastructure allowing greater access to education, health
and economic opportunities than their rural counterparts.
154
Map 2.3
155
Map 2.4
156
Map 2.5
157
Map 2.6
158
MAP 2.7
159
Map 2.8
160
The HPI-1 for Local Government Areas
The best performing local government area on the HPI-1 is Oshimili North in
Delta State at 15.794 per cent, while the worst performing is Odigbo in Ondo
State at 33.722 per cent. Considering that the national HPI-1 is 38.8 per cent, this
would mean that even the worst performing locality in the Niger Delta has
surpassed the national average. But the best score is still worse than the 11.4 per
cent score for Mauritius, the top country on the HPI-1 in sub-Saharan Africa.
HPI-1 performances vary widely across the region. Delta State has the lowest
level of disparity, while Edo State has the widest variation. Against the regional
average of 32.065 per cent, five states (Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo and Ondo)
rank better, while four states (Cross River, Abia, Akwa Ibom and Edo) rank
worse (table 2.14).
There are relatively few localities that perform well on the HPI-1 in both the dry
and swamp land areas (map 2.9). Most of the better-off areas are in Edo and
Delta states (table 2.15). In the swamp land zone, it is difficult to locate any
locality with a low level of poverty. Across the Niger Delta region, only 31 local
government areas, or 20 per cent of the total, have low poverty levels. Those with
low HPI-1 scores also have high or medium scores on the HDI, which is as it
should be. Some rated high on the HDI, such as Burutu, Warri North and Warri
South-West, only have medium HPI-1 scores, which further buttresses the fact
that poverty levels can be high even in the midst of oil wealth.
Table 2.14: Disparities in the HPI-1
HPI-1 High Low Disparity Rank
Cross River 28.232 18.860 33.196 6th
Abia 32.862 21.686 34.009 7th
Edo 26.230 14.030 46.512 9th
Ondo 33.337 23.284 30.156 5th
Akwa Ibom 29.075 18.564 36.151 8th
Bayelsa 31.138 22.428 27.972 3rd
Delta 24.710 18.787 23.970 1st
Imo 29.261 20.871 28.673 4th
Rivers 28.137 20.275 27.942 2nd
Niger Delta 29.220 19.865 32.065
The medium HPI-1 score for six of the eight local government areas in Bayelsa
State shows that benefits derived from oil have not transformed people’s lives.
Yenagoa and Brass, the state’s most developed areas, have high incidences of
poverty.
161
Average
Source: Computed from the field survey conducted for this report.
162
Map 2.9.
163
Table 2.15 : Categorization of Local Governments by HPI-1 Performance
Number of local government areas
HPI-1
Low (less
than 20.595)
Medium (20.595
to 27.158)
High (27.159
and above)
Total number
Cross River 2 14 2 18
Abia - 14 3
17
Edo 10 8 - 18
Ondo - 2- 18 20
Akwa Ibom 5 21 5 31
Bayelsa - 6 2 8
Delta 11 14 - 25
Imo - 22 5 27
Rivers 3 19 1 23
Niger Delta 31 116 36 187
Source: Computed from the field survey conducted for this report.
Map 2.10 shows the HPI-1 scores in relation to the distribution of oil facilities. As
is the case with the HDI, localities with oil facilities could be assumed to attract
more social and economic activities and to score better. Unfortunately, this is not
quite the case—most areas with oil facilities have high or medium scores,
indicating pervasive poverty. Areas without oil facilities appear to fare better
than those with oil facilities—another indication of the unequal distribution of oil
resources.
The high scores on the HPI-1 in those areas without oil facilities are not easy to
explain by looking at the individual parameters that make up the index. In Abia,
Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo and Rivers states, most localities with a
high or medium HPI-1 score also rate high or medium on the life expectancy
index. The same is true but to a lesser extent in the correlation between the HPI-1
and the educational index. A few localities with a high HPI-1 score low ratings
on both the life expectancy and educational indices, particularly in Edo State
(e.g., Ovia North-East, Ovia South-West and Orhiomwon), Abia State (e.g.,
Ikwuano, Ngwa, Ukwa East, etc.) and Akwa Ibom State (e.g., Mkpat Eni).
Areas without oil facilities appear to fare better on the poverty index than those with oil facilities—another indication of the unequal
distribution of oil resources.
164
All but two of the local government areas in Ondo State (Akoko North West and
Akoko South East) have high HPI-1 scores. Cases of low HPI-1 ratings
165
Map 2.10
166
indicate that the Niger Delta region has resources beyond oil and gas that can
generate sustained economic growth and development. The Niger Delta is so
richly endowed that all that needs to be done is to harness, in a more coordinated
manner, the diverse possibilities within the region.
The GDI for Local Government Areas
In terms of gender, many localities did relatively well on the equally distributed
education index, but poorly on the equally distributed income index. The best
performers on the GDI are Ondo East (0.556) and Ondo West (0.553) in Ondo
State, Oredo in Edo State (0.544), Port Harcourt in Rivers State (0.543) and
Calabar Municipal in Cross River State (0.543). The worst performing local
government areas include Mkpat Enin in Akwa Ibom State (0.295), Burutu in
Delta State (0.307) and Mbo in Akwa Ibom State (0.310). These scores may be
compared with the national GDI of 0.439 as well as the GDI for the worst
performing country in sub-Saharan Africa, the Niger Republic, which is 0.271.
The GDI rankings for the Niger Delta localities suggest they have done well
overall. As with the HDI and HPI-1, however, the disparities are wide. The
difference between the best and worst performers is 0.261, with the worst
performer scoring less than half the value for the best performer.
Maps 2.11 displays the GDI scores in relation to the ecological zones. In the dry
land zone, most low-scoring localities are in Akwa Ibom State. In the swamp
land zone, Ilaje and Ese Odo in Ondo State and Burutu in Delta State rank low.
Medium GDI scores predominate in both states. Most areas in Edo and Cross
River states fall in the high GDI category.
GDI scores in relation to the distribution of oil facilities appear on map 2.12. High
and medium scores closely correlate with the presence of oil facilities in Abia,
Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Rivers states. A few isolated local governments with oil
facilities have low GDI scores. Akwa Ibom deserves special mention and
attention because it is almost exclusively an area of low GDI performance,
irrespective of whether or not there are oil facilities.
The GEM for Local Government Areas
Almost all local government areas have performed poorly on women’s
representation in the National Assembly, which drags down scores on the GEM.
The best performing area is Ovia North East in Edo State (0.349), followed by
Ovia South West (0.348). The worst performing areas are Isoko North (0.264) and
Isoko South (0.264) in Delta State. Unlike on the HDI and HPI-1, where Delta
State areas did very well, many fared poorly on the GEM.
167
168
Map 2.10.
169
Map 2.11. .
170
Map 2.13 shows the spatial pattern of GEM scores in relation to the ecological
zones. In the dry land zone, localities in Edo, Imo and Ondo states have
predominantly high GEM scores; those in Abia, Akwa Ibom and Cross River
states have medium scores; those in Delta State are mostly in the low GEM class.
In the swamp land zone, local government areas in Rivers State tend to have
high GEM scores; Bayelsa’s localities are in the medium category; those in Delta
South are in the low GEM category. The scores appear to reflect administrative
(state) subdivisions rather than ecological zones, evidence of differences in
relevant policies and activities between states.
Map 2.14 shows the relationship between oil facilities and the GEM. Imo and
Rivers states show a strong correspondence between the presence of oil facilities
and high GEM scores. The reverse is the case in Delta State, while Bayelsa is
somewhere in between. This indicates that oil facilities do not guarantee higher
levels of gender empowerment.
171
Map 2.12. Please note that this is the old 2.13.
172
Map 2.13. Please note that this is the old 2.14.
173
CONCLUSION
It has not been easy to come up with consistently accurate and valid data to
analyse poverty trends in the Niger Delta. Available data from different sources
are sometimes contradictory. The accuracy of most is in doubt, as they do not
seem to reflect the obvious realities on the ground. Still, the foregoing analyses of
poverty and the human development situation in the Niger Delta clearly paint a
grim picture reflecting the almost total failure of governance at all levels.
Poverty is multidimensional, but some of the more important dimensions
relevant to the Niger Delta do not feature among those usually included in the
computation of human development indices. Therefore, analysis based on these
indices does not tell the whole story of the region’s human development. In
subsequent chapters of this report, every effort is made to address the social,
political, economic and environmental issues of greatest concern to people at all
levels of development.
With few exceptions, the Niger Delta states appear to be better off on most
human development indices than Nigeria as a whole, although not in the case of
such states as Lagos, Kaduna and the Federal Capital Territory, which have
clearly benefited from infrastructure paid for by oil. While the gap between the
Niger Delta states and the rest of the country has narrowed progressively over
the years, this is only because the indices for the rest of the country have risen,
while those for the delta region have remained virtually unchanged. This lends
credence to the general belief in the Niger Delta of neglect by successive national
administrations, and underscores the failure of state and local governments and
development agencies to address developmental problems. The lack of progress
is patently unacceptable given the resources generated from the region.
Spatial disparities in human development are blurred at the state level, but they
become pronounced at the local level. In general, local governments in the drier
interior parts of the region are better off than those in the swamp zone, which
clearly shows the adverse effect of the difficult core Niger Delta environment on
physical and socio-economic development. While some local governments in
difficult places that have oil wells or facilities appear to have performed much
better on the HDI than those without oil operations, this performance fizzles on
poverty measures. Some local governments with oil facilities also perform poorly
on overall life expectancy, education and equally distributed life expectancy. It is
sad that the oil industry appears to have such a limited impact. Local frustration
with the industry and governments in general is understandable.
In a situation of general socio-economic deprivation such as the one in the Niger
Delta region, minority or underprivileged groups such as youths and women
174
suffer more than others. The foregoing discussions have highlighted some of the
problems from gender disparities. Youth restiveness is discussed in subsequent
chapters of this report. Both issues must be addressed in any human
development agenda for the region.
175
CHAPTER THREE
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
CHALLENGES IN THE NIGER DELTA
POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
The environmental degradation resulting from oil and gas production in the
Niger Delta has attracted the attention of environmentalists and other experts,
who look at the region within the larger context of globalization. The
implications for livelihoods in the delta have been a major bone of contention,
with quite intense fallout in localities where oil exploration takes place. Many
arguments revolve around who is responsible for most of the ills of oil
exploration—the government, oil companies, youths who vandalize pipelines, or
the global community?
The world today recognizes the importance of environmental sustainability to
the development of nations. Goal 7 of the MDGs—“Ensure environmental
sustainability”—seeks to reduce environmental degradation arising from natural
and manmade causes as well as inefficient use of resources, and to improve
environmental management through private sector participation and
environmentally friendly technologies.
For the Niger Delta people, as for many poor rural and urban populations,
environmental sustainability is fundamental to their overall well-being and
development. The environment is important to people living in poverty not only
because their existence to a large extent relies on subsistence endeavours, which
depend on natural resources, but also because they perceive their well-being as
tied to their environment in terms of livelihoods, health, vulnerability and the
ability to control their lives. Poorer people are more vulnerable to changes in the
environment, in part because social, political and economic exclusion means they
almost always have fewer choices about where they live. They bear the brunt of
natural hazards, biodiversity loss and the depletion of forests, pollution (air,
water and soil), and the negative impacts of industrial activities.
Oil and gas extraction has had a severe impact on the delta’s environment—
and on poor rural and urban communities. For them, environmental
sustainability is fundamental to well-being.
176
Although direct and measurable links between poverty and the environment are
sometimes difficult to recognize, there is abundant empirical information to
establish that poverty is both a major cause and a result of environmental
problems (see box 3.1). Several studies on the poverty-environment nexus (e.g.,
World Bank 1999, Arnold and Bird 1999 and DIFID 2002) demonstrate that poor
people are usually the worst hit by environmental problems. Environmental
factors are implicated in about 20 per cent of the cases of disease in developing
countries, for example. In Nigeria, water-related diseases constitute about 80 per
cent of the total disease burden (NDHS 2003). Many of these illnesses are linked
to environmental conditions that cause water contamination. When people have
inadequate access to safe water, or have to rely on polluted sources to survive,
diarrhoea, cholera and vector-borne diseases such as malaria are the inevitable
result.
Environmental management issues therefore are highly germane to development
and to any poverty reduction strategy for the Niger Delta region, where nearly
60 per cent of the population depends on the natural environment—living and
non-living—for their livelihoods. Including environmental management in
poverty reduction strategies recognizes again that poverty encompasses both
income and non-income dimensions of deprivation.
In the Niger Delta, as in many other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the rural poor
are those who lack land sufficient to feed a family, or who have just enough to
sustain families but no surplus to enjoy. The poor in urban areas are those
without employment, or who work in the urban informal sector. Without
appropriate environmental management initiatives, both suffer the three key
dimensions of human poverty—insufficient livelihoods, poor health and
vulnerability. The connections between poverty and the environment are
complex, and will be considered in more detail in chapter six.
Over sixty per cent of the people in the delta depend on the natural environment—living and non-living—for livelihoods.
Without appropriate environmental management initiatives, both the rural and
urban poor suffer from the three key dimensions of human poverty—insufficient
livelihoods, poor health and vulnerability.
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Box 3.1: Invading the Environmental Resources of Indigenous People—The Case
of Brazil
Today in Brazil, indigenous people account for only 0.2 per cent of the total population,
and their lands make up about 12 per cent of the national territory. During the past few
years, their existence has become ever more precarious as a result of the increasing
invasion of their territory by people ready to confiscate land and exploit natural resources.
The invaders are mostly displaced marginal workers who engage in illicit activities, such
as illegally mining gold or extracting luxury woods including mahogany, cherry and
cedar. Their numbers are estimated at 45,000. Another type of invasion is by the public
sector, which is building highways, hydroelectric power plants and other infrastructure
projects.
The number of invasions nearly doubled in 1996, affecting around 43 per cent of the
indigenous population. More than two-fifths of the invasions were motivated by illegal
exploration for and theft of timber, mostly in the states of Amazon and Para. But illegal
logging activity on indigenous land was also carried out in more than half the Brazilian
states. In Rondonia, 40 per cent of indigenous lands were subject to illegal activities. In
Maranhao, about 37 per cent of the territories were invaded by loggers, and in the states of
Para and Mato Grosso, there was exploration for luxury hardwoods on 33 per cent of
indigenous lands.
Cases of environmental damage on indigenous land increased eightfold in 1996. They
involved the degradation of natural resources, the devastation of vegetation,
contamination from mining and agriculture, and endangered fish species. Nearly 33 per
cent of all illness in the localities was linked to environmental degradation. The invasion of
indigenous territory in Brazil has aggravated the survival conditions of nearly a third of
the country’s indigenous population.
Source: Culled from Readings in Human Development edited by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva
Kumar. (New York: OUP), 2003
178
THE STATE OF THE NIGER DELTA ENVIRONMENT
Until the period after World War II, a delicate balance existed between the
human population of the Niger Delta and its fragile ecosystem. The exploitation
of natural resources did not go beyond the search for medicinal herbs, fuel,
game, fish and construction materials. This was sustainable because the available
resources outmatched the needs of the population.
Today, the Niger Delta environment has changed and continues to change
rapidly. The human population has grown at a high rate. Industrialization, urban
development, and oil and gas exploration and exploitation have infringed on the
people and their environment, leading to the opening up of previously pristine
ecosystems. This has resulted in the alteration of habitats, biodiversity loss,
deforestation and pollution (Amakiri 2005). While natural hazards are clearly
responsible for some of the environmental impacts, industrial activities have no
doubt aggravated the situation. There is a strong feeling in the region that the
degree and rate of degradation are pushing the delta towards ecological disaster.
Environmental Problems Not Related to Industry
The natural terrain and hydrology of the Niger Delta have always caused certain
environmental problems, especially flooding, siltation, occlusion, erosion and the
shortage of land for development. The local people have lived with these
problems for many years and have evolved ways of dealing with them, albeit
ineffectively for the most part. These environmental problems are discussed
briefly as follows:
A delicate balance exists between the human population in the Niger Delta and its
fragile ecosystem. There is a strong feeling in the region that the rate of
environmental degradation is pushing the delta towards ecological disaster.
The lack of land makes settlement difficult and costly, forcing some communities to
engage in uncontrolled land reclamation.
In the mangrove areas, floods continually modify river courses, rendering the rivers
useless as modes of transportation. This has serious impacts on human life and
economic activities.
179
Flooding is widespread in the Niger Delta because of low relief, the reduced
hydraulic capacities of water channels and high rainfall. Seasonal flooding occurs
in the freshwater swamp forest zone during river floods induced by local rains
and releases from upstream dam spillways. Communities, roads and farmlands
are partially or totally submerged from channels or by water flowing over the
levees. In the mangrove swamp forest areas, diurnal tidal movements result in
floods exacerbated by rising sea levels, coastal erosion and land subsidence. The
floods cause continual modification of river courses in the area, rendering the
rivers useless as modes of transportation. This also has significant impacts on the
pattern of human life and economic activities (Olawoye et al. 2003; NDES 2000).
Focus group participants claimed that flooding and erosion have destroyed their
food and cash crops in addition to destroying arable and fertile farmlands.
Siltation and occlusion happens when silt carried down the Niger River system
is deposited as water velocity slackens in the more sluggish waters of the Niger
Delta. Siltation reduces channel capacity, narrows creeks and reduces water
depths. This increases the rate at which aquatic plants grow on waterways. The
weeds occlude the navigable sections of waterways and hamper fishing.
Erosion, both river bank and coastal, is prevalent due to natural and human
causes. Communities have been displaced and forced to relocate as a result of it.
Public facilities, houses and other economic assets have been lost. In Sagbama
and Otuopkoti, many homes were destroyed by river bank erosion in the 1970s
before the Rivers State Government of Melford Okilo awarded contracts for
control measures (Olokesusi et al. 1993; Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke 2003). While river
bank erosion is caused by floods, coastal and brackish water zones are eroded by
the combined action of high tides and waves. In some of the larger settlements,
there have been attempts to control erosion, but the problem remains acute in
many large settlements and in most small settlements. Coastal erosion poses
great threats to coastal communities and their economic activities. In the coastal
plains of Ondo and Cross River states, gully erosion is also taking a toll.
A shortage of land for development stems from the scarcity of dry and
relatively well-drained land, especially in the barrier island forest, mangrove and
freshwater swamp forest zones. This has made housing and settlement
development very difficult and costly, and to some extent accounts for neglect of
the region by successive governments. The dynamics of flood and tidal
Coastal erosion threatens coastal communities and their economic activities. In the
coastal plains of Ondo and Cross River states, gully erosion is also taking a toll.
180
movement further reduce available land space, forcing many communities to
engage in uncontrolled land reclamation with negative environmental impacts.
Environmental Problems Related to Oil Operations
Since 1958, when the first oil well was drilled at Oloibiri, over 1,481 oil wells
have sprung up, producing from about 159 oilfields. There are more than 7,000
kilometres of pipelines and flow lines, and 275 flow stations operated by 13 oil
companies4 (NNPC and AAPW 2004). The productive and environmental impact
of the growing number of smaller operators is likely to increase with time.
Although less than five per cent of the land of the region is occupied by the oil
industry, the problems associated with its operation are immense and regionwide.
Apart from the more visible impacts, such as the pollution of soil, surface
and groundwater, and air, oil and gas exploitation has negatively affected socioeconomic
conditions.
Canalization: In the attempt to shorten travel time and improve access to
oilfields and production facilities, oil companies have constructed canals that in
some cases have caused saltwater to flow into freshwater zones, destroying
freshwater ecological systems. Increased access to new areas has also aggravated
illegal logging activities.
Oil companies constantly dredge river channels to facilitate navigation. The
material dredged from the canals is often dumped on the channel banks, which
disrupts the hydrology of these essentially flat and low-lying coastlands. The
elevated banks restrict the free flow of water and create ponds that can be
detrimental to vegetation and the local ecology. The dredging of rivers can also
create negative environmental impacts downstream, hence the concerns being
expressed about the proposed dredging of the River Niger from Baro in the north
to Warri (see box 3.2).
4 The major oil companies include Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC),
ExxonMobil, Total Nigeria, Chevron, Elf, Agip Texaco, Phillip, PAN Ocean and Statoil. The
Nigeria Liquidified Natural Gas (NLNG) also plays a major role in the region. Te Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), over the years, have developed series of joint venture
activities with the oil majors. Some of the indigenous oil firm that operate in the region include
Dubri Oil, Consolidated Oil, and AMNI International Petroleum Company.
The oil industry occupies less than five per cent of the delta’s land, but the entire
region feels the impacts of its operations.
Some canals constructed by oil companies have caused saltwater to flow into
freshwater zones, destroying freshwater ecological systems. Increased access to
new areas has aggravated illegal logging activities.
181
Oil spills: With the expansion of oil production, the incidence of oil spills has
increased considerably in the region. Spills occur accidentally and through the
deliberate actions of the local people, who sabotage pipelines in protest against
the operations of the Federal Government and oil companies. Available records
show that a total of 6,817 oil spills occurred between 1976 and 2001, with a loss of
approximately three million barrels of oil. More than 70 per cent was not
recovered. Approximately six per cent spilled on land, 25 per cent in swamps
and 69 per cent in offshore environments. In recent times, oil spills appear to be
caused more by wilful damage to facilities than by accidents (see chart 3.1 and
box 3.3).
The environmental effects of oil pollution are well known. They include the
degradation of forests and depletion of aquatic fauna. Long-term impacts are
also possible, as in cases where mangrove swamps and groundwater resources
BOX 3.2: Environmental Impacts of Dredging in the Niger Delta
Dredging alone affects all parts of the environment, but the impacts are
often compounded by the abandonment of the dredged materials on the
banks of canals and rivers. This alters the topography and hydrology and
causes acidification. The results include water contamination, damage to
vegetation, fish kills and changes in land use. Altered topography
prevents the natural re-succession of mangroves.
In Louisiana, canal backfilling has been used to mitigate impacts from
canal dredging (Neil and Turner, 1987). Turner and Lewis (1997) showed
that the restoration of hydrology by removing tidal restrictions and
impoundments caused by dredged material restored wetland vegetation.
They also acknowledged that the failure of most restoration efforts is
usually related to hydrologic parameters, including salinity and tidal
flooding patterns, as well as the interaction between topography and
channel functions. Natural mangrove recruitment, and the restoration of
normal tidal exchanges and residence times, site topography and drainage
require freshwater inputs (Kaly and Jones, 1998). This calls for site
excavation (and grading to pre-disposal elevation) and backfilling into
disused canals (Turner and Streever, 2002).
Source: Ohimain, 2004
Available records show that a total of 6,817 oil spills occurred between 1976 and 2001,
with a loss of approximately three million barrels of oil.
182
are harmed. An impact assessment of the 1983 Oshika oil spill in Rivers State by
Powell and White (1985) confirmed the death of floating and submerged aquatic
vegetation, especially water lettuce. Dead crabs, fish and birds were also
reported. The Niger Delta has experienced two major oil spills—the Funiwa oil
well blowout in 1980 and the Jones Creek oil spillage in 1998. These resulted in
the greatest mangrove forest devastation ever recorded worldwide.
The implication of these findings is frightening, given that human health is tied
to the web of food. Udoette (1997) reported, for example, that ingestion of
hydrocarbon directly or indirectly through contaminated food leads to
poisoning. Some researchers, such as Kanoh et al. 1990, and Snyder and Hedlim
1996, have documented the toxic and carcinogenic effects of exposures to high
concentrations of hydrocarbons.
On 1 August 2004, there was a spill at Chevron’s Ewan oilfield near Ubale
Kerere, along the coastline in Ondo State. Although the cause of the spill is not
known, some communities, including the Igo, Awoye, Odun-Oyinbo, Ubale
Kerere, Ogungbeje and Yoren, were affected. Fishing grounds were devastated.
As fishing is the main source of income, the people were compelled to
demonstrate in Akure, the state capital, to draw public attention to their plight
(Sogbon, 2005). The incessant oil spills and other negative associations with the
oil industry continue to be a source of public agitation and concern (see box 3.4).
The Niger Delta has experienced two major oil spills—the Funiwa oil well blowout
in 1980 and the Jones Creek oil spillage in 1998—which led to the greatest
mangrove forest devastation ever recorded worldwide.
183
Chart 3.1: Quantities and Causes of Oil Spills from Shell Petroleum
Development Company Operations in the Niger Delta, 2000-2004
Source: Shell Petroleum Development Company Annual Report 2004.
184
Note: The data on oil spills and causal factors could prove to be different from
those from the Department of Petroleum Resources if made available.
Box 3.4: Lamentation by an Edo State Indigenous Person
about Oil Industry
Activities
Box 3.3: Summary of Some Oil Spills in the Niger Delta
Date Episode State Quantity
in barrels
July,1979 Forcados terminal oil spillage Rivers 570,000
Jan,1980 Funiwa No. 5 well blowout Rivers 400,000
May,1980 Oyakama oil spillage Rivers 10,000
Nov,1982 System 2c Warri-Kaduna
pipeline rupture at Abudu Edo 18,000
August,1983 Oshika oil spill Rivers 10,000
Jan,1998 Idoho oil spill Akwa Ibom 40,000
1998 Jones Creek Delta 21,548
Oct,1998 Jesse oil spill Delta 10,000
May,2000 Etiama oil spill Bayelsa 11,000
Dec,2003 Aghada oil spill Rivers Unknown
August,2005 Ughelli oil spill Delta 10,000
August,2004 Ewan oil spill Ondo Unknown
Source: Nwankwo and Ifeadi (1988); Eka and Udoyong (2003);several newspaper reports
185
Gas leaks and flares: There is evidence that gas leaks also occur in parts of the
Niger Delta. Bubbling has been observed in certain swamps. This means that an
unknown amount of hydrocarbons may be affecting the water organisms and is
being emitted into the atmosphere.
The World Bank (2005) estimated that Nigeria flares about 75 per cent of the gas
it produces due to the lack of a local market and infrastructure. A study of the
ambient air pollutants in the Niger Delta region by Oluwole et al. (1996) indicates
that the Federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (1991) environmental
standards were exceeded for volatile oxides of carbon, nitrogen oxides, carbon
monoxide, sulphur oxide and total particulates. Acid rain has become a major
problem. Oluwole et al. (1996), for example, obtained pH values of between 3.35
to 5.58 for sampled rainwater in some of the oil-producing communities. The
gases contributing to acid rain also emanate from some of the equipment used by
the oil companies.
Although appropriate laws have defined flaring standards, the financial
penalties have been so low that they hardly constitute a deterrent. Gas flaring
amounts to a monumental waste of a valuable resource, on top of the air and
Until very recently, Nigeria flared about 75 per cent of its gas, a monumentally
wasteful practice that also causes pollution and damages biodiversity.
186
thermal pollution that damages biodiversity. Flares cause noise and elevated
temperatures. The heat kills vegetation, suppresses the growth and flowering of
some plants, and diminishes agricultural production. Plants, animals and
humans in the vicinity of the gas flares are perpetually exposed to light with no
respite at night. This is harsh for nocturnal animals. The light from flares may
also be affecting the endangered marine turtles in the area. Turtles’ nesting
patterns are influenced by light on their approach to beaches, where they lay
their eggs. Additional largely unstudied potential impacts include the effects on
the migratory patterns of birds.
Major industry operators are embarking on a number of gas-harnessing schemes
to eliminate gas flaring before 2008. Appropriate fiscal incentives would also
encourage the oil companies to comply with the extant law on gas flaring.
Subsidence: Although the evidence is scanty, there are indications that the
extraction of large quantities of oil and gas is continuing to cause land
subsidence. This is suspected in Molume in Ondo State and Bonny in Rivers
State, and in other parts of the central delta axis. Evidence from other oilproducing
areas, such as the Mississippi Delta in the United States, confirms that
land subsidence can result from oil and gas extraction.
Depletion of forest resources: Apart from the illegal logging brought on by
increased accessibility to forests, oil exploitation itself has depleted biodiversity,
especially at ramp sites, flow stations and terminals. Extensive deforestation has
accentuated the inflow of eroded materials deposited by the major water bodies,
disturbing aquatic animals in particular.
Erosion: Deforestation, canalization and land subsidence have worsened erosion.
Apart from the riverbank erosion mentioned earlier, coastal erosion is on the
increase. This is partly the result of rising sea levels and strong tidal wave
currents. But oil and gas activities have also contributed to the increasing menace
of erosion through the construction of canals, shore-crossing pipelines, jetties and
moles. In Ondo State, for instance, one oil operator constructed a canal in the
Awoye area to improve its activities, but because of this disturbance and the
ensuing saltwater intrusion, more than 20 hectares of land have been lost.
Another oil operator constructed a pipeline from its facility in Delta State to the
coast, but the ecological disturbance and ensuing saltwater intrusion have caused
serious coastal erosion.
Extraction of large quantities of oil and gas is continuing to cause land subsidence.
A canal constructed by an oil company in Awoye, Ondo State, caused saltwater
intrusion and the loss of more than 20 hectares of land.
187
Effluent and waste from oil operations: Like most industrial enterprises in
Nigeria, the oil companies lack appropriate waste treatment facilities, and there
are no proper landfills. Consequently, the wastes generated by the oil operators
are discharged onto land, into mangrove and freshwater swamps, and into the
sea. Untreated wastes degrade water quality and the ecology of the receiving
environment, and harm human health.
Other Sources of Environmental Problems
Oil and gas operations are not the only sources of industrial environmental
problems in the Niger Delta. There are numerous other establishments that
demand careful consideration.
Large-scale industrial enterprises include the Aladja Steel mills, the National
Fertiliser Company of Nigeria at Onne, and the African Timber and Plywood
factory at Sapele. In addition, there are breweries and paint factories in Delta and
Rivers states; glass factories in Ondo and Delta states; cement and asbestos
factories in Delta, Edo and Rivers states; and rubber and palm oil-processing
factories in Delta and Edo states. There are multiple sawmills and establishments
to process food and distil gin.
While some of the wastes generated by these companies are biodegradable,
many are not. Some, like asbestos, constitute serious risks to human health. Air
pollution from cement and asbestos factories causes lung disease. Heavy metal
pollution and hazardous chemicals from steel, fertilizer and brewery operations
are of great concern. Quarrying associated with some industries, including
cement and glass manufacturing, destroys the land and its vegetation. The
devastating impact of sawmills on forests and biodiversity is all too obvious.
SOCIAL IMPACTS
In the on-going debates about the Niger Delta region, significant emphasis has
been placed on the devastation of the environment and ecological balance by oil
and gas exploitation, as well as by other industrial activities. People in the region
believe strongly that the environmental predicament contributes to social and
economic deprivation, further complicating the development situation. The
issues at stake include rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, occupational
changes, the loss of fishing grounds, the disappearance of livelihoods and land
shortages, among others. These changes have in turn threatened cultures,
188
traditional systems and values, and the authority structure in the region.
The Oil Companies and the People
The oil companies, particularly Shell Petroleum, have operated for over 30 years
without appreciable control or environmental regulation to guide their activities.
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency did not come into being until
1988, and all the environmental quality standards on emissions and effluent
discharge, and the laws requiring an environmental impact assessment for every
major project, did not come into effect until the early 1990s. By that time, the
Niger Delta environment had suffered much damage at the hands of the oil
companies. Even now, it is doubtful whether the Government’s environmental
monitoring agencies can adequately control the activities of the oil companies.
The companies have several advantages over and above all the government
regulating agencies. They have better quality and up-to-date maps, as well as
satellite images and other remote sensing techniques, and sophisticated
computer hardware and software for environmental data gathering, analysis and
display.
Local people can see clearly how poorly equipped the government regulating
agencies are in the face of the superior capabilities of the multinational
companies. They often voice contempt at the efforts of the agencies to deal with
the companies. Rightly or wrongly, they feel intimidated by the multinationals
and do not feel they can count on their government agencies to defend them.
Many of the laws formulated to protect the environment in the Niger Delta
prescribe sanctions in the form of fines and imprisonment. Some of the statutes
are as follows:
(a) Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 1963
(b) Oil in Navigable Waters Regulations 1968
(c) Oil in Navigable Waters Act No. 34 of 1968
(d) Petroleum Regulations 1967
(e) Petroleum Decree (Act) 1969
Local people see how poorly equipped the government regulating agencies are in the
face of the superior capabilities of the multinational oil companies.
Existing laws prescribe that cases against oil companies can only be heard in Federal
Courts, which are out of the reach of most rural inhabitants.
189
(f) Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulations 1969
(g) Petroleum (Drilling & Production Amendment) Regulations 1973
(h) Petroleum Refining Regulation 1974
These laws mandate specific government agencies to regulate and control
operations affecting the environment. In the case of the petroleum industry, the
Department of Petroleum Resources administers petroleum laws and
regulations. But local people complain that they cannot see any evidence of
enforcement. A few examples will suffice to understand their point of view.
Table 3.1 depicts the recommended compensation rates for the nation’s oil and
gas industry by the Oil Producers Trade Section of the Lagos Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. There have been fairly regular increases in the rates
over time. But more detailed analysis, especially in an inflation-prone country
like Nigeria, would reveal that these rates are not equitable. In addition, the rates
were determined in Lagos without involving the host communities. There are
problems with transparency and objectivity. The Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation belongs to the Oil Producers Trade Section (along with the
Department of Petroleum Resources). It is also the majority shareholder in the
seven major oil and gas firms that cause the pollution.
The 1991 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in
Nigeria (revised in 2002) outlines in Part VIIIB Sections 4 and 8 what should be
done for any mystery oil spill, including in terms of compensation. The
guidelines state that a spiller shall be liable for damages. If more than one person
is responsible, liability should be joint. Victims of pollution have been poorly
compensated for environmental pollution, however. Several cases have dragged
on for many years. Table 3.2 shows that more often than not, the awards made
by the courts are generally lower than the claims made by the victims. Some
experts have argued that the absence of standards of liability for oil pollution
and of rules for determining compensation to victims could have contributed to
the way cases are delayed and/or decided in favour of the oil companies
(Adewale 1988; Fajemirokun 1999; Worika 2002).
Victims of pollution have been poorly compensated, and some lawsuits have
dragged on for many years.
190
Table 3.1: The Oil Producers Trade Section’s Recommended Compensation Rates for the Oil and Gas Industry
Property
Rate/
hectare
Mature
1994
Medium
Seedlings
Rate/
hectare
Mature
1997
Medium
Seedlings
Rate/
hectare
Mature
2001
Medium
Seedlings
A. Food crops
Native beans 5,330 1.30/stand 0.65/stand 0.33/crop 10660 2.60/stand 1.30/stand 0.66/crop - 22,500 11,250 6,000
Bitter leaf - 6.50/stand 3.90/stem 2.60/stem - 13.00/stand 6.50/stem 3.25/stem - 14,700 7,500 3,750
Cassava 8,840 10.00/plant 5.00/plant 2.50/plant 17,680 20.00/plant 10.00/plant 5.00/plant - 38,000 18,000 9,000
Garden egg 195 6.50/crop 3.25/crop 1.63/crop - 13.00/crop 6.50/crop 3.25/crop - 12,000 6,000 3,000
Gourd - 7.80/crop 3.90/crop 1.95/crop - 15.6/crop 7.80/crop 3.90/crop - 18,000 9,000 4,500
Groundnut 3,250 1.20/crop 0.60/stand 0.30/crop 6500 2.40/crop 1.20/stand 0.60/crop - 20,000 10,000 5,000
Lemon grass - 3.90/crop 1.95/crop 0.98/crop - 7.80/crop 3.90/crop 1.95/crop - 0.32/stand 0.16/stand 0.08/stand
Maize 3900 3900/hec. 1950./hec 975.00/hec. 7800 7800/hec 3900/hec 1950/hec - 24,000 12,000 6,000
Melon 5850 3.90/crop 1.95/crop 0.98/crop 11700 7.80/crop 3.90/crop 1.95/crop - 31,000 16,000 8,000
Okra - 2.60/stem 1.30/stem 0.65/stem - 5.20/stem 2.60/stem 1.30/stem - 15,000 8,000 4,000
Alligator pepper - 3.90/stem 1.95/stem 0.98/crop - 7.80/stem 3.90/stem 1.95/stem - 1.20/stand 0.60/stand 0.30/stand
Hot pepper 4,940 3.90/stem 1.95/stem 0.65/plant 9,880 7.80/stem 3.90/stem 1.95/plant - 23,000 12,000 6,000
Pineapple - 10.00/crop 5.00/crop 2.50/crop - 20.00/crop 10.00/crop 5.00/crop - 150 75 40
Plantain - 160/plant 80/plant 40/plant - 320/plant 160/plant 80/plant - 750 375 180
Sweet potato 3,250 1.30/plant 0.65/stand 0.33/stand 6500 2.60/plant 1.30/plant 0.65/plant - 31,000 15,500 7,750
Sugarcane 11,570 0.91/plant 0.46/plant 0.26/plant 23140 1.82/plant 0.92/plant 0.52/plant - 44,000 22,000 11,000
Tomato 6,500 6.50/stand 2.60/stand 1.30/stand 13,000 13.00/stand 6.50/stand 3.25/stand - 28,000 14,000 7,000
Yam (regular) - 20.00/stand 10.00/stand 5.00/stand 4800 40.00/stand 20.00/stand 10.00/stand - 65,000 32,000 16,000
Water yam - - - - - - - - - 35,000 17,500 8,750
191
Mature
1994
Medium
Seedlings
Mature
1997
Medium
Seedlings
Mature
2001
Medium
Seedlings
B. Income-producing trees
Avocado 180 90 45 360 180 90 2400 1200 600
Banana 160 80 40 320 160 80 500 250 125
Breadfruit 80 40 20 160 80 40 1900 950 475
Calabash tree 10 5 3.5 20 10 5 1440 720 360
Cashew 120 60 30 240 120 60 2200 1100 550
Cocoa 500 200 100 1000 500 250 2500 1500 750
Coconut palm 300 150 75 600 300 150 5450 2750 1360
Timber and Mangrove
Timber (Iroko, Abura, etc. (mature) 600 300 150 1200 600 300 34,000 17,000 8,500
Mangrove (per hectare) 1500 750 375 3000 1500 750 - - -
192
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PAGE.
C. Land acquisition and loss 1994 1997 2001
Acquisition or permanent
land loss (urban land)
1.50 square metre 3.00/square
metre
Unchanged
Acquisition or permanent
Land loss (rural land)
1.00 square metre 2.00/square
metre
-Do-
Permanent loss of fishing
rights
2.50 square metre 3.00/square
metre
-Do-
Fishing ground/tidal basin 6.00 square metre 6.00/square
metre
-Do-
Rivers/creeks 6.00 square metre 6.00/square
metre
-Do-
Fish trap/animal trap
(depending on size)
10.00-50.00/square
metre
200.00 –
400.00/ square
metre
-Do-
Fish fence/animal fence
(depending on size)
32.00/metre run 50.00 metre
run
-Do-
Timber canal/fish channel 32.00/square metre 50.00/square
metre
-Do-
Agricultural lands (specific
items like crops, trees and
other items destroyed should
be assessed based on the
above rates)
800.00/hectare 800.00/hectare 100,000/hectare
Inhabited area 400.00/hectare 800.00 hectare 100,000/hectare
Other lands 400.00/hectare 400.00 hectare Compensation to be
negotiated between
polluter and claimants
Recreation/aesthetic areas 400.00/hectare - ,,
Loss of earnings from fishing
as a result of siltation
1.00 Square meter 1.00/square
meter
-Do-
Cut traces 1.00 Square meter 5.00/square
meter
-Do-
Compensation rates are in Naira (US$ = N129)
Source: Oil Producers Trade Section, Lagos; Phil Anoza Consultants, Port-Harcourt
193
DELETE EMPTY PAGE.
294
Table 3.2: Examples of Compensation Cases, Amounts Claimed and Final Awards
___________________________________________________________________________Cas
e Amount claimed Award %
1. Chief Tuaghaye and others vs. SPDC*(1997) N61,126,500 N30,000,000 49.0
2. Shell vs. Farah and others (1995) N26,490,000 N4,621,307 17.5
3. Elf (Nig.) Ltd. vs. Sillo and others (1994) N1,348,000 N288,000 21.4
4. SPDC vs. Tiebo VII and others (1996) N64,146,000 N6,000,000 9.4
5. SPDC vs. Joel Amaro and others (2000) N15,392,889 N30,288,861 196.8
6 SPDC and NPDC** vs. Stephanie Sele and others(2004)
N20,000,000 N18,329,350 91.6
Source: Compiled from Adewale 1988; Fajemirokun 1999; Worika 2002.
*Shell Petroleum Development Company
**Nigerian Petroleum Development Company
Existing laws prescribe that aggrieved persons can only seek redress against the
oil and other big multinational companies engaged in the oil industry in the
Federal High Courts. To the local people, this is another case of collusion
between the oil companies and the Government. The courts are located only in
state capitals, putting them out of the easy reach of most rural inhabitants. The
litigation process is fraught with many technicalities, requiring the services of
legal practitioners that most people cannot afford.
The lack of appropriate avenues for redress is one of the major causes of the
conflicts in the region. Other grievances arise from the negative social and
economic impacts of oil and industrial activities, as highlighted on the following
pages.
The lack of appropriate avenues for redress is one of the major causes of the
conflicts in the region.
295
Rapid Uncontrolled Urbanization
One of the most dramatic effects of oil production activities in the Niger Delta
was the sudden rise to prominence of certain towns that became centres of oil
production or associated industrial activities. Warri and Port Harcourt are the
two most important examples. Smaller but equally important towns include
Ughelli (Delta State), Bonny (Rivers State) and Eket (Akwa Ibom State). The
phenomenal growth in urbanization has had significant social and
environmental impacts.
The heightened pace of construction activities in the burgeoning oil and
industrial cities created huge and unprecedented demands for land and
construction materials such as sand, clay and wood. Local peoples were easily
seduced by the lure of easy money in the growing urban centres. The large
rubber plantations for which present-day Delta and Edo states were once noted
were abandoned and subsequently cleared by local people. They sold the land to
speculators in the urban peripheries and to contractors for quarrying sand, clay
and other materials for construction. Some local landowners turned into
contractors themselves. Thus, the local farmers and landowners mortgaged their
future by destroying their land inheritance and throwing away, perhaps forever,
their means of livelihood.
This period, especially since the mid-1980s when oil overtly replaced traditional
economic activities in oil-producing communities, marked the beginnings of the
whittling down of the sense of community and traditional authority in the Niger
Delta region. Many of the transformations that took place, including the sale of
land, land use changes, occupational changes, etc., were individual rather than
communal decisions. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear why land and
territorial disputes between individuals, clans and ethnic groups escalated from
the 1970s onward, aside from the other well-known struggle to share the benefits
of the oil industry.
Apart from the massive deforestation and destruction of land, the displacement
The phenomenal growth in urbanization has had significant social and
environmental impacts, while the heightened pace of construction has created
huge demands for land and construction materials.
Rapid and uncontrolled mass migration into cities spawned urban sprawl, slum
housing, housing congestion, traffic congestion, unemployment and a rise in
crime.
296
of people from rural economic pursuits coupled with the lure of social amenities
in the cities generated a wave of rural-urban and rural-rural migration
throughout the Niger Delta region and beyond. Rapid and uncontrolled mass
migration into cities spawned urban sprawl, slum housing, housing congestion,
traffic congestion, unemployment and under-employment, and a rise in crime, to
name only a few consequences.
Loss of Fishing Grounds
Quarrying activities spurred by the construction boom were not limited to land;
the demand for high-quality fine sand also led to the mining of river channels.
River sand mining destroys the aquatic habitat and disrupts the hydraulic
capacity and relationships in the river channels. Fishing communities suffer as a
result—on top of the destruction caused by the oil industry. Fishing has become
less productive and profitable in many areas, with reduced catches and lower
incomes compared to income from oil-related activities. The efforts of local
fishermen to maintain or improve upon their income levels result in over-fishing.
Many swamps, rivers and creeks where fish spawn have been destroyed or
polluted.
Land Losses and Shortages
A major socio-political issue in the Niger Delta region today is access to land.
Local people complain bitterly about having lost so much land to oil operations.
Oil facilities and installations directly took land and waterways away from the
people. Indirectly, people have also lost land through pollution, erosion and land
despoliation by quarrying activities. The scarcity is compounded by the lack of
dry land in the delta.
Land shortage is partly responsible for the loud protest against the Land Use Act,
which provides compensation for the appropriation of land—often for oil
facilities (see box 3.5). Most local participants at one of the focus group
discussions were vehemently opposed to the Act, saying it “has no redeeming
feature or value.” The Act does not take into account the impacts and negative
externalities that transferring land—say for oil purposes—may have on adjoining
areas. People are clamouring for restitution for all the damage that has been done
by oil operations and associated activities.
People are clamouring for restitution for all the damage that has been done
by oil operations; however, compensation rarely reaches all those affected
because of the ‘benefit captor’ syndrome.
297
Even the compensation that is offered tends to bring only short-lived satisfaction,
however. Those who sell their land, more often than not, quickly spend the
money and then are left high and dry. Many abandon their traditional
occupations and move to other pursuits, usually in the cities, which swells the
ranks of the urban poor and informal sector operators.
In many cases, compensation for land rarely reaches all those affected because of
the ‘benefit captor’ syndrome. Benefit captors are those who purportedly
represent and receive compensation and other resources on behalf of the
communities, who then rarely receive or enjoy the benefits. At best, a small
percentage of the communities may derive some benefit. The benefit captor
syndrome is partly responsible for the youth revolt against traditional authority
in the region.
Deforestation and Forest Resource Depletion
Traditionally, local people have depended heavily on the non-timber resources
of the forests to make a living. They extract a wide variety of forest products for
domestic use and for sale in traditional markets. These include fuel wood, fibres,
leaves, dyes, fruits and nuts, medicinal plants, barks and roots, spices, palm
wine, snails, wild game, etc. The much-reduced forest cover has increased
pressure on the remaining forests, which are now suffering from overuse that is
further exacerbated by high demand from the expanding towns and cities. It has
been well established that wealthier people in urban areas utilize far more forest
resource derivatives than the poor who directly depend on them.
People at the grass-roots unfortunately are not benefiting from the increased
exploitation of non-timber forest resources. Middlemen package most of the
harvest for urban markets, where they make huge gains. Very little returns to the
rural economy; in general, there is a net transfer of resources from the rural to the
urban areas.
Occupational Disorientation
One of the greatest challenges to human development in the Niger Delta region
is how to win people back to the traditional livelihoods that sustained them in
the past. As in other parts of the country, younger people have left the rural
Many youths, even those still residing in rural areas, are mainly interested in
rent-seeking from oil operations in the form of standby money or oil bunkering,
hostage-taking and sabotage of oil pipelines.
298
areas. Fishing and agriculture have suffered so much from environmental
problems and social challenges, and from the neglect of successive governments,
that it is very difficult to motivate young people to take an interest in these
livelihoods. Many youths, even those still residing in rural areas, are more
interested in rent-seeking from oil operations in the form of standby money or oil
bunkering, hostage-taking and sabotage of oil pipelines.
Boxes 3.4 and 3.5 describe an all too familiar incident in the running battle
between the oil companies and the aggrieved local people. The fundamental
issue is how traditional occupational pursuits can exist with oil production
activities in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and recrimination. Interest in
traditional economic pursuits such as agriculture and fishing cannot be
promoted as long as easy money flows from the oil companies, albeit on an
unsustainable basis.
Another concern is the increase in the number of sex workers and indulgence in
casual sex by both men and women. The repercussions are discussed in the
following chapters on HIV&AIDS and livelihoods.
The Influx of People into the Niger Delta
The Niger Delta region, understandably, has attracted a great number of
migrants from other parts of the country. They come seeking opportunities from
oil production. Although many migrants end up in the cities, a large proportion
also goes into the rural areas. Some fill the gaps left by the movement of local
people into the cities. They become farmers, fishers, hunters, harvesters of fuel
wood and other non-timber forest products, quarry operators and artisans in
other trades. These rural migrants increase the pressure on land and rural
resources, however. They are not interested in issues of resource conservation
and environmental protection, since their main motive is to maximize profit.
Some migrants become middlemen who collect products for transportation to the
urban markets. They pressure local producers to meet their demand for goods.
Traditional economic pursuits will suffer as long as easy money flows from the oil
companies.
Migrants have worsened congestion, and the sense of personal responsibility
towards communities has disappeared.
299
BOX 3.5: Poverty Grinds against Oil Wealth in Nigeria Delta
FISHTOWN, Nigeria: Every time Stephen Yibo goes fishing around the U.S.-operated
oil platform near his village in Nigeria’s southern delta, soldiers come out on boats and
shoot into the air to scare him away. Thousands of troops have been stationed across the
delta to stop residents occupying platforms again after an uprising last year threatened oil
supplies from Africa’s top producer. Their aggression has only hardened hostility to the
multinationals among the million-plus inhabitants of the mangrove swamps lining
Nigeria’s Atlantic seaboard. Yibo, 25, says oil could be used to bring health and education
to Fishtown, a poverty-stricken village of wood and thatch huts which has been
abandoned by the government. Instead, he reels off a list of what he believes are
unfulfilled promises of the oil company ChevronTexaco. “They promised a school
building, a town hall, electricity and a water borehole, but so far they have only built a
jetty,” he said. “We are the owners of the oil so we expect the companies to do more for
us.” His complaint is echoed across the Niger delta, where annual oil output is worth $20
billion, but where many live without access to clean drinking water, basic health care or
schools. In the absence of any visible sign of government in remote villages, residents
naturally look to the companies for help, said Chris Alagoa, a development worker in the
Akassa kingdom, which includes Fishtown. Relations between oil companies and residents
have deteriorated so far that they now look at each other down the barrel of a gun along
300 miles of coast, which Alagoa calls a “corridor of conflict.”
The situation does not bode well for the foreign investors in Nigeria’s bountiful oil
reserves, including Royal Dutch/Shell, ChevronTexaco, Agip, ExxonMobil and Total,
which had seen the country as a secure alternative source of oil to the Middle East. “When
we got to Akassa, two villages were already blackmailing the oil company,” Alagoa said.
“The people would go to the company and make demands for money or jobs. If it refused
they would harass the staff. The practice became widespread and climaxed in the taking of
hostages. It produced very clear and quick results.” The response of the oil companies was
to pay up and to invite government troops to defend them. Having seen blackmail and
hostage-taking pay off, local militants sought new ways to extort money. “In most cases,
blackmail was arrived at quite innocently from people’s anger at seeing the wealth oil
created. Oil workers were the visible fraction of a very unholy alliance between the oil
companies and the federal government,” Alagoa said. Oil companies tried to be “good
neighbors” to the villages in the delta, but residents say their efforts often backfired.
In Fishtown, the jetty built by ChevronTexaco is typical of the white elephant projects
across the region. After just a few years, erosion has completely separated it from the land.
In nearby Sangana village, a hospital built in 2001 by ChevronTexaco and its partners has
no doctors or medical supplies. It serves as a temporary hostel for youth volunteers while
local children die of treatable illnesses.
Source: www.planetark.com/dailynewssstory.cfm/newsid/24444/story.htm.
300
These migrants have also created social and political problems. They have
worsened congestion in both urban and rural areas. Problems such as poor
housing conditions; low levels of personal hygiene and environmental sanitation;
the dumping of solid wastes in streets, gutters and river channels; and poor
health facilities are not limited to the cities—they are increasingly evident in the
rapidly expanding villages and towns. The sense of personal responsibility for
keeping village streets and homes clean has disappeared; the urban mindset of
yielding responsibility for environmental sanitation to some impersonal
bureaucratic agency has permeated the rural areas.
Another trend has been incessant price movement, particularly for transportation
for both passengers and goods. The escalation in costs is often blamed on
increases in petrol prices, but it is also due to the pressure on the limited
transport facilities and the increase in demand over supply. With incomes
already low, rising inflation further entrenches poverty.
Alienated from their natural resources, either by oil companies or governments
or migrants, the people of the delta see total resource control as the only solution.
Different ethnic nationalities have different strategies for achieving this. The
Ogoni people, for instance, see the right to ownership and control of their lives and
resources as the only way to protect their environment from further degradation and
promote decent livelihoods on Ogoni land (see box 3.6).
301
BOX 3.6: Resolving the Niger Delta Challenges: The Kaiama Declaration
1. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory
belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.
2. We cease to recognize all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the
right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our
participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum Decree,
etc.
3. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land of all military forces of occupation
and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the
armed forces of the Nigerian State to “protect” its operations will be viewed as an enemy
of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should
appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone.
4. Ijaw youths in all the communities in all Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to
implement these resolutions beginning from the 30th of December 1998, as a step towards
reclaiming the control of our lives. We, therefore, demand that all oil companies stop all
exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area. We are tired of gas flaring, oil
spillages, blowouts and being labelled saboteurs and terrorists. It is a case of preparing the
noose for our hanging. We reject this labelling. Hence, we advice all oil companies staff
and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th of December 1998, pending
the resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the Niger
Delta
5. Ijaw youths and peoples will promote the principle of peaceful coexistence between all
Ijaw communities and with our immediate neighbours, despite the provocative and
divisive actions of the Nigerian State, transnational oil companies and their contractors.
We offer a hand of friendship and comradeship to our neighbors: the Itsekiri, Ilaje,
Urhobo, Isoko, Edo, Ibibio, Ogoni, Ekpeye, Ikwerre etc. We affirm our commitment to
joint struggle with the other ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta area for selfdetermination.
6. We express our solidarity with all people’s organizations and ethnic nationalities in
Nigeria and elsewhere who are struggling for self-determination and justice. In particular
we note the struggle of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), the Movement for the
Survival of Ogoni People (Mosop), Egi Women's Movement, etc.
7. We extend our hand of solidarity to the Nigerian oil workers (NUPENG and
PENGASSAN) and expect that they will see this struggle for freedom as a struggle for
humanity
8. We reject the present transition to civil rule programme of the Abubakar regime, as it is
not preceded by restructuring of the Nigerian federation. The way forward is a Sovereign
National Conference of equally represented ethnic nationalities to discuss the nature of a
democratic federation of Nigerian ethic nationalities. Conference noted the violence and
killings that characterized the last local government elections in most parts of the Niger
Delta. Conference pointed out that these electoral conflicts are a manifestation of the
undemocratic and unjust nature of the military transition programme. Conference affirmed
therefore, that the military are incapable of enthroning true democracy in Nigeria.
9. We call on all Ijaws to remain true to their Ijawness and to work for the total liberation of
our people. You have no other true home but that which is in Ijawland.
10. We agreed to remain within Nigeria but to demand and work for Self Government and
resource control for the Ijaw people. Conference approved that the best way for Nigeria is
a federation of ethnic nationalities. The federation should be run on the basis of equality
and social justice.
11. Finally, Ijaw youths resolve to set up the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the
struggle of Ijaw peoples for self-determination and justice.
302
Source:www.waado.org/NigerDelta/RightsDeclaration/KiamaDeclaration.html.
Air Pollution and Health
There is very little data and information on air pollution and its deleterious
effects on people in the Niger Delta, aside from some collected by the oil
companies at scattered locations. An existing network of meteorological stations
is too coarse to provide data covering the whole of the region. In any case, few of
the stations collect data on air pollution. As is shown in box 3.7, however, air
pollution is a serious health problem for poor people across the developing
world, particularly in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In the Niger Delta, all
the available evidence points to a high risk of health problems related to air
pollution. Outdoor air pollutants come from a wide variety of sources, including
oil facilities (refineries, gas flares and gas leaks from pipes), cement and glass
factories, quarries and thermal power stations. Emissions from vehicle exhausts
have increased astronomically in the last two decades, with the huge increase in
vehicular traffic. Nigeria still uses leaded petrol, a major source of lead pollution.
Box 3.7: AIR POLLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Although air pollution is normally seen as predominantly a problem of industrial countries, more
than 90 per cent of the deaths from this form of pollution occur in the developing world. And
while air pollution is normally considered to occur mainly outdoors, more than 80 per cent of the
casualties are from indoor pollution. Another misconception is that air pollution mainly affects
towns and cities, but more than two-thirds of the mortalities are in rural areas.
Poor people in developing countries are at the bottom of the energy ladder. They must burn dung,
wood and crop residues indoors for their cooking and heating, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
the region with the majority of the least developed countries. In most other regions, traditional fuel
use has declined substantially during the past two decades. Traditional fuels are much more
polluting than modern alternatives such as kerosene, propane, biogas and electricity. Burning such
fuel fills houses with smoke swirling with hundreds of toxic substances, killing 2.2 million people
a year, mostly in rural areas, where most of the poor live. Both indoor air pollution and poor
nutrition increase susceptibility to respiratory infections.
Outdoor air pollution—once almost entirely concentrated in the industrial countries—is now
quickly growing in the developing world. Rapid industrialization in many countries has greatly
increased pollution, and the spread of motorized vehicle ownership is raising emissions all over
the world. Vehicle exhaust, coal burning and smoke from factories form small particles in the air
that cause serious health damage.
Lead, often added to petrol and emitted by car exhaust, has been eliminated from petrol in some
OECD countries and is being phased out in others, but it is still used heavily in developing and
transition economies. In these countries, it continues to harm human health, permanently
impairing children’s development. The children of the poorest urban dwellers often are worst
affected, because they tend to live near busy roads.
Source: Culled from Selim Jahan in Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar 2003.
303
304
In addition to the probable high level of outdoor pollution in the Niger Delta, the
evidence also points to acute indoor pollution. The burning of fuel wood for
domestic cooking is the predominant practice, often in conditions of housing
congestion, poor ventilation and poor nutrition. The last increases susceptibility
to health problems such as respiratory infections, and lung and heart problems.
Although there are no concrete data, the inference is that air pollution-related
health problems are rising. In the survey of households carried out by the
NDDC, respiratory diseases are the third most serious health problem
(mentioned by 12.3 per cent of households), coming after malaria (73 per cent)
and diarrhoea (19.4 per cent). Until very recently, respiratory disease was never a
serious health problem in the region.
The costs incurred in dealing with health problems are very high. Beyond
hospital fees and the costs of drugs, sick people and their relations spend a lot of
money on transportation. This is due largely to the fact that health care facilities
are few and widely dispersed. In the difficult swamp environment of the core
Niger Delta, travelling to health care centres is a tedious and time-consuming
undertaking.
Waste Management and Health
As indicated above, the rate of waste generation in the Niger Delta has risen
astronomically. Wastes come from both oil and non-oil industrial establishments,
and from the local markets and residences. In the oil-producing areas, both
liquid and solid wastes are sometimes carelessly discarded on land, and in
swamps and water bodies, leading to the contamination of groundwater in some
places (see box 3.8).
There is very little or no treatment of either liquid or solid wastes before
disposal. Disposal methods remain very rudimentary and do little to reduce the
attendant health risks. Raw sewage water runs into wells and rivers. Some
communities use floating toilets, which are specially constructed on rivers or
creeks. The user fee charged by the community is meant for maintenance of the
comfort stations. While this facility meets the basic needs of the people, it
represents another source of water pollution (Olawoye et al. 2003).
Respiratory diseases have become the third most serious health problem in the
region.
Oil industry practices mean that waste management is a problem for rural
inhabitants, not just for city dwellers, as is the case elsewhere in Nigeria.
305
Solid wastes are also indiscriminately disposed of in most communities. One of
the focus group participants said, “There are no formal solid waste management
practices. What holds is the dispatch of refuse in the bush at the backyard and in
case of edible wastes like cassava, yam and plantain peels, they are left for goats
and like animals to feed from. Other forms of wastes are either buried or left to
rot away.”
The ubiquitous nature of the oil industry, particularly in the rural areas, means
that the waste management problem in the Niger Delta is not primarily an urban
dilemma, as in other parts of Nigeria; it is also a problem of the rural areas. The
whole region is thus at risk not only from the contamination of domestic water
supplies by liquid and solid wastes, but also from waste dumps that become
breeding grounds for diseases. It is not surprising that malaria and diarrhoea are
the two top diseases afflicting households in the region.
Impacts on Culture, Traditions and Authority Structures
Box 3.8: Waste Treatment and Disposal
Throughout the Niger Delta region, no special treatment is given to waste
generated by most of the people. There is no formal recycling beyond scavenger
activity or treatment plants for publicly generated waste. All the States operate
unlined open dumps. The only exceptions being large multinational Oil
Companies, particularly Shell Petroleum Development and ExxonMobil that have
privately developed engineered Sanitary Landfills. Some private organizations
such as Coca-Cola Bottling Company Plc, Guinness Nigeria Plc and Nigerian
Breweries Plc engage in some form of primary sewage treatment of some of their
effluent discharges.
Waste is dumped indiscriminately across the Niger Delta. Throughout the region,
there were no working public incinerators. The operational incinerators and
Thermal Disruption Units (TDUs) service the Oil and Gas industry and are used
for the disposal of hydrocarbon-contaminated wastes. The final disposal of solid
wastes in the Niger Delta takes place in the form of open dumping, accompanied
by burying, burning and, more frequently, disposal into water bodies. The survey
shows that about 55% of the refuse collected in the Niger Delta States naturally
ends up being burnt. Most dumpsites are illegal. They constitute major risks and
are health hazards.
Source: NDDC Regional Master Plan Final Report: Waste Management Sector, p.64-65.
Traditional local arrangements for resource use have broken down. Sustainable
management will require local people to once again become actively involved.
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The major socio-political results of the changes in the Niger Delta have included
the disintegration of societal values and the loss of traditional authority
structures. In earlier times, youth were typically at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Today, however, traditional rulers and elders in the various communities have
lost control over the youths. They have worked out their own, largely
unsustainable ways of reaching and dealing with the oil companies,
governments at all levels, and national and international organizations. The
influx of ‘stranger’ elements from other parts of the country and abroad has
further diluted local cultures and safeguards. A whole new class of middlemen
controls the sale and distribution of goods, down to the village level.
For the environment and natural resources, this means that traditional
arrangements for resource use and land management have virtually broken
down. Clan rulers, village elders and family heads can no longer be relied upon
to enforce traditional practices, which has negative consequences for the
environment. Sustainable resource and environmental management will require
local people to once more become active participants in using and overseeing
local resources, including as partners with development agencies.
THE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE
NIGER DELTA
Attempts at environmental management in the Niger Delta, as in Nigeria as a
whole, date back to the colonial era. Two major environmental issues attracted
the attention of the colonial administration: forest conservation and flood control.
In line with the colonial administration’s forest policy, some nature reserves were
created in parts of the delta in order to protect the ecosystem and its biodiversity.
All the nature reserves in the delta region today have their origins in the colonial
period (see table 3.3).
Most of the present nature reserves are remnants of what they used to be. Poor
monitoring and management in the past led to widespread encroachment and
illegal harvesting of natural products. In the last two decades, however, a
concerted effort has been made to rehabilitate and develop the reserves. These
initiatives can be sustained only by raising people’s awareness of the need for
natural resource conservation and environmental protection, and by making the
A concerted effort has been made to rehabilitate nature reserves, but this can
only be sustained by making local people the chief beneficiaries of conservation
programmes.
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local people the chief beneficiaries of conservation programmes in their localities.
308
Table 3.3 List of Protected Areas in the Niger Delta States
Name State
Kwale Edo
Orle River Edo
Cross River National Bank Cross River
Okomu Edo
Becheve Cross River
Gilli-Gilli Edo
Ifon Ondo
Afi River Forest Reserve Cross River
Upper Orashi forest Rivers
Biseni Forests Rivers
Akaassa Forests Bayelsa
Ebok-Boje Forests Cross River
Itu Wetlands and Swallow Forest Akwa Ibom
Lower Orashi Rivers
Andoni Game Sanctuary Rivers
Edumaron Bayelsa
Ikebiri Creek Bayelsa
Nun Creek Bayelsa
Nun River Bayelsa
Egredi Creek Bayelsa
Uremure-Yorkri Delta
Ebue Edo
Sapoba Edo
Obaretin Edo
Uronigbe Edo
Ofosu Edo/Ondo
Ehor Edo
Cross River Estuary and Mangrove Forest Reserve CRS
Akure Ondo
Owo Forests (Ifon, Ogbesse, Little Osse) Ondo
Olague Delta
Idanre Ondo
Source: ERML survey 2005.
The flooding problem of the Niger Delta rivers was of special interest to the
colonial administration because it affected their shipping activities and access to
the interior. It became necessary not only to monitor flooding, but also to chart
the waterways to track the movement of sandbanks and keep the waterways
open for navigation. In the 1950s, the colonial administration commissioned the
Netherlands Engineering Company (NEDECO) to carry out a major hydrometeorological
survey of the Niger Delta. NEDECO established a network of
309
hydro-meteorological stations for data gathering on a permanent basis. Most of
the data and information we have today on the hydrology of the Niger Delta
rivers derive from the NEDECO surveys. There has been no comparable
comprehensive hydro-meteorological survey in the Niger Delta or anywhere else
in Nigeria since the 1950s.
In the 1970s, the Federal Government created river basin and rural development
authorities throughout Nigeria. The Niger Delta region was carved up among
three different authorities. These were meant to manage the environment of each
river basin, dealing with issues such as land drainage, flood control, soil erosion
control, irrigation, water supply, etc. But they made very little impact,
particularly in the southern parts of the country. In the northern savannah lands,
they achieved more, particularly in terms of large-scale irrigation and water
supply projects. In the Niger Delta, there is almost nothing to show for the many
years of their operation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the military governments took certain policy decisions
that have had a lasting impact on environmental management in the Niger Delta
region. In 1976, the Land Use Act was promulgated. From the local people’s
perspective, this Act is an affront and an instrument of oppression and
expropriation of people’s land and natural resources. It has served more to
protect oil companies and other agents of land degradation than to safeguard the
environment and natural resources.
Following the 1988 toxic waste dumping incident at Koko in Delta State, the
Federal Government established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency.
Its functions have now been taken over by the Federal Ministry of Environment.
State environmental protection agencies were also created, and then replaced
with ministries of the environment, as at the federal level. In 1999, the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency produced the country’s Agenda 21 document.
It emphasized the rational use of oil and gas resources, industrial pollution
management and natural resources conservation. The Agency was also
instrumental in getting industrial emission and effluent discharge standards
promulgated in order to control air, water and land pollution. Zonal offices of
the Agency (and now the Environment Ministry) in Port-Harcourt and Warri
coordinate environmental management activities in the Niger Delta region.
The 1989 National Policy on Environment (revised in 1999) was meant to guide
environmental management in the country. It introduced environmental impact
Environmental impact assessments require listening to local views, but the oil
industry consultants who conduct them usually gloss over critical issues.
310
assessment studies in development project planning and implementation. This
should have helped environmental protection and management in the Niger
Delta. But in reality, the impact has not been felt on the ground. As far as the
local people are concerned, it has been business as usual. The impact assessments
do require listening to the views of local people who will be affected by a given
development project, but very few of the consultants engaged by the petroleum
companies to carry out the assessments are social scientists, so critical social and
economic issues are usually glossed over in the reports. Some projects have
commenced before their environmental impacts were fully ascertained, giving
the impression that the oil companies can operate without any controls. Over
time, the process has begun to improve.
During its lifetime, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency could not
exercise much oversight of the petroleum industry, due to over-centralization,
weak enforcement mechanisms and inadequate capacity. In addition, there was a
‘cold war’ between the Agency and the Department of Petroleum Resources, the
initial regulator of the industry. Even though the Department appears to have
more clout with the industry, its effectiveness has been seriously hampered by
inadequate personnel, funding, equipment and logistics support. The overall
impact of the federal and state environmental agencies in the Niger Delta region
remains quite feeble. The sordid environmental condition obviously reflects
institutional failures, compounded by market and policy failures.
In response to the persistent complaints of people in the Niger Delta about the
negative impacts of oil production and the perceived insensitivity of the oil
companies and the Federal Government, the Niger Delta Environmental Survey
was commissioned in 1997. With funding from the Shell Petroleum Development
Company and other companies, it carried out a comprehensive survey of the
Niger Delta environment.
This was the most comprehensive and results-oriented survey since the
NEDECO feat of the 1950s. Using the most modern data-gathering and analysis
technology, and a large number of local and foreign experts, the NDES has
amassed, collated, classified and mapped vital data and information on various
aspects of the Niger Delta environment. Sadly, however, this report has never
been published, thus depriving the public of a rich source of data that could
make major contributions to the development of the region.
The NDDC Regional Master Plan recognizes the importance of, and contains
recommendations for, managing the natural environment and resources.
Regulating the petroleum industry has been constrained by over-centralization,
weak enforcement, inadequate capacity and disputes between government
agencies.
311
Significantly, it provides for ‘stakeholder participation’ in key areas such as land,
fisheries and forest management; water supply; flood control; waste
management and public health.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has highlighted the devastation of the Niger Delta environment as a
result of several decades of oil production, and industrial and infrastructural
developments. Profound changes have often had adverse effects on local
livelihoods and social well-being. For years, local people hoped for protection
that never came from successive federal and state governments. Attempts to
fight back have at times compounded their environmental challenges—the
sabotage of oil pipelines, for example, has only exacerbated oil pollution.
The oil companies initially thought they could ‘buy off’ people from complaining
too loudly about the environmental and socio-economic challenges they face. The
companies adopted the practice of paying aggrieved local people whenever
complaints arose. But this simply encouraged more and more people to come
forward and make claims. The practice undermined community spirit and
cohesion, and soon factions and divisions emerged within the different
communities. Youth and other pressure groups formed with the sole purpose of
seeking their own share of the oil money. Traditional rulers and elders lost face
because of a lack of transparency and accountability in the collection and
disbursement of compensation for the loss of or damage to land, fishing grounds
and other property. Today, the deplorable human development situation in the
Niger Delta is further aggravated by growing violence and increasingly acute
insecurity.
People’s demands for substantial investments in infrastructure and industrial
development in the region are quite legitimate and worth pursuing. But
environmental sustainability must be factored in. The level of infrastructure and
industrial development demanded can hardly be sustained by the fragile
ecosystems in the core Niger Delta, particularly in the unique mangrove swamp
zone. It will be necessary to learn from other countries how to achieve a judicious
balance between development, and ecosystem protection and preservation. The
oil-producing areas of the Mississippi River Delta in the United States provide a
good example of how to minimize the environmental impact of oil production
activities on the mangrove ecosystem.
312
CHAPTER FOUR
HIV&AIDS
A CHALLENGE TO SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Nigeria’s first case of HIV&AIDS was reported in 1986 with the diagnosis of a 13-
year-old female hawker. Since then, the prevalence of HIV has increased from 1.8
per cent in 1990 to five per cent in 2003 (see chart 4.1). In 2001, a federal survey
showed that 5.8 per cent of the population (or 7.5 million people) had tested
positive for HIV—in other words, six out of every 100 Nigerians, including over
one million children.
Today, Nigeria ranks among the countries at risk5 of the next stage of the
HIV&AIDS pandemic, when prevalence rates begin to skyrocket. It has the third
largest number of people living with HIV&AIDS in the world (UNICEF 2003),
and the highest number of orphans from AIDS (UNAIDS 2002), estimated at
about 1.2 million in 2003. Between 1986 and June 2001, 52,962 AIDS cases were
recorded in Nigeria, although this is a gross underestimation due to underreporting
by private health facilities, the fear of stigma, under-diagnosis and the
limited use of health care facilities (Government of Nigeria 1999). AIDS deaths in
the country were projected to be as high as 850,000 adults and children by the
end of 2001 (Government of Nigeria 2002: 6). Current UNAIDS estimates indicate
that as many as 3.5 million Nigerians may be living with AIDS.
These grim statistics are only the proverbial tip of the iceberg, however (Alubo et
al. 2002: 118). Worsening mortality is reversing gains in life expectancy
accomplished over decades through programmes like the Expanded Programme
on Immunization. Rural impoverishment has steadily worsened as the epidemic
intensifies the ratio between dependents and workers. These trends make the
development implications of HIV&AIDS very grave. The pandemic poses the
most significant threat to government planning aspirations in Nigeria.
5 A country is at high risk of an explosion of the disease when the HIV prevalence rate is more than five
per cent. The size of the affected population is another important factor.
The HIV&AIDS pandemic poses the most significant threat to government
planning aspirations in Nigeria. In the Niger Delta, when combined with the
prospects for an eco-catastrophe, the crisis is potentially devastating.
313
Across Africa, the HIV&AIDS pandemic is widely acknowledged as probably the
greatest medical, humanitarian and developmental crisis that the continent has
ever known (see box 4.1). In the Niger Delta, when combined with the prospects
for an eco-catastrophe, the crisis is potentially devastating. The epidemic
impedes sustainable human development by destroying the family as the basic
unit of society; weakening the educational system, which nurtures the next
generation of leaders; threatening agricultural productivity and food security;
impeding industrial capacity; and overwhelming the health care system. The
disease erodes human capacity, which is a principal building block for
development, by raising attrition among farmers, teachers and other groups to
rates that cannot be managed. This is a critical problem because, as discussed in
chapter six, human capital is a necessary asset for sustainable livelihoods.
HIV&AIDS stands apart from other diseases because of the scale of its morbidity
and mortality, as well as the patterns of contagion primarily among people in the
15- to 50-year age group. The effects of long illness and premature death within
the economically active workforce have profound economic implications,
causing acute labour shortages at household and community levels; altering
established relations between labour, land and capital; changing established
community patterns in the transmission of agricultural knowledge between
generations; and distorting the age range of agricultural workers.
A high rate of HIV&AIDS also leads to irreversible drops in rural household
assets and reversals in rural capital flows. It offsets the balance in strategic rural
migration patterns and triggers response strategies that undermine individual
and community well-being. Community structures weaken and safety nets are
strained. The resilience of farming and livelihood systems diminishes,
vulnerability to food shortages increases, and households have less of a capacity
to recover from disasters that occur. In dealing with the burdens from
HIV&AIDS, people lose time and opportunities they might otherwise have had
in a world without this disease.
314
Chart 4.1: National HIV Prevalence Increase from
1991 to 2003
5.8
5
5.4 4.5
3.8
1.8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003
Percent
Median National HIV Prevalence Increase: Median National HIV Prevalence Increase:
1991 1991- 2003 2003
315
Box 4.1: The Challenge of HIV&AIDS in Africa
THE PREVALENCE OF HIV&AIDS IN THE NIGER DELTA
The prevalence of HIV&AIDS in the Niger Delta is among the highest in the
country, higher than the average for Nigeria as a whole (see table 4.1 and chart
4.2). The 2003 sentinel survey rated the South-South region as having the second
highest prevalence (5.8 per cent), after the North Central zone with seven per
cent. This result is alarming compared to the South-West at 2.3 per cent and the
North-West at 4.2 per cent (see chart 4.3). The delta has an average prevalence
rate of 5.3 per cent, compared to the national average of five per cent. Nearly half
Africa is currently faced with a grave and degenerative crisis
under HIV&AIDS. Available statistics show that nine out of
every 10 new cases of HIV occur in Africa. AIDS is not only
“the deadliest epidemic in continental history, but also a
major demographic, humanitarian, and development crisis”
(Gaigbe-Togbe and Weinberger 2003: 1).
By the end of 2002, 42 million people worldwide were infected
with HIV, with 25 million already dead from AIDS. About 95
per cent of this total is in the less industrialized world. An
estimated 13 million AIDS orphans currently live in sub-
Saharan Africa alone. In 38 African countries (including
Nigeria), the United Nations Population Division explicitly
incorporated the impact of AIDS into its 2002 population
projections. It estimated the total population at 603 million in
Prevalence is dramatically higher in areas with a heavy
concentration of oil production.
316
the delta states (Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Delta and Rivers) have either the same
or higher prevalence rates as the national average.
The Niger Delta and national rates rose from 1999 to 2001, but declined in 2003.
This decline might not be an indication of successful strategies to stop
HIV&AIDS, however. Official statistics over this period show a declining
number of births attended to by trained medical practitioners, which is relevant
given that the prevalence rate is obtained through sentinel surveys. Some experts
contend that fewer Nigerians are taking voluntary tests for HIV.
There are important variations in the distribution of HIV&AIDS among the nine
states of the Niger Delta. Prevalence rates range from 2.3 per cent in Ondo to 12
per cent in Cross River State. Part of the explanation for this variation is that the
latter state is bordered on three out of four sides by states with a prevalence level
of six per cent or more. In the north, Cross River shares boundaries with Benue
State, with a prevalence of 9.3 per cent. Prevalence levels increase dramatically as
one moves from the South-West to the South-East of Nigeria, where industrial
activities related to oil exploration are most intensive.
Maps 4.1 to 4.4 show progressions in the incidence of HIV&AIDS in Nigeria
through the years. They indicate a continuous rise in prevalence levels in the
states of the Niger Delta in the period under review. Evidence from chart 4.3,
however, shows three trends. First, Akwa Ibom, Edo and Imo states had
consistent declines between 1999 and 2003, while the situation has been
worsening in Abia and Cross River states. Rivers, Ondo, Delta and Bayelsa states
worsened between 1999 and 2001 but improved in 2003. While developments in
each state influence the dynamics of HIV prevalence in the region, the overall
average is shaped by the situation in Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Ondo states
(chart 4.4). Charts 4.5 and 4.6 provide a good view of the performance of the
Niger Delta states relative to other states in Nigeria.
The impact of HIV&AIDS has been particularly harsh in the Niger Delta. It is
well known that the disease wreaks greater havoc where there is poverty, social
inequity and general political marginalization. Inadequate health systems
prevent the management of the epidemic. The weakening of livelihoods and the
social fabric in areas prone to oil exploitation creates additional problems in
terms of care and support. Also disturbing is the limited access to anti-retroviral
therapy. While no figures are available for the delta, the World Health
The disease wreaks greater havoc in the midst of poverty, social inequity and
general political marginalization—all of which afflict the Niger Delta.
317
Organization estimates that only one per cent of Africans living with HIV can
obtain these drugs.
Data from the 2003 National Sentinel Survey show that prevalence rates in the
South-South region of Nigeria are higher in urban than in rural areas. Six of the
Niger Delta states are within this region. In the South-West, where Ondo State is
located, urban prevalence is also higher. The picture is different in the South-
East, where HIV&AIDS rates are higher in rural than in urban areas.
Data further show that in the South-South zone, the 20-24 age bracket displayed
the highest prevalence, at 8.9 per cent, followed closely by the 25-29 age group
with seven per cent. The lowest prevalence of 1.7 per cent was in the 15-19 age
bracket. There was a consistent fall from 20-24 year-olds down to 40-49 year-olds
(see chart 4.7). The high prevalence among younger people underscores the
serious threat the epidemic poses to productivity now and in the future.
In Nigeria and the Niger Delta, the dominant form of transmission of HIV is
through heterosexual sex. Prevalence rates are higher for women (especially
those aged 15-24 years) than for men, as are employment truncation rates. The
gender patterns signify that traditional practices such as polygyny, the holding
of concubines and permissive male sexual norms operate to make women more
vulnerable.
Evidence from the focus group discussions shows that the level of social
exclusion and stigma is still high in the region. Women face a double
vulnerability from the links between poverty and exclusion and HIV&AIDS.
Table 4.1: HIV&AIDS Prevalence in the Niger Delta, 1999-2003
Prevalence rates per cent States
1999 2001 2003
Abia 3.0 3.3 3.7
Akwa Ibom 12.5 10.7 7.2
Bayelsa 4.3 7.2 4.0
Cross River 5.8 8.0 12.0
Delta 4.2 5.8 5.0
Edo 5.9 5.7 4.3
Imo 7.8 4.3 3.1
Ondo 2.9 6.7 2.3
Rivers 3.3 7.7 6.6
Niger Delta 5.5 6.6 5.4
Nigeria 5.3 5.7 4.8
Source: Technical Report, National HIV&AIDS Sentinel Survey, 2004.
318
Chart 4.2: HIV Prevalence in the Niger Delta and
Nigeria, 1999-2003
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1999 2001 2003
%
Niger Delta
Nigeria
319
Map 4.1: HIV Prevalence Rates Among Antenatal
Care Attendees by State, 1995
STATE TRENDS 1995-2001
Map 4.2: HIV Prevalence Rates Among Antenatal Care
Attendees by State, 1999
320
Maps 4.3: HIV Prevalence Rates Among Antenatal
Care Attendees by State, 2003
Chart 4.3: Median HIV Prevalence by Zone
North West
South East
South-South
North East
North Central
National
321
Bayelsa
Cross River
Delta
Edo
Imo
Ondo
Rivers
Niger Delta
Chart 4.4: HIV Prevalence in the Niger Delta State
322
Chart 4.5: HIV Prevalence Trends in the South-West and South-East Between
1991 and 2003
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003
lagos
oyo
ondo
ogun
osun
ekiti
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003
Abia
Imo
ebonyi
anamb
enugu
Trend in the SW and SE
323
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
%
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 25-39 40-49
Chart 4.7: Prevalence by Age in South-South, 2003
Chart 4.6: HIV Prevalence Trends in the South-South
and North Central Regions Between 1991 and 2003.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003
Cross river
rivers
akwa ibom
bayelsa
edo
delta
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1991 1993 1995 1999 2001 2003
Niger
FCT
Benue
kogi
kwara
plateau
nasarawa
State trends in the SS and NC
324
325
FACTORS BEHIND THE EPIDEMIC
The factors promoting the spread of HIV&AIDS in the Niger Delta region can be
broadly categorized as behavioural, economic, socio-cultural and biological,
although there are significant overlaps in causes and effects.
Behavioural Factors
Since the dominant mode of transmission of the HIV virus is by heterosexual
intercourse, one of the behavioural factors fanning the epidemic is the common
practice of having multiple sexual partners. This tendency is common in all the
Niger Delta states for both men and women. The practice cuts across men of
varying classes, but for women, it is predominant among those from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds. Oil wealth encourages men to take advantage of their
perceived economic buoyancy by engaging in sexual intercourse with many
girls, often without protection. A focus group participant sums up sexual
profligacy as follows:
It is a common thing in Port Harcourt, Warri and other
places here. It is difficult to find a married man who does not
have girlfriends outside. You know when men have little
money, they behave like kings.
This is a clear confirmation of earlier findings from the 2003 NDHS, which noted
that 70.6 per cent of women and 94.5 per cent of men sampled from the region
revealed that they engaged in high-risk sex in the 12 months preceding the
survey. Many men have sex with sex workers, and sex at young ages is also
common. In the Niger Delta, while eight per cent of women and 11.5 per cent of
men mentioned that they used condoms for their first marriage, the region had
the highest proportion of women (7.2 per cent) stating that they had had two or
more sexual partners within the preceding 12 months (NDHS 2003: 190-192).
Men’s vulnerability is exacerbated by the type of work they engage in. Some jobs
entail a lot of mobility, such as being a long-distance driver or oil worker. There
may be separate living arrangements for spouses in different cities, and
migration for labour or military work (Orubuloye 1995). The work schedule of oil
workers makes them prone to the risk of HIV, because most are forced to stay
away from their wives or regular sexual partners for up to one month or
sometimes longer while engaged in exploratory and production activities. Some
A sense of economic buoyancy from oil wealth encourages men to engage in
sexual intercourse with many partners.
326
workers on this schedule reportedly engage in sexually risky behaviour after the
one-month period of seclusion.
Because of their greater mobility, men tend to migrate to urban centres and
places far from their families in search of employment. Youths are also likely to
leave rural areas in search of opportunities in the cities. Oil industry jobs in
particular have spurred migration within the delta and attracted a mass influx of
people from outside. The industrial cities of Port Harcourt and Warri and the
whole of Cross River State are heavy receivers of migrants and tourists who
establish high-risk sexual networks.
Migration has spawned urban squalor and overcrowding; child labour (Oloko
2002); thriving commercial sex (Olusanya et al. 1986; Adedoyin et al. 1995;
Omorodion 1994); the proliferation of sub-standard health care facilities,
including quacks masquerading as health care agents; and abject poverty. These
factors encourage risky sexual behaviour and lifestyles contributing to the spread
of HIV&AIDS. In urban centres such as Port-Harcourt, Warri and Benin City,
overcrowded housing units have become the breeding ground for sexual
activities among neighbours, and between older men and the children/wards of
their neighbours. Girls and women who hawk various items but suffer
commercial shortfalls readily become the victims of predators or voluntarily
resort to commercial sex. There are reports of widespread unprotected sexual
intercourse between older men and girl hawkers (Erinosho 2004).
Participants in the focus group discussions for this report acknowledged that
sending their children out to work and sell things at the market or by the
roadside may be dangerous, but noted that it was necessary due to poverty. One
participant said:
“We are trying our best, but because of hardship, we could not do anything to
pay their fees and look after them; that is why we send them to go and sell; to
go and help us to work. It makes it look like it is child abuse, but it is because
of hardship.”
The migration of girls and women from Edo State, in particular, to other parts of
the world for commercial sex work has been documented by Onyeononu (2003).
Some of the girls, because of the need to make money, often yield to the pressure
from clients to have unprotected sex. This migratory pattern spreads HIV&AIDS
not only in Edo State, but in the whole of the Niger Delta and beyond.
Migration and overcrowded urban centres encourage risky sexual networks to
flourish.
327
Economic Factors
Poverty and HIV&AIDS are closely linked. Poverty prevents the establishment of
needed prevention, care, support and treatment programmes. It also reduces
access to information, education and services that could reduce the spread of the
virus (UNFPA 2002). For individuals and households, income poverty can mean
that women, and sometimes men, end up in risky sexual situations.
HIV&AIDS also generates poverty. As those with the virus fall ill and die, a
family or community loses much needed human capital or productive resources.
In the Niger Delta, poverty has been one of the main propellants of the spread of
HIV&AIDS (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1991; Orubuloye et al. 1992; Oyeneye et al.
1993; Omorodion 1993; Oloko et al. 1993; Makinwa-Adebusoye and Odumosu
1997; Isiugo-Abanihe et al. 1998). It also aggravates the already harsh
repercussions of having the HIV virus
The lack of good and/or affordable health care facilities or the inability of people to pay
for health care services means that the medical needs from HIV&AIDS cannot be met.
About half the women in the delta region say they cannot afford health care, compared to
a national average of 30 per cent. Qualitative data corroborate that there are few proper
facilities even for common ailments, not to mention HIV&AIDS cases. One focus group
participant said, “We do not have these facilities. People have to travel for eight hours to
attend the hospital in the local government headquarters.”
Not having health facilities makes it difficult for people to know their HIV status, even
those willing to be tested for HIV. Throughout Akwa Ibom State, there are only 10
voluntary counselling and testing centres, two centres for the prevention of mother-tochild
transmission of HIV&AIDS and one anti-retroviral centre. In Cross River State,
each local government has a voluntary counselling and testing centre, but there are only
four centres for mother-to-child transmission and one for anti-retrovirals. One focus
group participant commented, “How do you expect us to know if there is HIV&AIDS or
not? We do not have any clinic and there is no other government facility where we can be
tested. How then are we going to know who has HIV&AIDS?”
Poverty drives the poor to seek health care from assorted health care agents who
are usually quacks (Erinosho, 2004), including patent medicine sellers. They are
likely to use infected needles for intravenous injections. Traditional healers, who
An inadequate health care system means people don’t know their HIV status or
cannot get help when they are ill. Many turn to quacks.
Infected blood often ends up in the veins of the poor.
328
constitute a formidable sub-group among health care providers in all states of the
Niger Delta, often use unsterilized blades and knives for incisions on their
clients, in order to protect them from diabolical attacks. They pose a serious
threat to social and physical well-being.
The abuse of blood products is also rife within the region. Blood transfusion is
extremely risky because the skills and facilities needed to screen blood products
are either not available or have deteriorated and/or broken down. This is
particularly true in the riverine areas, which are inaccessible by road and have
suffered from years of infrastructural neglect by the federal, state and local
governments. Even where health care facilities are available, technical services
such as blood screening often are not. People who require blood transfusions
often die before screened blood can be obtained, or unscreened blood is
purchased and transfused at great risk of HIV infection.
The situation is further compounded by a dangerous trend whereby
unscrupulous Nigerians sell infected blood products that are transfused to
unsuspecting clients. This blood often ends up in the veins of the urban and rural
poor. The 2003 national sentinel survey showed a consistent difference in HIV
prevalence among women who had never received blood transfusions and those
who had. For instance, in the South-South zone, the HIV rates are higher among
women with a history of blood transfusion. The same pattern is observed in the
South-East and South-West zones.
The drive for economic development has unfortunately helped the spread of
HIV&AIDS. In Cross River State, which has the country’s highest HIV
prevalence, there is apprehension that tourism might increase the spread of HIV
if adequate safeguards are not in place (and that conversely, HIV could
undermine development aspirations in tourism). The mass distribution of
condoms to major hotels in Calabar, the state capital, during peak tourist
periods, complemented with a vigorous health education campaign targeted
primarily at youth should help to reduce new infections.
Cross River State is one of the few states that has allocated an appreciable
amount of money to HIV&AIDS programmes. In a recent assessment conducted
by the National Action Committee on AIDS, the state rated very high on financial
provision, sensitization and intervention, but could do more on monitoring and
developing capacities to respond to the epidemic.
329
Socio-cultural Factors
There are two kinds of socio-cultural factors related to HIV&AIDS: those
embedded in the social structure (macro-sociological) and those that can be
regarded as the externalities or unintended consequences of rapid modernization
following the discovery of oil and gas in the region. The latter have become part
of the socio-cultural milieu (micro-sociological).
One readily apparent area of social change is the decay in social values and the
spread of social instability. There is a moral dimension to the pattern of social
change in the Niger Delta region that is not always immediately visible, although
there are strong implications for human social behaviour and the spread of
HIV&AIDS. The delta’s oil economy has generated severe moral contradictions
by creating a class of rich exploiters who take advantage of the endemic poverty
to flaunt their wealth, seduce impoverished adolescent girls and generally gain
access to an extensive network of female sexual partners.
Parental inability to meet the needs of young persons has opened the door to
youth rebellion and further degeneration of the sexual code. Adolescent females
engaged in transactional sex activities became an important mode for the
heterosexual transmission of HIV from the mid-1980s onwards (see box 4.2).
Social instability resulting from skewed development has meant high
unemployment rates for restive youth, many of whom turn to violence.
Education systems have become destabilized and employment patterns more
precarious, paving the way for behaviour that transmits the virus.
Social beliefs affect understanding of the causes and prevention of HIV&AIDS, as
well as practices to spread or stop the virus. Most people of the Niger Delta
belong to two worlds: the European and the African. They subscribe to both
scientific and magico-religious world views. According to some focus group
participants, the disease is a “punishment from God and the handy work of
witchcraft.“ In one discussion, people’s perception of good health was
Social instability and decaying social values have encouraged the widespread
practice of risky behaviours.
There are strong connections between the moral dimensions of human social behaviours and the spread of HIV&AIDS.
Adolescent females engaged in transactional sex activities have become an
important mode for the heterosexual transmission of HIV.
330
erroneously predicated on the size of the body. A fat person was said to be
healthy while a slim one is sick. Although they recognized that HIV&AIDS is a
very serious disease, they could easily be deceived into believing that someone
carrying the virus is healthy until the final stages of AIDS, with ill health
evidenced by loss of weight.
Box 4.2: Increasing Prostitution in Oil-Producing Communities
A social problem generating serious concern is the prevalence of
commercial sex workers patronized by oil company workers.
Informants lamented the increasing social decadence and decline in
traditional social values as prostitution is now very rampant in nearby
communities. The appeal for ‘easy money’ is a serious temptation, not
only to ladies who come from other areas, but also to local young girls
as well as their poverty-stricken families who sometimes even send
them out to make money for the family. Sexually-transmitted diseases
are now very common.
Source: EMRL field survey 2005.
Research shows that many people do not have correct information about the
transmission and prevention of HIV&AIDS, as well as the risks associated with
it. Data from the focus groups reveal that women’s and men’s knowledge of
HIV&AIDS is grossly deficient in both the urban and rural areas of the Niger
Delta. The modes of transmission known and shared by all are unprotected
sexual intercourse with an infected person and sharing of needles. But their
knowledge of other transmission routes as well as the associated risks of HIV
infection is low. On participant aptly summarized: “We do not have any
knowledge of HIV&AIDS because there is no enlightenment.” Another
discussant said, “HIV&AIDS means many things to many people. While the
elites know much about it, the illiterates know very little and sometimes nothing
about AIDS. It is a disease from God.” Responses like these underscore the need
for rapid sensitization on HIV and AIDS prevention, control and management.
Many people don’t have correct information about HIV&AIDS. Some
attribute it to God, witchcraft or a conspiracy by developed countries.
It is evident that knowledge about HIV prevention is very low.
331
The 2003 NDHS corroborates this view. In the South-South region, it reveals that
about 10 per cent of women and eight per cent of men have yet to hear about
HIV&AIDS. It is also evident that knowledge about HIV prevention is very low.
Only 47.1 per cent of women and 49.8 per cent of men knew about prevention
techniques such as using condoms and limiting sex to one uninfected partner.
This figure was 52.4 per cent for women and 69 per cent for men in the South-
West region (NDHS 2003: 170-171). The recent assessment of 17 Nigerian states
by the National Action Committee on AIDS revealed that only Cross River and
Akwa Ibom performed above the national average on HIV&AIDS advocacy and
sensitization (see chart 4.8).
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Ranking
Akwa Ibom
Cross River
Edo
Imo
National Average
Chart 4.8: State Responses on HIV/AIDS: Scope of Intervention,
Advocacy and Resources
Intervention
Advocacy&Sensitization
Human and Material Resources
Given the low level of understanding about HIV&AIDS in the Niger Delta, it is
not surprising that a significant number of people believe that HIV&AIDS can be
prevented and/or cured by traditional healers and medicines. Some take risks
when they consume concoctions, before or after sex, that they believe are sure
antidotes to HIV. Many people in the Niger Delta simply believe that the disease
is not real. During one of the focus group discussions, a teacher stated that the
AIDS scare is a grand design by the developed world to subject the developing
332
countries to their whims and caprices. The following is another of the responses
from the discussions that reflects the lack of understanding:
The social stigma attached to carriers of HIV&AIDS has also hampered efforts to
curb the spread of the disease. One focus group participant said, “Stigma does
not allow people to open up. They claim other problems of poison or witchcraft
when they have AIDS.”
In the Niger Delta, as in most regions of Nigeria, harmful traditional practices
add an extra dimension of risk in contracting HIV. These include female genital
mutilation (FGM), widowhood rites and body scarification.
FGM, which is widespread in some parts of the Niger Delta, is usually
performed by traditional healers or circumcisers. This custom is particularly
rampant in some areas of Ondo, Edo and Delta states. FGM can cause serious
consequences, including death from excessive bleeding, as well as from the use
of unsterilized equipment that spreads HIV and other infections. Several
responses from Ondo State revealed that some people are aware of the link
between FGM and HIV&AIDS:
HIV&AIDS can be contracted through circumcision for
children and people that do incision that involve the use of
blade and letting out of blood.
The aspect of our culture that can increase the risk of
HIV&AIDS is through circumcision of children, tribal/facial
marks and tattoos. All these acts should be stopped as they
can cause AIDS.
“It happens. People die suddenly and you do not
know the cause of their deaths. Men will marry their
wives and die too. It happens.”
– Focus group participant
Widowhood rites as practiced in some parts of the Niger Delta, such as Edo
and Delta states, may put a woman at risk.
Traditional practices put people at high risk of acquiring HIV from unsterilized
surgical instruments.
333
Widowhood rites as practiced in some parts of the Niger Delta, such as Edo and
Delta states, may put a woman at risk by requiring the woman to shave her hair,
which is usually done by older women using old and unsterilized blades.
Traditional scarifications on the abdomen, chest, back and/or hand are still
performed in rural areas and by the urban poor. Bodily modifications such as
piercing or shading have been practiced throughout human history for aesthetic,
social and therapeutic reasons—virtually all the Niger Delta states have peculiar
cultural body marks. But the use of unsterilized instruments again can expose
people to HIV. Scarifications are often done on several people at once, which
further increases the risk. And they are normally not carried out in modern
hospitals, but by older community men and women who might have acquired
expertise over many years. Other risky customs include traditional barbering
(shaving of the head) and nail cutting to the skin, both undertaken by barbers
typically using unsterilized blades or scissors.
Another socially approved traditional practice in the Niger Delta that can foster
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is polygyny. This custom is rooted in the
patriarchal nature of Nigerian society and promotes multiple sexual partners.
About a quarter of married people in Nigeria are in polygynous unions (National
Population Commission 2000). The practice is prevalent in the Niger Delta,
especially in Ondo, Edo and Delta states. Those who engage in polygyny seek to
increase social parity by establishing affinal relationships and alliances. Having
more wives usually enhances the social status of the man, and having more
children is seen as giving a man a greater chance of becoming immortal.
Ethnically, polygyny allows a man and his lineage to establish political and
economic alliances with other lineages. It also helps space childbearing, which
can be a survival strategy for women in low-income groups. The fidelity of all
partners in a polygynous relationship, however, is critical for the avoidance of
HIV&AIDS.
Another widowhood rite linked to HIV&AIDS in the Niger Delta is levirate,
otherwise known as wife inheritance (Owasanoye 1997; Inter-African Committee
2000). The custom is based on the principle of lineage continuity, a privilege
initially conferred on one member of the lineage but transferable to another on
the death of the first. In the Niger Delta, as in other areas of Nigeria, the husband
is usually the administrator of a woman’s fertility, acquired through the payment
of bride wealth. His death does not nullify the marriage. Instead, it opens access
and control of the widow’s fertility to some other well-defined member(s) of the
lineage, even if the deceased died of AIDS. Levirate practices have been
documented in Ondo, Edo, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Imo states (Inter-
African Committee 2000).
334
Gender Relationships and HIV&AIDS
Gender relationships are of great social significance in the spread of HIV&AIDS.
Studies show that HIV prevalence is typically higher among females—about 55
per cent of adults living with HIV&AIDS in Africa are women (UNAIDS 2000: 3).
The majority were infected by age 25, with women’s peak infection rates often
occurring at earlier ages than those of men. In the Niger Delta, HIV&AIDS
prevalence is also highest among young people and women. Gender issues are of
prime importance (Ezumah 2004) in women’s heightened vulnerability, which
stems from biological, social, cultural and economic factors.
Power relationships and decision-making in marriages, particularly in
polygynous unions, are conducive to the spread of HIV&AIDS among women,
since a man has statutory sexual privileges and access to more than a single
female partner. Men usually shun condoms, while women cannot always insist
on condom use during sexual intercourse, even when they know fully well that
their partner could infect them.
The intersection of patriarchy with poverty, including when it propels women
into the sex trade, adds another layer to women’s vulnerability. Those who are
poor and depend economically on their partners/husbands face an extra obstacle
in insisting on protective measures in sexual relationships. The fear of
repercussions also prevents them from being assertive. Some are not able to
challenge their husbands for having extramarital affairs because of this.
Women at all economic levels in many Niger Delta societies are expected to be
passive sexually, because it is often considered improper for women to
demonstrate sexual knowledge. Even when women are provided with
knowledge about HIV&AIDS, its transmission and how to protect themselves,
they often feel too inhibited to share this information with their partners. Unable
to participate in meaningful communication about sexuality (Ezumah 2004;
Olawoye 2004), they are not able to protect themselves with abstinence, mutual
fidelity or condoms (Richardson 1990). Once women acquire HIV, the communal
and lineage ideologies of male preference make it less likely that meagre family
or household incomes will be expended on treatment for them, especially if they
are not regarded as major contributors to those incomes.
With a lower social status and limited economic power, women often cannot
negotiate safe sexual practices.
Some women expose themselves to risk rather than facing the scorn heaped upon women who don’t have children.
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On another front, women’s indulgence in risky behaviours in order to have
children also predisposes them to contracting HIV&AIDS. In the Niger Delta, as
in most other places in Africa, women are under great pressure to demonstrate
their fertility and become mothers. This goal of childbearing is often
incompatible with safer sex practices. Some women establish outside
relationships to have babies when they perceive that their husbands are not in a
position to impregnate them. Women want to save themselves from the
embarrassment and scorn heaped upon women who are childless in Nigerian
society.
Sexual harassment, sexual coercion and exploitation in schools and the
workplace also make women and girls vulnerable to HIV&AIDS. Many
schoolgirls are coerced and exploited by teachers and older men. The
phenomenon of ‘sugar daddies’ has been a terrible development.
Biological Factors
The differences in prevalence rates between men and women can be partly
accounted for by their biological differences. During sexual intercourse,
abrasions or injuries in the vagina are more than those on the penis, particularly
during violent or coerced sex. This is more serious in the case of younger girls,
whose vaginal canals are not fully developed and are prone to tears and
abrasions. Women tend to have a higher rate of genital ulcers, which facilitate
HIV transmission.
Government Responses
Government commitment to activities to control HIV&AIDS has lagged behind
the high prevalence in the Niger Delta region, although the institutional
frameworks for preventing and controlling the spread of HIV and mitigating its
impacts are now in place. These include the national, state and local action
committees on AIDS.
Sexual coercion and exploitation in schools and the workplace make women and girls vulnerable to HIV&AIDS.
Across the delta states, there are wide variations in resources, commitment and
action devoted to addressing the pandemic.
336
The performance of some of the delta states can be rated using indicators from
the National Action Committee on AIDS. These include governance, planning,
coordination, human and material resources, advocacy and sensitization of
stakeholders, finance, monitoring and evaluation, and capacity building (see
charts 4.8 to 4.10). On the issue of governance, none of the states performed up to
the national average. In the composition of Akwa Ibom’s State Action
Committee, for instance, Muslims, youths and armed forces were excluded.
Although stakeholders are well represented in activities in Edo State, there is no
documented policy on HIV&AIDS, nor has HIV&AIDS been fully integrated into
development programmes.
Unlike other states in the Niger Delta region, Akwa Ibom State put a 2005 work
plan in place and is currently developing a five-year strategic plan with inputs
from the State Action Committee and the State Project Team. Both Imo and
Akwa Ibom states are very good in coordinating HIV&AIDS programmes (see
chart 4.9). Imo’s State Action Committee submits quarterly reports to the
National Action Committee, the state government and the World Bank, and
collaborates with about 42 organizations. Coordination is considered to be very
weak in Cross River and Edo states, where the state committees lack logistical
support.
Only Cross River and Akwa Ibom states outperformed the national average in
advocacy and sensitization activities. In both states, advocacy outreach is
targeted at policy makers, while sensitization programmes are directed at a
cross-section of society. Strategies used in reaching out to people include lectures
and seminars, jingles, rallies, media campaigns, meetings and distribution of
educational materials. Still, there is much room for improvement.
All states in the region are still below the national average in the scope of their
intervention programmes. Resources have also fallen short. Although roughly all
the states have paid their counterpart funding for the International Development
Association credit (see chart 4.10), only Cross River State has put in place an
effective financial system. It released N14.00 million to implement its 2005 work
plan. In contrast, although N21.00 million was approved by the Akwa Ibom State
Government for HIV&AIDS activities in 2005, nothing was actually released.
In Edo State, there is no documented policy on HIV&AIDS, nor has
HIV&AIDS been fully integrated into development programmes.
337
Given the low level of intervention, inadequate facilities and limited resources,
the future prospects for the region in terms of controlling HIV&AIDS are
troublesome. Stepped up efforts are needed for the challenges ahead.
338
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Ranking
Akwa Ibom
Cross River
Edo
Imo
National Average
Chart 4.9: State Responses to HIV/AIDS: Coordination,
Planning and Governance
Coordination
Planning
Governance
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Ranking
Akwa Ibom
Cross River
Edo
Imo
National Average
Chart 4.10: State Responses to HIV/AIDS: Capacity Building,
Monitoring and Evaluation, and Finance
Capacity Building
M&E
Finance
Impacts on Key Sectors
Days of labour are lost, productivity drops, and households slash spending on
education to pay for health care.
339
HIV&AIDS touches every sector of the Niger Delta economy. In agriculture, for
example, when HIV&AIDS strikes farmers, the reduced cultivation of cash crops
and food products is the result. Although it is difficult to precisely define the
shortfall in crop production attributable to HIV&AIDS, primary data collected
indicate that many farmers have died of diseases related to AIDS. A focus group
participant in Abia said:
“When you see young farmers getting very sick and lean,
what else can be responsible?”
In the economic and business spheres, HIV&AIDS has exacerbated the already
severe shortage of qualified men and women. Days of labour are lost to illness,
productivity drops, and funeral and health costs increase. Households must
slash spending on education to pay for health care. Focus group discussions
across the Niger Delta confirmed these findings. Respondents described how
attending the funerals of young and middle-aged men and women is now a
common practice.
The impact of HIV&AIDS on education is severe. It reduces the supply of
teachers, the resources for education, and the demand for education by children.
The withdrawal of children from school in response to increased expenditures on
and care requirements for sick family members was commonly mentioned in the
focus group discussions. Some children even become breadwinners when the
heads of the family are incapacitated by sickness or die (UNESCO 2003). The
quality of education suffers through teachers’ absenteeism. The view of a focus
group participant in Edo sums up the comments of many other discussants:
Since HIV&AIDS affects everybody, the education sector is
not left out. Although we do not know for sure if teachers’
deaths, school children’s deaths, etc. are due to HIV&AIDS,
but it seems like it is so.
The impact of HIV&AIDS on the health sector is felt in the increased demand for
care. Already weak health systems are overstretched, and the costs are rising for
infrastructure, drugs and personnel.
Other concerns include the growing increase in the number of orphans and
widespread premature death, which is radically altering life expectancy. A
Nigerian child can now expect to die before his or her 41st birthday, according to
the 2005 Human Development Report on Nigeria (UNDP 2005).
340
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL STRATEGY
Nigeria’s response to the HIV&AIDS pandemic has unfolded in three phases.
The first phase, from 1986 to 1990, involved a slow beginning, due to initial
denial, apathy, and lack of political will and commitment by the Government.
The National AIDS Control Programme was set up in 1986, the same year that
AIDS was officially reported in the country. It was highly centralized at the
federal level.
In the second phase, from 1991 to 1997, some efforts at decentralizing the
government response began with the establishment of the state and local action
committees and programmes. The National STD and AIDS Programs were
merged with the National AIDS and STD Control Program in 1992. In 1993, the
Nigerian film on AIDS, Dawn of Reality, was produced. NGOs working on AIDS
and STDs proliferated. In 1997, the Government launched the nation’s National
Policy on HIV&AIDS/STIs Control.
In the first two phases, HIV&AIDS was seen purely as a health issue. Most
activities were restricted to health ministries and related agencies. Stakeholders
were not very involved in the planning and management of HIV&AIDS -related
programmes.
By the third phase, from 1999 to the present, a growing awareness of the
devastating impact of HIV&AIDS on development prompted the Nigerian
authorities under the present administration to develop a high-profile National
AIDS Control Program. The authorities, in collaboration with bilateral and
multilateral organizations, have initiated various intervention programmes that
include advocacy, counselling and the management of known cases. The
principal goal of these programmes is to heighten the level of awareness,
discourage high-risk sexual behaviour patterns, and promote the physical, social
and mental well-being of Nigerians.
The authorities have also outlined and approved the comprehensive HIV&AIDS
Emergency Action Plan. It incorporates a wide range of activities that are being
implemented with the cooperation of the local, state and federal governments,
Awareness has grown that HIV&AIDS is about much more than health—it
challenges all dimensions of development and requires a holistic response.
341
and NGOs. Ongoing efforts include the formation of support groups for people
living with HIV&AIDS; efforts to support orphans; and the creation of the
National Action Committee on AIDS, along with its state and local counterparts.
There has been an increased focus on care and support for AIDS patients. Policy
and programmatic links have been made between HIV&AIDS and various
sectors of the economy, including health, education, agriculture, defence,
banking, the transport industry and so on. Umbrella organizations now join the
efforts of NGOs, youth and people living with HIV&AIDS.
The Nigerian Government appears to have grasped the notion that addressing
HIV&AIDS requires a holistic approach that encapsulates both treating the
symptoms and addressing the underlying causes. Viewing HIV&AIDS as a
development problem allows for an understanding of the complexity of the
issues at stake, and the identification of actions across different sectors.
Essential to this process is the establishment of partnerships to stop the
HIV&AIDS pandemic. The organized private sector has abundant resources that
could be mobilized to support HIV&AIDS programming, for example. At a
minimum, businesses should develop programmes for their staff. Private sector
organizations could also contribute advocacy work, and counselling and health
care services.
The National Action Committee on AIDS has already convened a meeting of
major private sector organizations to discuss intervention programmes. Other
initiatives could involve working with NGOs on public education to increase
awareness and ease the social stigmas surrounding HIV&AIDS. The state action
committees in the nine Niger Delta states should pick up on this lead.
In the Niger Delta, the process of convincing political leaders to see HIV&AIDS
as an issue of strategic priority is gathering momentum, but not all leaders are
yet on board. Here, too, partnerships could open the door to rapid progress. The
Niger Delta has a large number of local groups and external organizations
already working on development. Harnessing the energies of these organizations
will quickly expand and multiply efforts to control HIV&AIDS, perhaps by
starting with capacity development programmes. Some organizations are
already being used to deliver programmes in various communities that cannot be
easily reached by authorities. They also have a vital role to play in providing
support to people living with HIV&AIDS and orphans.
The process of convincing political leaders to see HIV&AIDS as an issue of
strategic priority is gathering momentum, but not all leaders are yet on board.
342
One particular point of outreach in the delta is to engage those actively profiting
from the sale of infected blood products and traditional healers/circumcisers
who use infected blades and needles. They are important partners in the fight
against HIV&AIDS. Public education campaigns should target the use/abuse of
blood products and blades by barbers, surgeons and traditional healers, and
should place a special emphasis on reaching those in urban slums and rural areas
who wholly rely on marginal forms of health care.
HIV&AIDS and Human Rights
In part because of the strong stigmas associated with HIV&AIDS and the discrimination
that often results, any strategy to control the disease needs to recognize the protection of
the basic rights of people living with HIV&AIDS. Numerous national and international
laws and agreements define human rights, including the following, which are of special
interest in terms of HIV&AIDS.
1. The right to life and the right to health are guaranteed under Section 33 of the 1999
Nigerian Constitution. Article 4 Section 17(3) (d) of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights says that “the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are
adequate medical and health facilities for all persons.” Assured treatment and care for
HIV&AIDS patients is very far away from patients in the Niger Delta and in Nigeria in
general, however. It is a common practice for hospitals to refuse treatment to people with
HIV&AIDS. Health care workers often decline to treat patients or treat them badly.
2. The right to human dignity is provided for in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and in other international documents. The Nigerian Constitution says that every
individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person and accordingly no person
shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. The following comment
The Niger Delta states could harness the energies of the many development
organizations already on the ground.
Initiatives must reach those profiting from the sale of infected blood or blood
products, and traditional healers/circumcisers who use infected blades and needles.
Any strategy to control HIV&AIDS needs to protect people’s basic human rights.
Assured treatment and care for HIV&AIDS patients is very far away from patients in the Niger Delta.
343
from one of the focus group participants illustrates the usual degrading treatment of
people living with HIV&AIDS:
I cannot have anything to do with them. I pity them but I
need to protect myself too.
3. The right to privacy is also protected under the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, which states in Act 12 that no person shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, home or correspondence, or to attacks upon his reputation. People living
with HIV&AIDS have the right to privacy concerning information on HIV status, as well
as information indicating whether a person has agreed to undergo an HIV test or not.
4. Confidentiality is one of the oldest principles guiding the medical profession. A
person has a right to medical confidentiality; this includes his or her HIV status. The
failure to respect confidentiality will drive infected people to withhold information
concerning their health status, or they may even resort to telling lies.
5. The right to marry and the right to family life: Every individual,
including those living with HIV&AIDS, has the right to marry and raise a family.
6. The right to an education: Everyone, regardless of ethnic affiliation and social or
health status, has the right to an education. Data suggest that children of parents with HIV
may be rejected and excluded from schools, even though an HIV test was not carried out
on them. This indication of discrimination violates people’s rights.
7. The right to work: Everyone has the right to work, and to have just and favourable
work conditions. Although the HIV virus is not easily transmitted, many employers in
Nigeria either sack those found to be HIV positive or refuse to employ them. In the Niger
Delta, aside from the multinational oil and gas operators and the big oil service firms,
most workplaces do not have HIV&AIDS programmes. It is a common practice to
request prospective employees to undergo HIV testing before employment.
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CONCLUSION
Nigeria’s HIV prevalence rate remains relatively high, especially for younger people. In
the Niger Delta, most people continue to see HIV&AIDS as a health issue. But in
influencing diverse aspects of national and regional welfare, it has become a major
development challenge. While a poor livelihood or poverty encourages vulnerability to
HIV&AIDS, the disease also dampens prospects for economic growth and development.
These inextricable links are clearly at work in the delta, although social and cultural
factors also account for its high rates of HIV, including heterogeneous sexual behaviours.
Reversing HIV&AIDS will require an integrated approach that recognizes the many
dimensions of the epidemic. All stakeholders, including federal, state and local
authorities, the NDDC, the private sector, civil society groups and international
organizations, have roles to play. Strong leadership will be needed at all levels.
The most effective strategies will be holistic, combining programmes to prevent
opportunistic infections, manage existing cases and care for people living with
HIV&AIDS. Strong policy advocacy among top-level policy makers and opinion leaders
must take place, accompanied by a boost in awareness in the population at large. The
issues of sustainable livelihoods and gender inequality must be addressed, and there must
be steps to discourage heterogeneous and unsafe sex. Routine community conversations
about HIV&AIDS would go far in reducing stigmas that curtail efforts to stop the
epidemic.
Social and cultural factors help account for the delta’s high rates of HIV,
including heterogeneous sexual behaviours.
Reversing HIV&AIDS will require an integrated approach that recognizes the
many dimensions of the pandemic.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PEACE
THE NIGER DELTA, YESTERDAY AND TODAY
A brief history of the Niger Delta will set the stage for the current conflicts, although only aspects germane to human development are
highlighted. For a start, this region had the earliest and most sustained contact with Europeans, especially during the pre-colonial
period. This contact served the region well. While the colonial government’s 1917 township classification rated Lagos the only firstclass
town in Nigeria, eight of the 18 second-class towns were in the Niger Delta and 27 of the 47 third-class towns.
Since the township classification guided the distribution of infrastructure and
amenities, many towns in the delta, such as Brass, Burutu, Forcados, Sapele, etc.,
received colonial attention much before bigger settlements further inland.
According to Church (1965), Forcados became so important during this early
colonial period that until 1914, goods meant for Lagos were usually shipped
through there. In the Nigeria of that time, the place to be was probably the Niger
Delta!
Yesterday
The Niger Delta was an important area for European trade, which stimulated the
economic, political and social life of the people living there. New city states
emerged to cope with growing prosperity. Most towns in the delta sprang up
during the period of European trade between 1450 and 1800, especially in places
where European traders had set up businesses (Dike 1956). As a result of the
palm oil trade, middlemen became a powerful and prosperous class.
For fear of malaria, European merchants were reluctant to move into the interior
of the Niger Delta until after 1854, when the explorer Baikie proved that quinine
protects against the disease. The role of the middlemen in the palm oil trade was
sufficiently high for McPhee (1926) to remark that the commercial penetration of
the interior was made possible through their help as agents of European firms on
the coast. Middlemen established stores in the interior with goods advanced to
them on credit by their European principals on the coast (Mabogunje, 1968).
The Niger Delta conflicts over resources began simmering during the pre-colonial
period. But today, the region has become far more volatile. Years of deprivation
have pushed citizens into anger, hopelessness, cynicism and violence.
346
As a result of the foothold the British traders had in the Niger Delta, the area
now known as Nigeria was conceded to Britain at the Berlin Conference of 1885.
The Royal Niger Company, in addition to its trading activities, was already
virtually in charge of governance on behalf of the British. Its attempt to
monopolize the trade in palm oil to the exclusion of the Niger Delta kings and
middlemen was to result in the first major rebellion in the region against
injustice. The British revoked the charter empowering the company to govern in
1900; thereafter, Britain assumed direct rule of Nigeria.
The active participation of the British Government in the internal development of
Nigeria did not begin until the passing of the first series of Colonial
Development Acts in 1929. Before this time, development was carried out with
funds generated from Nigeria itself. In 1939, the scope of the Acts was changed
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Its stated aim was the
promotion of the development of the resources of the colonies and the welfare of
their peoples.
In the same year, southern Nigeria was subdivided into the Western and Eastern
Regions. The present Niger Delta peoples in Delta and Edo states thereby became
minorities in the Western Region, which was dominated by the Yoruba. In the
same way, the peoples in the states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River and
Rivers became minorities in the Eastern Region, which was dominated by the
Ibo. The creation of minority populations also underlies the subsequent
unfairness and inequity suffered by the Niger Delta states in a Nigerian
Federation dominated by three big ethnic groups. Besides the Yoruba and Ibo,
the third group is the Hausa/Fulani. It dominates the north of Nigeria, and has
played a major role in Nigerian governance, particularly through the military.
In the pre-colonial period and certainly all through the colonial period, the
mainstays of the Niger Delta economy were agriculture and fishing. A World
Bank report in 1952 and 1953 (see Alamieyesigha 2005) indicated that the Niger
Delta had tremendous agricultural potential—enough to produce crops for itself
and for export. During this period, the production of palm oil and kernels in
The Royal Niger Company’s exclusion of the Niger Delta kings and middlemen
from the palm oil trade resulted in the first major rebellion against injustice.
Before the advent of oil in commercial quantities, the production of palm oil, palm
kernels and timber earned considerable income for the region and Nigeria.
347
much of the Niger Delta; rubber in mostly the current Edo, Delta and Cross River
states; cocoa in Ondo and Edo states; and timber in most states was at a high
peak, earning considerable income for the region and Nigeria as a whole,
including through a large proportion of foreign exchange earnings. Timber was
so important in the Niger Delta that the African Timber and Plywood company,
a subsidiary of the United African Company, established a large factory in Sapele
to process wood. At that time, it may have been the largest such operation in
Africa if not the world.
Today
The Niger Delta conflicts over resources such as palm oil began simmering
during the pre-colonial period and have continued today over the region’s
copious oil reserves. The major difference between then and now is that the
region has become far more volatile, a situation brought on by limited access to
an array of resources. Unemployment is high, especially among youth. Social
services (for education, health, recreation, etc.) and physical infrastructure
(roads, electricity, water, sewers, etc.) are poor everywhere. The problem of
poverty in the midst of ballooning oil revenues has spawned discontent and
disillusion. Several angry groups have taken up the fight for equity through
agitations for resource control or at least enhanced allocations in the federally
shared revenues from the oil industry. The Niger Delta is virtually in a state of
siege.
Unfortunately, there are few alternatives to oil. The production of palm oil and
kernels has fallen to such low levels that many palm trees are now not being
harvested. Very few new palm trees are being planted.6 Rubber production is a
shadow of its old self. Timber has held its own, but certainly not on the previous
scale. The severe pollution of rivers and soils and the overall environmental
degradation wrought by oil have led to the decline of crops and fishing. In Ondo
State, cocoa production is also decreasing. This is surprising, considering that
this area produced a considerable proportion of the cocoa exported from Nigeria
during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods.
6 Until 1970, Nigeria was acknowledged as the world’s leading palm oil producer. This influenced many
countries, including Malaysia, the current leading palm oil producer, to come and study palm tree
production in the country. Today, Nigeria is no longer on the list of leading palm oil exporters.
The loss of the once vibrant agricultural and fishing sectors and very limited
access to benefits from today’s oil resources have set the stage for violence in the
i
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TYPES OF CONFLICT
Violent political conflicts in the Middle Belt and Western Region of Nigeria,
which national leaders could not resolve amicably in the 1960s, contributed
significantly to the collapse of Nigeria’s first post-independence democratic
regime in 1966. The Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970, and the consequential
widespread access to and use of small arms, popularized the use of force to settle
disputes, particularly disputes between groups, in the rest of the country. Since
the 1990s, the Niger Delta has assumed the character of a conflict-ridden region.
The delta’s peculiarities as the cradle of Nigeria’s oil industry and its associated
externalities, the realities of a constricted land area, a fragile environment
compounding difficult geographical terrain, the heterogeneity of cultures,
extreme economic deprivations, and competition by individuals and
communities for a greater share of the natural wealth of the region have
combined to create a theatre of almost permanent violence.
The most common and vicious forms of conflict, in terms of lives lost and
property destroyed, are:
• intra-community
• inter-community
• inter-ethnic
• community and oil company conflicts
Box 5.1 contains a list of examples from the past several years. There are, of
course, other forms of conflict. These include disputes between local
governments, between communities and local governments, between
communities and state governments, between local and state governments,
between states, between states and the federal government, and between local
governments and oil companies. These conflicts are also important, but they lend
themselves more easily to negotiated settlement than to force by either of the
parties. In these cases, one party is the government, and the other party is
generally reluctant to take the law into its hands.
Intra-community
Nigeria’s civil war popularized the use of force. The delta has
become a theatre of almost permanent violence.
Intra-community conflicts arise most often in struggles over the sharing of
benefits from oil.
349
Intra-community conflicts involve members of a clan, village or ethnic group
with some form of communal identity. Examining a few cases of these conflicts
will show the typical root causes.
In Ogbogoro community, for example, violent intra-community conflict has
flared sporadically since 1998. Under dispute is the 1978 agreement that the
community reached with an oil services company, ARCO. It requires the
company to pay a modest annual rent to the community, and replaced an earlier
agreement with a single family voided by a court after a protest by the rest of the
community. In 1993, OIL (Nig) Ltd. and West African Field Services leased the
property when ARCO left. They signed an agreement that promised higher rent,
contracts and jobs to local people.
This raised the stakes for Eze Oha, the traditional head of the community,
because he became responsible for distributing the compensation to the
community. At the same time, a new candidate emerged who made a successful
claim to the right to serve as the traditional head. This divided the community
into two camps, with one behind the old ruler and one behind the new ruler.
Several lawsuits were filed and pending in court when, as a result of rising
tension in the community, the Rivers State Military Administrator set up a
Caretaker Committee and representative council to disburse the benefits from
the oil companies to the indigenous members of the community. In 1998,
supporters of the new ruler violently challenged the Committee’s attempt to
collect fees for market stalls.
According to Ojo (2002), “Hell then broke loose. Rampaging youths engaged in
gun battles, burnt down houses and destroyed millions of Naira worth of
property. At the end, two Youth Forum members were dead, 50 houses had been
burnt to ashes, Waterfront Youth fled the community to become refugees. Guntotting
teenagers became armed robbers and extortionists.”
350
351
Box 5.1: A Catalogue of Escalating Violence in the Niger Delta, 2003-2006
1. 2003: At Irri, Isoko South local council, a traditional ruler was alleged to have sold the rights of the
community to Agip Oil. This sparked off violence. At the end of the imbroglio, no fewer than 10
persons died and property worth millions of naira was vandalized, including the palace of the
traditional ruler who took to his heels in the heat of the crisis.
2. 15 January 2003: Indigenes of Ohoror-Uwheru community in Ugbelli North local council were
attacked by a detachment of soldiers from the Joint Security Task Force ‘Operation Restore Hope’.
3. 21 March 2003: While the Security Task Force was on patrol off Escravos River, youths attacked the
team with 17 speedboats at Oporosa on the Escravos Creek, killing three soldiers and one naval
rating.
4. 22 March 2003: Youths struck at the TotalFinaElf tank farm in Oponani Village and killed five
soldiers and destroyed property worth billions of naira.
5. 2 May 2003: Barely 24 hours after the state House of Assembly election, youths brandishing AK-47
pump rifles and other light weapons attacked the naval base, leaving two naval ratings severely
injured.
6. 7 November 2003: Eight mobile policemen were reportedly killed by youths between Otuan and
Oporoma in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State.
7. April 2004: Five persons including two Americans were killed by militant youths. They were
among nine people travelling in a boat along Benin River, West of Warri, when they came under
what was described as “unprovoked attack”. The two American expatriates were on the staff of
ChevronTexaco.
8. January 2004: Suspected Itsekiri militants invaded some communities in Okpe Kingdom, killing 17
people and injuring three others.
9. 14 April 2004: Ijaw youths attacked and killed four children including a 90-year community leader,
Madam Mejebi Eworuwo, in Koko, headquarters of Warri North Local Council, Delta State.
10. 23 April 2004: About nine members of the Joint Security Task Force, ‘Operation Restore Hope’, in
charge of security in Warri were killed by militant Ijaw youths.
11. 2 November 2004: For several hours, youths of Igbudu and soldiers of the Joint Task Force clashed
in Igbudu area of Warri, Delta State.
12. 18 November 2004: Ijaw youths from Odioma community in Brass Council in Bayelsa State,
protesting an alleged violation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by Shell Petroleum
Development Company (SPDC), shut down and occupied its 8,000-barrel a day flow station.
13. 22 November 2004: At least 17 youths of Ijaw extraction were confirmed dead as soldiers deployed
to guard a flow station belonging to an oil-servicing firm shot sporadically into a crowd.
14. 28 November 2004: Ijaw youths clashed with soldiers at Beneseide flow station, near Ojobo in
Bayelsa State over breach of MoU.
15. 23 December 2004: The youths in Ogbe-Osewa and Ogbe Ilo quarters in Asaba clashed over a land
dispute. Over 100 houses were ransacked, with property running into millions of naira destroyed.
16. 23 December 2004: At Ekpan, Uvwie local council of Delta State, youths clashed over the
appointment of Unuevworo (traditional head) of the community.
17. 24 December 2004: Militant youths kidnapped 16 oil workers including a Yugoslav at Amatu
Community in Ekeremoh local council of Bayelsa State. They were kidnapped from a vessel
identified as Seabulk, owned by an oil-servicing firm working with Shell.
18. 26 December 2004: Alleged similar breach of MoU by SPDC led to the abduction of a Croatian
worker, Mr. Ivan Roso, at the company’s Sea Eagle floating crude oil production facility.
19. 21 December 2005: Explosion rocked Shell pipeline in Niger Delta.
20. 22 December 2005: Fire raged in Shell installations causing 13 deaths.
21. 31 December 2005: Explosion rocked Shell pipeline in Niger Delta (The Guardian, 21 December
2005).
22. 12 January 2006: Pirates took four expatriates hostage.
23. 16 January 2006: Militants attacked another Shell platform and torched houseboats.
24. 16 January 2006: Fourteen soldiers killed in Niger Delta shoot out (ThisDay, 16 January
2006)
25. 18 January 2006: Soldiers, Bayelsa militants engaged in gun duel.
26. 18 January 2006: Shell cut oil output by 115 BPD (ThisDay, 18 January 2006).
27. 19 January 2006: Federal Government opened talks with militants (The Punch, 19 January
2006).
28. 29 January 2006: Oil workers threatened to pull out of Niger Delta.
Source: The Guardian, 13 February 2005, p. 26, and various issues from December 2005 to January,
2006.
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Another struggle for an adequate share of the benefits from oil resulted in the socalled
‘Nembe War’. In Nembe, like Ogbogoro, the oil companies (Shell, Agip,
etc.) negotiated an agreement with the chiefs on compensation, contracts and job
opportunities. As usual, the chiefs kept a disproportionate share of such benefits,
appropriating most of the money for themselves and assigning most contracts to
their front companies. Even jobs in the companies could be obtained only
through the nomination of the chiefs. In the late 1990s, excluded youths
organized to interject themselves into these transactions. They started harassing
oil workers, taking hostages, occupying flow stations, etc. to make the oil
companies negotiate with them and make side payments. The side payments
usually amounted to such huge sums that soon the youths split into factions to
make separate demands. Rival gangs emerged, and soon second and third
generations of youth gangs were extorting money from the oil companies. Once
when the first-generation youths were away to collect their largesse from the
state headquarters, Yenagoa, a younger group, took control of Nembe and
banished them. Violent clashes by rival youth gangs imposed a reign of terror on
Nembe until the community rose in 2000 to resist (Ojo 2002). The result was
heavy loss of lives and property.
What is evident from these examples of intra-community conflict is that they
arise because of struggles over the sharing of benefits from oil. Quite often a
community’s traditional ruler or council of elders, which negotiates with the
companies, is at the centre of such conflicts. When some people perceive
unfairness in the distribution of compensation, they organize to challenge the
existing order and seek its overthrow. This is one of the major causes of the
breakdown of traditional authority in most oil-producing areas. Traditional
rulers have lost their legitimacy partly because of greed and partly because there
is not enough money to satisfy everybody anyway.
The consequences of the weakening of the traditional socio-political order are
far-reaching. Youths no longer respect not just their chiefs, but all authority
The breakdown in authority includes traditional rulers. They have lost their
legitimacy partly because of greed and partly because there is not enough money to
satisfy everybody.
Most youths lack entrepreneurial skills and fritter away their ransom money, so
they constantly have to engage in extortion to maintain themselves.
The use of force has become a common practice rather than a last resort.
353
structures. Having experienced the sudden wealth that can be obtained by taking
matters into their own hands, they want to deal directly with oil companies
themselves. Unfortunately, most lack entrepreneurial skills. They fritter away
their ransom money, so they constantly have to engage in extortion to maintain
themselves.
Property rights also come into play in intra-community conflicts. Individual and
community rights to land are insecure. Litigation is common because every plot
of land is valuable either for oil exploration, farmland or building houses.
In managing all of these different issues, local government chairpersons, who are
the closest government functionaries to the communities, command little or no
respect, as chapter one describes. Evidence from the field survey revealed that
their loss of legitimacy is the result of a number of factors. Local elections are not
properly conducted, starting from the nomination through campaigning to actual
voting. Candidates are either imposed by a godfather or the state governor.
Election outcomes do not reflect voter choices, so people feel frustrated and
alienated. In several communities in the Niger Delta, there is no political
authority capable of making authoritative decisions. In such a situation, the use
of force to effect even routine policy decisions has become a common practice
rather than a last resort. This frequently draws the involvement of security
agencies in local administration.
Inter-community
Inter-communal conflicts do not always result in violence. Some cases are settled
in courts—Niger Delta communities are famous (or perhaps notorious) as
patrons of the judicial system. The courts in such urban centres as Port Harcourt
and Warri have a series of these cases. But in many instances, when communities
are not satisfied with the outcome, violence results. These conflicts usually
involve a wide spectrum of people in each community. Since only the physically
strong can fight, however, male youths are often the most active participants.
Election campaigns are constrained by thuggery and official hostility
towards candidates of opposition parties.
The oil economy is stressing traditional communal relationships. Some conflicts
are so brutal that they result in entire communities being razed to the ground.
354
The role of the elders, both male and female, is usually advisory, particularly in
terms of the need for moderation.
As in the case of intra-communal conflicts, inter-communal conflicts are not new
in the Niger Delta. But the incidences have increased phenomenally since the
1970s, and particularly since the 1990s (see box 5.2). Table 5.1 summarizes some
noteworthy examples that led to widespread destruction of life and property. For
instance, in the conflict between Okpoama and Ewoama, the latter community
was completely destroyed. In the Liama and Beletiama case of the 1990s, the
destruction of Beletiama was such that even by the middle of 2005, it was
difficult to imagine that a town of several thousand people once existed there.
Table 5.1: Noteworthy Inter-Communal Conflicts in the Most Conflict-
Prone States
Bayelsa State Delta State Rivers State
Okpoama vs. Ewoama
Twon-Brass vs. Okpoama
Liama vs. Beletiama
Emadike vs. Epebu
Egweama vs. Beletiama
Oleh vs. Olomoro
Isama vs. Gbarigolo
Ogidigbe vs.
Okerenkoko
Odimodi vs. Ogulagha
Olota vs. Oboro
Emohua vs. Ogbakiri
Okrika vs. Elesa-Eleme
Bille vs. Ke
Ekunuga vs. Okolomade
Soku vs. Kula
Box 5.2: Oil and the Conflict between Emadike and Epebu
…the now warring communities have not always been enemies. Those communities,
including Okodi, had always been good neighbours in the past until seismic activities began
in the area in the 1960s by the United Geophysical Company (UGC) and Western
Geophysical of Western Atlas International Nigeria Limited. When oil was struck on the
piece of land, known as Obama Asaraba, Epebu, Emadike and Opuma communities soon
started laying separate claims to the land; from then on, relations among these communities
became strained. Peace finally took flight when aggression among these neighbours went on
the high side with the discovery of the Frigbene B and Frigbene A oil wells in Frigbene by
NAOC, with each community claiming ownership of the land. No farm located near the area
was safe any longer. This led to frequent claims and counter-claims over farmlands and the
crops.
Source: Niger Delta Alert, August-October, 1998.
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The dispute between Oleh and Olomoro illustrates the kind of issues that can
spark a conflagration. The Shell Petroleum Development Company oil flow
station in the area straddles the communities’ land, with 80 per cent in Oleh and
20 per cent in Olomoro, but Olomoro and Uzere have 70 per cent of the oil
produced while Oleh has only 20 per cent. The flow station is named after
Olomoro, which the Oleh community does not like, while the royalty payment
favours Oleh despite its lower production quota, which Olomoro contests. In
2000, the Shell Petroleum Development Company negotiated with the two
communities to replace its old pipelines. Labor was to be recruited 80 per cent
from Olomoro and 20 per cent from Oleh. Each community was to keep
exhumed old pipelines. After the exercise, Olomoro predictably had more
pipelines to share. Oleh youth invaded the sharing site and, in the ensuing battle,
lost their leader. They retreated to Oleh to attack Olomoro indigenes in their
community, burning down their houses and shops. The police came from Benin
to restore law and order, but their response was to raze Oleh to the ground.
What is evident from this episode, and many other conflicts of this type, is that
the oil economy is stressing traditional communal relationships. Litigation over
land is usually not a satisfactory means of resolving conflicts because the wheels
of justice grind too slowly, while good counsel is expensive to hire. Typically, a
land dispute can take 10 years to move through a high court, while appeals
through the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court can take as long if not
longer. The benefits of being able to immediately assert rights over disputed
territory are attractive. Communities are impatient to seize the moment and
claim whatever benefits they can from oil companies while they are still in their
communities. The role of security agencies, called to restore law and order
between warring communities, can also aggravate the violence, as in Oleh and
several other places.
Inter-ethnic
Inter-ethnic conflict, in spite of its relatively low occurrence, is the most well
known of the delta conflicts to the Nigerian public, largely because it usually
involves a bigger area and a greater loss of life and property. The following
incidences are noteworthy:
The benefits of being able to immediately assert rights over disputed territory are
attractive. Communities are impatient to seize whatever they can.
Not all conflicts are related to oil. Some stem from the government’s failure to
encourage civic participation or deliver development results.
356
Ijaw vs. Itsekiri (Delta State)
Urhobo vs. Itsekiri (Delta State)
Ogoni vs. Okrika (Rivers State)
Ogoni vs. Andoni (Rivers State)
Ilaje vs. Ijaw (Ondo State)
The inter-ethnic conflicts demonstrate that not all conflicts in the Niger Delta are
related to oil exploration. Quite a few are the result of historical disputes that
erupt violently because violence has become the prevalent means of resolving
disputes in the region. Some inter-ethnic conflicts may also be attributed to the
government’s failure to involve people in deciding policies that affect them
and/or to deliver development results. Many persist because the government
has been unable to deal with the root causes or to find acceptable solutions.
The Warri conflicts (Ijaw versus Itsekiri and Urhobo versus Itsekiri) provide
some prominent examples of inter-ethnic confrontations. The Warri district of
Delta State has had long-standing land disputes involving the Itsekiri, Ijaw and
Urhobo, who have the largest settlements in the area. Unending litigation
preceded the discovery of oil in the area, which made Warri the second most
important oil city in Nigeria. The claims and counter-claims revolve around who
owns the city of Warri. The courts have, of course, not been able to resolve this
question to the satisfaction of all parties, hence the numerous and unending
court cases. The situation has been compounded by the reorganization of local
government administration in Warri.
Until 1997, the Itsekiri dominated two local governments in Warri. Their more
numerous neighbors, the Ijaw and Urhobo, considered this a spiteful deprivation
of political rights. So when the government decided to create a third local
government in 1997, the Ijaw and Urhobo, especially the former, hoped that the
headquarters of the new local government, Warri South West, would be sited at
Ogbe-Ijoh, one of their settlements. Instead, the headquarters ended up in
Ogodigben, an Itsekiri settlement. For the next few months, rampaging Itsekiri
and Ijaw youths attacked each other’s villages and properties, killing, maiming
and disrupting travel on the waterways, as well as stopping oil production. The
Delta State Government instituted a Commission of Inquiry but was unable to
publish its report or issue a ‘White Paper’ until a new civilian administration
came into office in 1999. The violence abated somewhat when the local
government headquarters relocated to Ogbe-Ijoh.
Intense conflicts often arise from spiteful deprivation of political rights or ethnic
domination.
357
The violent Urhobo-Itsekiri conflict of 2003 was also related to the battle for
political supremacy in Warri. The Urhobo considered the demarcation of wards
in the Delta South Senatorial District to favour the Itsekiri. To force the
government to redress the situation, Urhobo youths attacked Itsekiris and their
properties, with the latter replying in kind. As in Oleh, the Urhobo allege that the
security forces, especially soldiers, sided with the Itsekiri. For a couple of
months, both sides carried out reprisal attacks on each other’s settlements.
Normal economic activities, especially oil exploration, ceased. Several hundred
people on both sides were displaced. Schools, clinics, maternity wards and other
facilities were shut down.
Communities and Oil Companies
Generally speaking, communities are dissatisfied with the consequences from oil
operations. This disaffection is expressed in various forms, including violent
demonstrations against oil companies, blockades of their operations, the
sabotage of pipelines and other oil installations, and hostage-taking. Some
groups have produced charters, declarations, agendas and resolutions to express
their demands. These began with the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990 (box 5.3) and
include the Kaiama Declaration by Niger Delta youths, containing ‘100 reasons
why we want our resources’ (see box 3.5 in chapter three); the Oron Bill of
Rights, in which the Oron people of Akwa Ibom State resolved to take their
destiny into their own hands; and the Warri Accord, in which the Itsekiri people
of Delta State sought ways to reap maximum benefits from the oil production in
their area. In the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the Ogoni people of Rivers State sought to
fight the environmental degradation, unfairness and inequities arising from the
exploitation of oil resources in the area.
The oil companies, especially the Shell Petroleum Development Company, are
accused of not assisting their host communities enough. They were accused of
failing to adequately provide infrastructure such as water systems, health
facilities, roads and electricity grids. The neglect is made more obvious when
their own staff live in estates that meet international standards and are adjacent
to the deprived host communities. The lifestyles of oil workers aggravate feelings
of discrimination. Many locals blame the increasing incidence of prostitution and
its attendant diseases such as HIV&AIDS on the influx of young girls looking for
livelihoods. Local young women and even school girls feel the pressure to join
the race for petro-money to raise their own standards of living.
The lifestyles of oil workers living on estates that meet international standards
aggravate feelings of discrimination.
The new economy leaves out those who are not connected to it. Land is lost and
prices rise, even as many local people lack the skills to work in the oil industry.
358
The new economy leaves out those who are not connected to it. Land is lost to oil
exploitation, while the invasion of oil workers invariably raises the local cost of
living. Most local people lack the skills required to be employed by the oil
companies; if they are employed at all, it is in the most menial and poorly paid
jobs, where they suffer the indignity of seeing outsiders arrive to take
preeminence over them in the oil industry. Outsiders always occupy the higher
echelons of the oil companies. Agitators in the region attribute this to a deliberate
policy of exclusion. None of the major oil companies is headquartered in the
delta.
Many conflicts have centered on renegotiating the memorandums of
understanding that communities negotiate with the oil companies for benefits
meant to compensate everyone in the community for the consequences of the oil
activities. Since there are no standard or regulated compensation rates for either
exploitation or spillage, different rates are paid to different communities.
Conflicts arise when communities realize that they have not bargained hard
enough and have not secured as many benefits as other communities.
Some oil companies have not always honoured the negotiated terms of entry.
And in some of the worst-case scenarios, representatives of oil communities and
civil society organizations accuse companies of calling armed police to maim and
kill aggrieved people at the merest hint of protest. Many peaceful protests have
met severe police brutality instigated by the oil companies. When individuals or
communities have differences with the companies, individual or community
rights suffer.
Governance and Conflict
Chapter one outlined how the states of the Niger Delta region are in conflict with
the Federal Government and non-oil states over the oil revenue allocation
formula. That this conflict potentially threatens the stability of the nation was
revealed when the 2005 National Political Reform Conference broke up over a
failure to agree on an increase in the derivation fund that was acceptable to the
oil-producing states. This generated tension—protagonists and antagonists made
inflammatory statements. Other conflicts have arisen between states and local
governments over the locations of oil wells. These are mostly resolved
The government and its agencies, through negligence or outright failure, are
implicated in most conflicts.
359
bureaucratically, and only result in violence if interested communities lose their
patience and take matters into their own hands.
Directly or indirectly, however, the government and its agencies, through
negligence or outright failure, are implicated in most conflicts. The government
has fallen short on ensuring a proper legal and social environment for peaceful
conflict resolution, which has contributed significantly to the emergence of
parties that resort to violence in the Niger Delta. Regulations are inadequate in
terms of requiring companies to adopt and operate uniform corporate
responsibility measures—this is behind the problems with variations in the
memorandums of understanding with host communities. The fact that oil
companies are allowed to maintain supernumerary police means that even the
mildest protests may be met with blunt force.
360
Box 5.3: Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990
1. That the Ogoni people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai)
numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Government and people of
Nigeria to the under-mentioned facts:
2. That British colonization forced us into administrative division of Opobo from 1908 to
1947.
3. That we protested against this forced union until the Ogoni Native Authority was created
in 1947 and placed under the then Rivers Province.
4. That in 1951 we were forcibly included in the Eastern region of Nigeria where we suffered
utter neglect.
5. That we protested against this neglect by voting against the party in power in the region
in 1957, and against the forced union by testimony before the Willink Commission of
Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958.
6. That this protest led to the inclusion of our nationality in Rivers State in 1967, which State
consists of several ethnic nationalities with differing cultures, languages and aspirations.
7. That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at K. Dere
(Bomu Field).
8. That oil has been mined on our land since 1958 to this day from the following oil fields (i)
Bomu, (ii) Bodo West, (iii) Tai, (iv) Korokoro, (v) Yorla, (vi) Lubara Creek, and (vii) Afam
by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) limited.
9. That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the Nigerian
nation over 40 billion Naira (N40 billion) or 30 billion dollars.
10. That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING.
11. That today, the Ogoni people have (i) No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of
the Federal Government of Nigeria. (ii) No pipe-borne water. (iii) No electricity. (iv) No
job opportunities for the citizens in the Federal, State, public sector or private companies.
12. That the Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are underdeveloped and are about to
disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.
13. That the ethnic politics of successive Federal and State Governments are gradually
pushing the Ogoni to slavery and possible extinction.
14. That the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria does not employ Ogoni
people at a meaningful or any level at all, in defiance of the Federal Government’s
regulations.
15. That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni, one of the
most densely populated areas of Africa (average: 1,500 per square mile; Nigerian national
average: 300 per square mile.)
16. That the neglectful environmental degradation laws and substandard inspection
techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni
environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster.
17. That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.
18. That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject
poverty and destitution.
19. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right enshrined
in the Nigerian Constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by administrative restructuring
and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of
the Republic.
20. That the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs.
Source: Ogoni Bill of Rights presented to the Government and People of Nigeria, 1990.
361
The security forces are supposed to act as peacekeepers or observers of conflicts,
but once they become engaged, their use of force results in clashes with
communities or ethnic groups. These secondary conflicts tend to run their own
course, and are sometimes more ferocious than the original dispute, as was the
case when the police levelled the town of Oleh. Military interventions are also
devastating. When the youths of Odi abducted five policemen, soldiers invaded
and destroyed the town. Ijaw towns have been bombarded indiscriminately
whenever youths have taken hostages. These knee-jerk reactions aggravate
rather than deter the youths, because those responsible usually escape reprisals,
while innocent citizens suffer unnecessarily.
The failure of governance also incites violent conflict. When people feel betrayed
by the government through its neglect of their well-being and security, they may
resort to violence to seek redress. Declining economic performance leading to
rising unemployment or underemployment; a lack of access to basic necessities
of life like water, shelter, health facilities, food and clothing; discriminatory
policies that deny access to positions of authority and influence so people can
participate in shaping the rules by which they are governed—all these factors
indicate a failure of governance. For the most aggrieved people, they serve as a
call to arms against the government.7 Corruption aggravates feelings of being
cheated when the rulers are seen to live ostentatiously amid mass poverty and
extreme want.
The people of the Niger Delta region strongly believe that their various
governments (state and local) have failed them (table 5.2). But the leaders of the
region believe the fault is not theirs alone, and that governance failure at the
national level is similarly culpable. Recent advertisements by people of the
South-South and South East zones make the case that the South-South area,
which is the heartland of the oil region, has been systematically discriminated
against and excluded from the exercise of political power at the federal level
7 The two million-man march organized by youths in 1997 in support of Abacha’s self-perpetuation
accelerated the conflict in the Niger Delta. Hundreds of Niger Delta youths participated in the statemanipulated
rally. This exposed them to the extreme modernization in Abuja, compared to the crudity and
lack of modern facilities in most Niger Delta communities. They became agitated, wild and more
confrontational. The demand for resource control became more forceful, leading to the formation of several
militant groups. The Ijaw Youth Council was established in December 1998; the Kaiama Declaration
followed. Shortly after the declaration, youth militias of different shades appeared, e.g., the Egbesu Boys
and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force.
The security forces are supposed to act as peacekeepers, but they often clash with
communities or ethnic groups.
362
(table 5.3). When people from the region have been included in the federal
system, they are usually given minor cabinet positions. Federal parastatals are
dominated by people from the majority ethnic tribes, while the Yoruba and Igbo,
in particular, predominate in employment in the senior echelons of the oil
industry. Such pervasive exclusion is obnoxious, from the perspective of people
in the delta. Some believe this justifies the extreme measures, including violence,
that their youths are using to compel redress.
An analysis of the governance situation and people’s perception of the federal,
state and local governments shows that all levels need to do a lot to mend fences
and restore their credibility. Chapter seven puts forth some of the steps they
should take.
Table 5.2: What the People of the Niger Delta Most Dislike about the Region
Priority Per cent of respondents identifying it
as most disliked
Poor leadership (governance) 16.7
Poor governance 16.1
Corruption 14.4
Environmental degradation 14.3
Unemployment 14.0
Low education 6.7
Insecurity 5.6
Lack of infrastructure 4.4
High cost of living 4.4
Poverty 3.3
100.0
Source: ERML fieldwork 2005.
363
Table 5.3: Zones that Have Produced Nigeria’s Head of State
Zone Period Years in power
North-West 10 years + 8 months • General M. Mohammed: 29 July
1975–13 February 1976
• Alhaji Shehu Shagari: 1 October
1979–31 December 1983
• General M. Buhari: 31 December
1983–27 August 1985
• General Sani Abacha: 17
November 1993–8 June 1998
North-East 5 years +10 months • Sir Abubakar Tafa Balewa: 1
October 1960–15 January 1966
North Central 18 years • General Yakubu Gowon: 29 July
1966–29 July 1975
• General Ibrahim Babangida 27
August 1985–26 August 1993
• General Abdulsalami Abubakar::
9 June 1998–29 May 1999
South-West 10 years + 11 months • General Olusegun Obasanjo: 14
February 1976–1 October 1979
• Chief Ernest Shonekan: 26
August 1993–17 November 1993
• General Olusegun Obasanjo: 29
May 1999 to date
South-East Six months, excluding the
period of 5 years and 2
months as head of
government
• Dr Namdi Azikwe: First
Governor General, 1 October
1960–1 October 1963; President, 1
October 1963–15 January 1966
(both positions were not as the
leader of government)
• General Aguyi Ironsi: 15 January
1966–29 July 1966
South-South — —
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS
Sustainable development cannot be achieved in the face of constant fighting.
364
The economic and social costs of conflict in the Niger Delta region are enormous,
both directly and in terms of lost opportunities. A general agreement among all
stakeholders, including the various tiers of government, the local people, civil
society organizations and the oil companies, is that sustainable development
cannot be achieved in the face of constant fighting.
The most obvious public concern is the disruption of oil exploitation and allied
activities, which drags down the economy and leads to the loss of foreign
exchange sorely needed to finance national development. Blown pipelines
disrupt the supply of crude oil to refineries and result in shortages of petroleum
products and energy. The international oil market feels the shock through
sudden rises in crude oil prices. Hostage-taking is not only a stress on foreign
captives, their families and the companies they work for, but also a challenge to
international diplomacy.
For the oil companies, specifically, the costs of conflict are quite high. These
include: the loss of revenue due to illegal bunkering, contractor claims for
breaches of contract when deliveries cannot be made, huge compensation to
communities as a result of damaged pipelines and fires, the high costs of
providing security for staff and equipment, higher insurance rates, large ransom
payments or ‘public relations’ to pacify potential trouble-makers, inducement
contracts to community and youth leaders, and payments to government
security staff. The estimated loss to illegal bunkering is 10 per cent to 15 per cent
of daily production. This becomes a shortfall not only for the companies, but also
for the government. Instability and lost revenues cut down hopes for achieving
sustainable human development.
Violence hurts individuals and communities by endangering their livelihoods. It
discourages investments in the region that could bring new jobs. Whole villages
have been destroyed and the populace displaced because of conflict that could
have been amicably resolved. Diminished prospects for children unable to go to
school as a result of violence constrain the development of critically needed
human capital.
“The frequent recourse to violent protests, hostagetaking,
blockage of the water ways, illegal
bunkering and seizure of oil wells constitute
avoidable clogs to the wheels of economic
development and stability of not only the region
The disruption of oil production cuts into company bottom lines and government
revenues. Violence endangers livelihoods and discourages investment in industry
and education.
365
The frequent conflicts and the associated occupation by military and police,
coupled with the preponderance of weapons, provoke a sense of insecurity in the
region and even the whole country. A major consequence of the serious threats
to life and property has been the emergence of ethnic militia in the region and
even across Nigeria. These groups take the law into their own hands, practicing a
kind of jungle justice. Youths who could be productively engaged have become
agents of a thriving crisis generation, prevention and recovery ‘industry’, which
allows them to live on ‘standby’ money rather than earning a legitimate income.
Even the military, sent to quell crises like the one in Odi community, sometimes
becomes an agent of human degradation. One aspect of human degradation that
cut across the focus group discussions is rape. They expressed that the massive
rape of young women in Odi by the soldiers sent to ensure peace in the
community was a devastating example. Two years later, the community is now
filled with fatherless babies. On top of being a serious assault on human dignity,
the incident may have spread HIV.
THE BENEFICIARIES
The Niger Delta conflicts have greatly benefited some people. To start, the
underground economy of oil and gas that has flourished on the back of the
instability has become hugely profitable. Human Rights Watch (2003) describes
the bunkering or illegal theft of oil as “effectively Nigeria’s most private
business.” According to the 2002 report of a Special Security Committee on Oil
Producing Areas set up by the government, this leakage in oil revenues enriches
militant youths and their sponsors, and cartels made up of powerful politicians,
retired and serving military officers, and community business men. These groups
depend on lawlessness to thrive and have a stake in keeping conflict running all
the time.
Ethnic militias have emerged to take the law into their own hands, practicing a
kind of jungle justice.
The military, sent to quell crises, sometimes becomes an agent of human
degradation.
Law enforcement agents sent to check illegal bunkering become tempted
by the huge profits to be made from conniving with bunkerers.
The underground economy of oil and gas that has flourished on the back of the
instability has become hugely profitable.
366
Even law enforcement agents sent to check illegal bunkering become tempted by
the huge profits to be made from conniving with bunkerers. A House of
Representatives’ probe in November 2004 uncovered the illegal release by naval
officers of the MT African Pride, a ship that had been caught bunkering and
towed to a naval base. There were attempts to cover up the crime with forged
release documents, showing that the network of actors reaches high levels. The
detention of foreign ships and nationals indicates the international character of
this shady business. Breaking networks of powerful crooks with huge arsenals of
deadly weapons, often superior to those wielded by security agencies, calls for
very strong government determination.
State and local governments in the Niger Delta region have benefited from
conflict, even if indirectly. Until 2001, the agitation for resource control was
largely fought by militant youths, civil society organizations, ethnic groups and
community-based originations. Elected governors and prominent politicians kept
a safe distance because of uncertainty over the security implications of
involvement. In 2001, however, most governors discovered it made political
sense to lead the agitation in order to prevent the opposition from capitalizing on
it, as well as to potentially secure more revenue from the derivation funds. The
agreement at the National Political Reform Conference to raise the derivation
percentage to 17 per cent to pacify and avert the escalation of conflict became an
example of the latter.
Box 5.4: President Obasanjo’s Diagnosis of the Niger Delta Youth Crisis.
Compared to the enormous oil reserves of the region, however, how much of modern
development is evident in the area, and, how have we seized on the resourcefulness of the
people and the region’s other natural endowments to turn it into a region of great
sufficiency?
I hasten to admit, in truth, that as a result of insincerity, lack of foresight and commitment
of all stakeholders (government at all levels, the youth themselves, oil and gas companies,
traditional leaderships, etc.) in the past, not much of the desired transformation was evident.
Rather, what we had was the harvest of failed policies typified by absence of basic
infrastructures like roads, electricity, health services, capacity deficiencies arising from a
failing school system, army of unemployed and unemployable youths, environmental
degradation, etc. The cumulative effects of these are anger in the land and easy predisposition
of the population, especially the youths, to violence.
Source: Address by President Olusegun Obasanjo on 16 April 2004 at the Niger Delta
Youth Stakeholder Workshop held in Port Harcourt.
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EXTRA BURDENS: WOMEN AND YOUTH
The chaotic and desperate situation in the Niger Delta condemns youth to a
future without hope. No young person with healthy aspirations can fail to
appreciate that his life chances depend upon more massive investments in social
and economic infrastructure, and the more responsible harnessing of the natural
endowments of the environment. For their part, women bear the greater brunt of
poverty in the region. They receive the short end on all fronts, whether in terms
of jobs, water, health facilities, schools or environmental resources. For both
women and youth, deprivation has driven them into deep involvement in the
Niger Delta conflicts.
The youth crisis began with the Twelve Day Revolution led by Isaac Boro. On 23
February 1966, a group of young Ijaw men declared the Ijaw territory of the
Niger Delta ‘The Niger Delta People’s Republic’. Their aim was to liberate the
region and obtain access to the benefits from its petroleum resources. The group
blew up pipelines, particularly those linking Oloibiri and Ughelli to Port
Harcourt. Within 12 days, Boro and his associates were arrested, tried and
sentenced to death, but subsequently pardoned.
There was no widespread youth crisis in the region until the 1990s, when the
Ogoni and others revolted. Several localized conflicts flared, however,
characterized mainly by protests against oil companies. The most noteworthy
was in the Umuechem community in Rivers State. In December 1990, youths
demonstrated against Shell to express their displeasure over the environmental
impact of oil exploitation and the lack of development in the area. The police,
invited by Shell, quelled the demonstration. After a police officer was reported
missing, and youths were suspected of killing him during the demonstration, the
police sent a punitive mission to the community. There was extensive loss of
lives and property.
In 1990, the educated elite formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People. It presented its Ogoni Bill of Rights later in the year, clearly stating
demands for environmental and socio-political rights. Before long, a youth wing
sprang up and began organizing protests that were largely peaceful until the
killing of the ‘Ogoni Four’ by a mob of other youths on 21 May 1994. The
incident culminated in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis.
Since then, the youth crisis in Ogoniland has been pronounced, characterized
For most people outside the Niger Delta, the youth crisis is an unnecessary evil.
For most in the region, it is an inevitable, although sometimes evil, development.
368
largely by activities to prevent the oil companies from extracting oil without due
regard for the environment and the people.
The youth crisis escalated after the meeting of several Ijaw youths (later
constituting themselves as the Ijaw Youth Council) at Kaiama, Bayelsa State, on
11 December 1998. The Kaiama Declaration that resulted made far-reaching
demands for resource ownership and control. The youths demanded that
pending the resolution of the issues raised, all oil companies must leave the
Niger Delta before 30 December 1998. Rallies were organized in major Ijaw
towns, but in the end, the revolt was brutally checked.
Since the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the Kaiama Declaration, and declarations and bills
by other ethnic groups, such as the Urhobo and Itsekiri, militia groups have
emerged claiming to promote the interests of the ethnic groups. They are not
limited to the Niger Delta—in Yorubaland, there is the Oodua People’s Congress;
in Iboland, the Bakassi Boys; and in the north of Nigeria, the Arewa People’s
Congress. The Egbesu Boys of Africa is the best-known Niger Delta militia
group. It arose after the Kaiama Declaration to defend the environmental and
socio-political rights of the Ijaw.
While some militia groups are based on ethnicity and have a large number of
followers across different regions, others are more limited and centred on
individuals. The Niger Delta Volunteer Force is a typical example. It began in
2005 and is led by Asari Dokubo, an Ijaw from Rivers State. The objective of this
group is the economic and political emancipation of the Niger Delta, largely
through ownership and control of its petroleum resources.
There are varied opinions on the youth crisis. For most people outside the Niger
Delta, it is an unnecessary evil, while for most in the region, it is an inevitable,
although sometimes evil, development. The views of President Obasanjo (box
5.4) and former Governor D.P.C. Alamieyeseigha (box 5.5) reveal the
ambivalence about the conflicts. President Obasanjo reveals an understanding of
the causes of the violence. Former Governor Alamieyeseigha found nothing
wrong with youth protests.
The various protests by women in Warri against Chevron and the Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria are other dramatic examples (box
5.6).
369
Box 5.5: The Bayelsa Governor’s Viewpoint on the Youth Crisis
More than any other area in Nigeria, the Niger Delta, where oil and
gas exploration companies operate, has engaged the attention of
those interested in Nigeria and its survival. In recent times,
conference after conference, report after report and commission after
commission, have attempted to tender solutions to what has been
described as the Niger Delta crises. Yet the social conflicts are not
abating. The principal actors in these conflicts have been the youths,
leading to what has now come to be known as youth restiveness.
Strictly speaking, I have no problems with the phenomenon of youth
restiveness. Given the prevailing socio-economic condition in the
Niger Delta, the youths have no choice but to be restive. The only
problem is that sometimes, they have over-stepped their bounds and
adopted methods which have led to violence and lawlessness.
Otherwise, their goals have been noble, geared as they are toward
protecting their future from complete ruin.
Source: A lecture delivered by Governor D.P.C.
Alamieyeseigha on 7 April 2005 at the Lagos Country
Club.
370
CONCLUSION
The Niger Delta’s poverty in the midst of vast oil wealth has frustrated
expectations, fostered widespread indignation, entrenched deep-rooted and
destructive mistrust, and incited unprecedented restiveness. Ongoing tension
has changed the lives of individuals and communities, constricted the operations
of the oil companies, and revealed a deep crisis in governance.
Box 5.6: Women’s Protest in Warri against the Shell Petroleum Development
Company
In August, a large group of women barricaded the gate of SPDC’s office in Warri. Unlike other
similar demonstrations in the area, it did not concern requests for employment or community
development projects. Instead, it was rooted in a contractual dispute.
SPDC employs drivers through logistics contractors, who supply vehicles and drivers to transport
staff on company business. There was a contractual dispute between the drivers and their
employers—and the drivers decided to blockade the SPDC gates to press for a resolution.
Subsequently, staff at the gates noticed that the drivers had mobilized a large group of women to
participate in and support their demonstration.
The police were called as the demonstrators were refusing to allow passage through the gates. The
crowd was subsequently dispersed, but accounts vary as to the manner in which this was done. A
number of the women present at the demonstration claimed that the police used excessive force and
local newspapers reported that one woman had been shot and 15 other women were missing.
Alerted by these articles, a 20-women delegation from the National Council of Women’s Societies
decided to visit Warri to establish the truth of what took place. They found no evidence to support
the story about women being shot or missing. However, they did find that ten women had minor
bruises and cuts.
Eight women were treated at the SPDC clinic in Warri following the demonstration. All had minor
injuries and none required hospitalization. Four of the women treated said that they had been
beaten. In only one case was there any indication that this might have been so, but the medical
evidence was by no means conclusive.
Source: Shell Petroleum Development Company Annual Report 2002.
Conflict has become a booming business, with grave implications for future
development prospects in the delta region.
371
The result has been a general deterioration of economic, social and political
cohesion. Conflict has become a booming business, with grave implications for
future development prospects. Already entrenched are productivity losses, weak
entrepreneurial skills, the destruction of traditional institutions that formerly
served as reservoirs of social capital, the disregard of formal and informal
authorities, and insecure property rights. Ongoing dissent denies the region
lasting security, enduring peace and prosperity, and the realization of abundant
opportunities.
There is some agreement among those with a stake in the region that peace will
require a determined effort to develop the region. Long years of neglect and
conflict, however, have left a large part of the population with a siege mentality,
particularly the youth. Peace will depend therefore not only on the physical
development of the region, but also on the establishment of a new and positive
culture of social, economic and democratic rebirth. The following could be vital
steps forward:
A psychological reorientation should be encouraged. Cross-cultural
communication systems that could facilitate human coexistence,
harmony and mutual partnerships should be created.
Rehabilitation efforts should reach out to youths who have become
largely unemployable or unwilling to develop themselves.
A realistic, long-term development agenda needs to genuinely
promote sustainable development in the Niger Delta region. It must
include poverty reduction through the widening of people’s choices,
capacity development for employment opportunities, gender
empowerment and the effective management of the environment.
A proactive evaluation mechanism could allow all stakeholders—
political authorities, civil society, community members and the oil
company operators—to constantly gauge operational and
development levels vis-à-vis an agreement on expectations for human
development. This would also serve as an antidote to conflict.
Improvement in the quality of governance should focus on enhanced
service delivery, checks on corruption and engagement of people in
shaping policies for their well-being.
There should be a review of compensation to communities and the
faithful implementation of memorandums of understanding signed
between communities and oil companies.
The derivation issue in national revenue allocation needs to be
resolved.
An Oil Trust Fund for the derivation fund should be established, and
an equity stake assigned to oil communities.
Human security should be enhanced across the region.
372
CHAPTER SIX
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS
The previous chapters highlighted several development challenges facing the
people of the Niger Delta. Underlying all of them is the fundamental dilemma of
pervasive poverty, accentuated by the erosion of livelihoods. Despite abundant
oil resources, formal employment opportunities lag behind the demands of a
growing population; informal activities remain rudimentary and insufficient.
These gaps are wide enough to undermine any future development efforts.
To catalyse development, growth must be pro-poor. It must promote
employment and guarantee sustainable livelihoods that expand people’s
capacities to generate and maintain their means of living, and enhance their wellbeing
and that of future generations. The viability and effectiveness of
development strategies to improve livelihoods depends upon the availability of
assets, services and opportunities, which can be either enhanced or adversely
undercut by social structures, ecological factors or institutional processes.
To be sustainable, a livelihood system must be economically efficient, firmly grounded in
social equity, ecologically sound, able to preserve or restore resources for use by future
generations, resilient, and capable of coping with shocks and stresses. It should allow
individuals to meaningfully and productively live their lives while contributing to
society. The notion of sustainable livelihoods, which UNDP has adopted as one of the
requirements of sustainable human development, has acquired popular use in the
“The development of a person is about how he can
meaningfully and productively live his life while
contributing to his society.”
—President Olusegun Obasanjo (2003)
A sustainable livelihood system is efficient, equitable, ecological and able to cope
with shocks and stresses.
373
development community because sustainable livelihoods are vital for alleviating poverty
and vulnerability to poverty. They must be supported by economic, social and political
policies, and their core assets—human capital, social capital, natural capital and
infrastructure (see box 6.1)—must be allowed to complement and be re-enforce each
other.
Any framework to encourage the development of sustainable livelihoods should
encompass:
• Investment in human, environmental and physical capital;
• Gender equality and women’s empowerment;
• Participatory development emphasizing the indigenous economy with
particular emphasis on the poor;
• Reassessing resource allocations, processes and institutional mechanisms; and
• Promoting peace, social harmony and political stability.
Sustainable livelihoods hinge on job creation and high-value products that yield
income for poor and vulnerable groups. Best practices across the globe have
shown that vital factors include a healthy environment, opportunities to acquire skills,
the diversification of the economy, resource management and control, and financial
empowerment, such as through credit for micro- and small enterprises.
For the Niger Delta region to become economically prosperous, socially stable,
ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful, its people need sustainable livelihoods.
Box 6.1: Sustainable Livelihoods
Sustainable livelihoods must be accompanied by industrial diversification and
economic growth, and grounded in several capital assets fundamental to the
development of communities. These include:
• Natural capital: Natural resource stocks from which resource flows
useful for livelihoods are derived (land, water, wildlife, biodiversity,
environmental resources, etc.)
• Human capital: The skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health
important to pursuing different livelihood strategies.
• Physical capital: The basic infrastructures (transport, shelter, water,
energy and communities), and the production equipment and means that
enable people to pursue livelihoods
• Social capital: The social resources (networks, membership groups,
relationships of trust, access to wider institutions of society) upon which
people draw in pursuit of livelihoods
• Financial capital: The financial resources (whether savings, supplies of
credit or regular remittances or pensions) that supply people with different
livelihood options.
Sustainable livelihoods hinge on job creation and high-value products that yield
income for poor and vulnerable groups.
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LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AND ACTIVITIES
Prior to the discovery of oil in large commercial quantities in the Niger Delta in the
1950s, much attention was paid to rural transformation. Substantial resources poured
into agricultural facilities, basic education and primary health care. This was the period
when agricultural settlement was established in many parts of Nigeria. The Western
Region served as the benchmark for free education, agricultural settlements, industrial
development and the promotion of small-scale industries, among other things. Regional
advantages were given serious consideration, so groundnuts were cultivated in the north,
cocoa in the west, and rubber and palm oil in the east.
The discovery of large stores of petroleum shifted attention to urban industrialization and
the extraction of these resources. People were pulled from rural areas to urban centres,
which widened gaps between the two. Agricultural productivity plummeted, while urban
areas began suffering from strains on infrastructure, unemployment and a proliferation
of social vices. The Government’s inability to promote balanced development during the
oil boom has had serious repercussions for livelihoods.
Sustainable livelihoods require people to have access to economic activities,
especially employment. The link between employment and sustainable
livelihoods derives from the second aspect of human development, which
emphasizes the use people are able to make of their acquired capabilities for
employment, productive activities or leisure. In the Niger Delta, available data
show that formal and informal sector activities are generally at a low level,
meaning that access to employment and other economic activities is limited
(table 6.1).
The lack of work correlates to the highest incidences of youth restiveness
and conflicts.
The discovery of petroleum shifted attention from agricultural and rural
transformation to urban industrialization and the extraction of petroleum
resources with serious repercussions for livelihoods.
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TABLE 6.1: Unemployment and Underemployment Rate in the Niger Delta,
2000
UNEMPLOYMENT % UNDEREMPLOYMENT % COUNTRY/
STATE Composite Urban Rural Composite Urban Rural
Nigeria 4.7 7.2 3.7 12.9 5.8 16.0
Abia 2.9 8.7 2.4 7.7 NA 8.4
Akwa Ibom 18.2 12.6 18.3 18.5 9.2 18.8
Bayelsa 6.5 13.0 5.5 6.0 NA 6.9
Cross River NA NA NA 16.6 7.3 18.3
Delta 10.3 16.2 8.8 13.0 23.6 10.2
Edo 1.5 7.3 NA 4.6 1.8 5.3
Imo 6.8 2.7 7.2 15.5 21.1 25.0
Ondo 4.1 4.7 3.6 12.9 9.3 15.5
Rivers 19.1 18.2 19.3 14.1 2.7 15.9
Note: An unemployed person did not do any work during the period of survey; an
underemployed person worked less than normal hours for involuntary reasons.
Source: Labour force sample survey December, 2000 FOS/ILO, Federal office of Statistics Statistical News No. 322,
June 2001
Except for Abia, Edo and Ondo states, the unemployment rate is much higher in
the region than the national average.8 Similarly, the underemployment rate is
generally higher, except in Edo, Bayelsa and Abia states. A particularly
disturbing dimension is the incidence of unemployment per household. For
example, 5.8 per cent of households have one to two dependents without a job,
15.3 per cent have three to four dependents without a job, and 72.5 per cent have
five or more dependents without a job (DPC, 2001). A high level of
unemployment increases the dependency ratio, which worsens poverty.
Data from the NDDC (2005) portray the same pattern of findings on
unemployment. The lack of work, as a good direct measurement of
8 The figures for Edo State in the table cannot be realistically interpreted as a reflection of the rate
of unemployment. For example, a survey from the Federal Office of Statistics that defined the
labour force age bracket as 15-70 years (rather than the 15-64 years used by the International
Labour Organization) reports a composite unemployment rate of 14.3 per cent, an urban rate of
24 per cent and a rural of 11.8 per cent for Edo State. For Cross River State, the figures are 16.6 per
cent, 7.3 per cent and 18.3 per cent, respectively.
Unemployment is very pronounced in states with the highest incidence of youth
restiveness and conflicts.
376
unemployment, has been most markedly pronounced in Delta, Rivers and
Bayelsa states, which also have the highest incidence of youth restiveness and
conflicts. The percentage of unemployed household members on the basis of lack
of available work in those states by far surpasses the average for the region,
although equally high percentage points in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River and
Imo underscore that unemployment is high across the region. This obviously has
implications for income inequality and poverty.
The positive correlation between states earning high revenues with high rates of
people with no available work is striking. It indicates that in terms of providing
employment, the revenue generated is not having much impact upon the local
population.
Evidence from the NDDC (2005) findings reveals that an appreciable portion of
people is disabled (ranging from 7.1 per cent in Cross River State to 2.6 in Edo
State), while about 1.1 per cent of people suffer from some form of infirmity.
These vulnerable groups must be incorporated into any meaningful human
development agenda in the region.
The Informal Sector
The most important issue to consider when attempting to bolster sustainable
livelihoods is how to enhance the informal sector’s potential to absorb those
with